Domination and Decomposition in Multiobjective Programming by Engau, Alexander
Clemson University
TigerPrints
All Dissertations Dissertations
5-2007
Domination and Decomposition in Multiobjective
Programming
Alexander Engau
Clemson University, aengau@clemson.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_dissertations
Part of the Operations Research, Systems Engineering and Industrial Engineering Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Dissertations at TigerPrints. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Dissertations by
an authorized administrator of TigerPrints. For more information, please contact kokeefe@clemson.edu.
Recommended Citation
Engau, Alexander, "Domination and Decomposition in Multiobjective Programming" (2007). All Dissertations. 69.
https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_dissertations/69
DOMINATION AND DECOMPOSITION IN
MULTIOBJECTIVE PROGRAMMING
A Dissertation
Presented to
the Graduate School of
Clemson University
In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
Mathematical Sciences
by
Alexander Engau
May 2007
Accepted by:
Dr. Margaret M. Wiecek, Committee Chair
Dr. Georges M. Fadel
Dr. Hyesuk K. Lee
Dr. Matthew J. Saltzman
ABSTRACT
During the last few decades, multiobjective programming has received much
attention for both its numerous theoretical advances as well as its continued success
in modeling and solving real-life decision problems in business and engineering. In
extension of the traditionally adopted concept of Pareto optimality, this research in-
vestigates the more general notion of domination and establishes various theoretical
results that lead to new optimization methods and support decision making.
After a preparatory discussion of some preliminaries and a review of the
relevant literature, several new findings are presented that characterize the non-
dominated set of a general vector optimization problem for which the underlying
domination structure is defined in terms of different cones. Using concepts from lin-
ear algebra and convex analysis, a well known result relating nondominated points
for polyhedral cones with Pareto solutions is generalized to nonpolyhedral cones that
are induced by positively homogeneous functions, and to translated polyhedral cones
that are used to describe a notion of approximate nondominance. Pareto-oriented
scalarization methods are modified and several new solution approaches are pro-
posed for these two classes of cones. In addition, necessary and sufficient conditions
for nondominance with respect to a variable domination cone are developed, and
some more specific results for the case of Bishop-Phelps cones are derived.
Based on the above findings, a decomposition framework is proposed for the
solution of multi-scenario and large-scale multiobjective programs and analyzed in
terms of the efficiency relationships between the original and the decomposed sub-
problems. Using the concept of approximate nondominance, an interactive decision
making procedure is formulated to coordinate tradeoffs between these subproblems
and applied to selected problems from portfolio optimization and engineering design.
Some introductory remarks and concluding comments together with ideas
and research directions for possible future work complete this dissertation.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Whether a doctoral graduate chooses his first professional position, a univer-
sity professor a research emphasis for her next grant proposal, or a business manager
an investment strategy for last year’s financial returns, making the final decision in
each case requires a thorough consideration of multiple and, in general, conflicting
criteria. Does the graduate strive for new challenges and a career in industry or
enjoy the further commitment to research and education in academia? Does the
professor plan to spend more time to prove a promising recent conjecture or con-
tinue her engagement in more profitable interdisciplinary collaboration? And does
the manager gear his actions towards the short-term satisfaction of stakeholders or
choose to invest the capital into more sustainable reserves? Without a doubt, for
each of these three situations one can easily think of many additional alternatives
and objectives, and clearly, based upon personal priorities and preferences, different
people would make different decisions.
In fact, every day during both our private and professional activities, we
make choices that very often not only affect our own lives but also the lives of our
family, friends, customers, co-workers, and essentially anybody else with whom we
interact or, as a result of our decision, do not interact. Furthermore, the presence of
several objectives and potential uncertainties usually does not allow us to identify a
universal best alternative so that we need to weigh or trade off between the different
consequences to reach a consensus and arrive at a best compromise decision. This
step can be facilitated in two ways. First, we should immediately exclude all those
alternatives from further consideration that are decidedly worse than, or dominated
by another alternative. Second, to reduce the challenges arising with a large number
of objectives we may divide, or decompose the different objectives into smaller groups
to iteratively select potential candidates that are brought into agreement in the form
of a preferred decision for our initial problem. These two ideas of domination and
decomposition form the heart of this dissertation.
The discipline of multiple criteria decision making deals with the analysis of
decision problems like the ones described above and provides decision makers with
theoretical and methodological support on how to structure a problem, describe
available alternatives, identify essential criteria, deal with uncertainties, reflect on
preferences, and many other issues related to the overall decision making process.
Combining aspects from a great variety of different fields such as economics, so-
ciology, or psychology, the number of possible applications is long and includes a
nearly endless number of problems from business and management, financial, indus-
trial and economic planning, location, transportation, scheduling, and all areas of
engineering. Because a decision is usually associated with some qualitative action,
it is not surprising at all that mathematics and especially operations research play a
substantial role as well in deriving underlying mathematical models that formulate
both the decisions and objectives in a quantitative manner to enable a subsequent
numerical comparison between the different resulting consequences.
In this text, we study the class of mathematical models for which each of a
finite number of objectives is described in terms of a real-valued mathematical func-
tion, thereby giving rise to a multiobjective programming problem. We refer to the
underlying domain as the decision set, and based on its properties or characteristics
of the objective functions we usually distinguish between discrete and continuous,
or linear and nonlinear programs, respectively. For the most part of our discus-
sion, we consider the continuous nonlinear case so that both the decision set and
its image under the multiple objective functions are continuous sets which usually
consist of an infinite number of points. We call this image the set of outcomes, which
consequently describe the consequences of each decision, and under the assumption
of objective minimization we are interested in identifying those decisions which are
mapped to the minimal elements in the outcome set.
For mathematical programs with a single objective, this notion of minimality
is well defined based on the order of real numbers, and in principle we can use any
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applicable optimization technique from linear, nonlinear, or integer programming to
find solutions for the corresponding optimization problems. For multiple objectives,
however, each outcome is a vector for which the individual components correspond
to the several objective functions so that we need to give a more precise statement
of what we mean with vector minimality. Based on the assumption of an underlying
partial order that can be described by certain classes of cones, the concept that is
discussed in this text is the concept of domination which, similar to its informal
introduction above, is used to characterize the preference relationships between the
different alternatives and outcomes.
In general, however, the partial order, or equivalently, the implied preference
or domination structure does not provide the means to completely capture all prefer-
ences and identify a unique outcome that dominates every other outcome, but results
in a set of efficient decisions whose outcomes are merely nondominated, or not dom-
inated by any other outcome. In extension of the existing theory of multiobjective
or vector optimization, which deals with the characterization of these efficient and
nondominated sets and the development of applicable methods for their generation
or approximation, in this dissertation we study various of these previous results and
methods and investigate possible generalizations for three new classes of domina-
tion cones. Furthermore, we analyze the effects of objective decompositions and use
our results to formulate several interactive decision making procedures to eventually
identify a preferred decision as the unique solution for a multiobjective decision or
programming problem. These procedures are illustrated on selected applications
from financial optimization and engineering design.
For further guidance, we now give a brief outline of the general organization
of this dissertation. In preparation for the original discussion in this text, we begin in
Chapter 2 with a review of some relevant mathematical concepts and literature and
conclude with a concise statement of our specific research objectives. In particular,
in Section 2.1 we introduce some elementary notation and properties of functions,
define the fundamental notions of cones and binary relations, and highlight the con-
nection between – and relevance of – the former and latter in terms of partial orders.
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Of central importance in this chapter is Section 2.2 in which we define a domination
structure and the nondominated set in order to subsequently formulate the multi-
objective program with the corresponding concept of efficiency. We also highlight
the two concepts of Pareto and epsilon-efficiency, which are prominently discussed
in later chapters, and present several typical solution methods. For Section 2.3, we
change our style and more informally address some of the previous aspects in the
more practical context of multiple criteria decision making with particular focus on
the existing literature that describes preferences based on domination structures and
discusses interactive decision making or decomposition. Based on that discussion,
Section 2.4 contains the research statement of this dissertation.
In Chapter 3, we study the nondominated set of a multiobjective program for
three different domination structures that generalize the previous notions of dom-
ination cones, extend several existing results from the literature and derive some
new characterizations of – and methods for – the specific domination concepts de-
fined. In particular, in Section 3.1 we show how every cone can be induced by a
positively homogeneous function, use this new representation to extend some known
results from the polyhedral to the nonpolyhedral case, and modify several solution
methods from Pareto to more general domination cones. In Section 3.2, we for-
mulate the new preference assumption of ideal-symmetry for which the domination
structure cannot anymore be described by only one cone but is defined by a collec-
tion of domination cones. We illustrate some benefits of the resulting variable-cone
model, address the problem of finding the corresponding nondominated set, and
derive some optimality conditions for its characterization. Highlighting the concept
of epsilon-nondominance, we define translated cones for a possible characterization
of approximate nondominance in Section 3.3 and derive some specific representa-
tion results for the case of translated polyhedral cones. To provide the means of
computing epsilon-efficient decisions, we extend several optimality conditions from
traditional to translated domination cones and develop some new problem formu-
lations that also allow the volitional generation of a merely approximate solution.
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Several examples are given throughout the discussion, and further research that is
stimulated by these results is proposed in Section 3.4.
For multiobjective programs and the concept of Pareto efficiency, in Chap-
ter 4 we examine the effects of objective decompositions and formulate three inter-
active coordination methods to facilitate the selection of a preferred decision in the
context of multiple criteria decision making. The efficiency relationships between the
original and the decomposed subproblems are analyzed in Section 4.1 and provide
the theoretical foundation for the procedures that we explain in detail in Section 4.2.
Being aware that for practical or discrete problems actual optimization is not always
possible, two optimization-based procedures that make use of nonhierarchical and
hierarchical decision making schemes are complemented by an additional approach
that can also be applied to a mere selection problem. In Section 4.3, we select one
of the former procedures for an initial demonstration on a mathematical program-
ming example before summarizing our results and addressing remaining research
directions in Section 4.4.
Choosing four applications from financial and engineering optimization, we
highlight the practical use of each of the three procedures in Chapter 5. The
optimization-based nonhierarchical coordination method is illustrated in Section 5.1
on an investment selection problem from portfolio optimization for which the final
investment strategy needs to compromise between different subproblems that are
defined based on different stock market scenarios. For the hierarchical procedure,
in Section 5.2 we describe an application of truss topology design in structural opti-
mization and, similar to the previous case, show how we can identify a truss design
that performs well for multiple loading conditions. In Section 5.3, we present a
modification of this approach to solve a discrete selection problem that requires
selecting a single layout from among a finite set of possible layout configurations
for a medium-sized truck vehicle. Finally, using another discrete data set provided
courtesy of the Ford Motor Company, in Section 5.4 we also comment on several
implications of the optimization-free procedure.
Some concluding remarks and our final thoughts are offered in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH STATEMENT
2.1 Basic Concepts and Notation
We first introduce some basic notation, clarify our general conventions, and
provide a number of concepts that are used extensively throughout the complete
following text. Starting in Section 2.1.1 with the elementary definition of a function
and the associated notions of injectivity, additivity, linearity, and convexity, the
definitions and propositions regarding convex sets and cones in Sections 2.1.2 and
binary relations and partial orders in Section 2.1.3 are taken in large part from
the fundamental works by Rockafellar (1970, 1997) on general convex analysis and
Sawaragi et al. (1985) and Yu (1985) on some more specific results underlying the
theory of multiobjective and vector optimization.
2.1.1 Real and Vector-Valued Functions
We denote the set of real numbers by R and, for any positive integers l, m
and n, let
Rn = {x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn)T : xi ∈ R for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n} (2.1a)
be the set of n-dimensional real vectors and
Rl×m = {A = (a1, a2, . . . , al)T : ai ∈ Rm for all i = 1, 2, . . . , l} (2.1b)
be the set of real l ×m matrices.
Definition 2.1.1 (Function, image and domain). Let X ⊆ Rn be a nonempty set.
A function
f : X → Rm (2.2)
is a mapping that assigns to each element x in the domain X a unique element
y ∈ Rm, denoted by y = f(x). The image of X under f is denoted by
Y := f(X) := {y ∈ Rm : y = f(x) for some x ∈ X} (2.3)
If m = 1, then f is a real-valued function, otherwise it is vector valued and
can also be written in terms of its component functions f = (f1, . . . , fm), where each
fi : X → R is a real-valued function. If f = (f1, . . . , fm) is vector valued, then we
write
f(x1) ≦ f(x2) if and only if fi(x
1) ≤ fi(x2) for all i = 1, . . . ,m (2.4a)
f(x1) ≤ f(x2) if and only if fi(x1) ≦ fi(x2) and f(x1) 6= f(x2) (2.4b)
f(x1) < f(x2) if and only if fi(x
1) < fi(x
2) for all i = 1, . . . ,m (2.4c)
and use ≧, ≥ and > accordingly.
In general, two different elements x1 6= x2 in the domain X of f can be
mapped to the same element y = f(x1) = f(x2) ∈ Rm.
Definition 2.1.2 (Injective function). A function f : X → Rm is said to be injective
if
f(x1) = f(x2) if and only if x1 = x2 for all x1, x2 ∈ X (2.5)
Remark 2.1.3 (Sufficient condition for injectivity). For a vector-valued function
f = (f1, . . . , fm), injectivity of some fi is sufficient but, in general, not necessary for
injectivity of f .
Definition 2.1.4 (Subadditive, superadditive, and additive function). A function
f : X → Rm is said to be subadditive if
f(x1 + x2) ≦ f(x1) + f(x2) for all x1, x2 ∈ X (2.6)
Furthermore, f is said to be superadditive if the inequality holds in reverse, and
additive if it is both subadditive and superadditive.
In particular, if f is subadditive, then −f is superadditive and vice versa.
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Definition 2.1.5 (Positively homogeneous, sublinear, superlinear, and linear func-
tion). A function f : X → Rm is said to be positively homogeneous if
f(λx) = λf(x) for all x ∈ X and λ > 0 (2.7)
In this case, f is said to be sublinear if it is also subadditive, superlinear if it is
superadditive, and linear if it is additive.
As before, if f is sublinear, then −f is superlinear and vice versa. In partic-
ular, a positively homogeneous function is linear if and only if it is both sublinear
and superlinear.
Definition 2.1.6 (Convex and concave function). A function f : X → Rm is said
to be convex if
f
(
λx1 + (1− λ)x2) ≦ λf(x1) + (1− λ)f(x2) for all x1, x2 ∈ X and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1
(2.8)
Furthermore, f is said to be concave if the inequality holds in reverse.
Again, if f is convex, then −f is concave and vice versa.
Proposition 2.1.7 (Rockafellar and Wets (1998)). A positively homogeneous func-
tion f : X → Rm is convex if and only if it is sublinear, and concave if and only if
it is superlinear. In the former case
f
(
k∑
i=1
λix
i
)
≦
k∑
i=1
λif(x
i) for all xi ∈ X and λi > 0, i = 1, . . . , k (2.9)
and in the latter the above holds with the inequality in reverse.
In particular, a positively homogeneous function is linear if and only if it is
both convex and concave.
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Throughout this whole text, we consider Rn and Rm as Euclidean vector
spaces equipped with the standard Euclidean inner product, norm, and metric
〈x1, x2〉 :=
n∑
i=1
x1ix
2
i , ‖x‖ :=
√
〈x, x〉, and d(x1, x2) = ‖x1 − x2‖ (2.10a)
〈y1, y2〉 :=
m∑
i=1
y1i y
2
i , ‖y‖ :=
√
〈y, y〉, and d(y1, y2) = ‖y1 − y2‖ (2.10b)
unless specified otherwise. In particular, this provides us with a topology of open
sets with the standard notions of continuity and differentiability. If the function
f = (f1, . . . , fm) is differentiable at x ∈ X, then we write
∇fi(x) =
(
∂fi(x)
∂x1
, . . . ,
∂fi(x)
∂xn
)T
∈ Rn (2.11a)
for the gradient of fi for all i = 1, . . . ,m and denote the Jacobian of f at x by
∇f(x) = (∇f1(x), . . . ,∇fm(x))T ∈ Rm×n (2.11b)
As we will make only very rare explicit use of these concepts, we do not repeat
the precise definitions which can be found in any beginning textbook on advanced
calculus (Fulks, 1961) or real analysis (Royden, 1963; Rudin, 1976). Furthermore,
although much of the material presented in this text is similarly valid for any other
real linear or topological space, we choose the conceptual simplification of Euclidean
spaces to avoid any additional notational burden and, therefore, for the benefit of a
more coherent presentation.
2.1.2 Elements from Convex Analysis
Let Rm be a Euclidean space. We denote the interior, the boundary, and
the closure of a set Y ⊂ Rm by intY , bdY , and clY , respectively. For any two sets
Y and Z in Rm, we let
Y + Z := {y + z : y ∈ Y and z ∈ Z} (2.12a)
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be the Minkowski sum, and for z ∈ Rm a single element, we also write Y + z instead
of Y + {z}. Moreover, for λ ∈ R a real number, we denote
λY := {λy : y ∈ Y } and − Y := {−y : y ∈ Y } (2.12b)
Definition 2.1.8 (Convex set). A set Y ⊂ Rm is said to be convex if
λY + (1− λ)Y ⊆ Y for all 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 (2.13)
Definition 2.1.9 (Cone). A set C ⊂ Rm is called a cone if
λC ⊆ C for all λ > 0 (2.14)
A nonempty cone is also said to be proper, and in this text we assume that
every cone is a proper cone.
Remark 2.1.10 (Cone and origin). Following the classic definition in Rockafellar
(1970) but different from Rockafellar and Wets (1998) and other authors, according
to Definition 2.1.9 a cone may contain the origin or not. Compare Remark 2.1.20.
Proposition 2.1.11 (Convex cone). A cone C ⊂ Rm is convex if and only if
C + C ⊆ C (2.15)
Definition 2.1.12 (Pointed cone). A cone C ⊂ Rm is said to be pointed if
k∑
i=1
ci = 0 if and only if ci = 0 for all ci ∈ C, i = 1, . . . , k (2.16)
Proposition 2.1.13 (Pointed convex cone). A convex cone C ⊂ Rm is pointed if
and only if
C ∩ −C ⊆ {0} (2.17)
Definition 2.1.14 (Cone convexity, closedness, boundedness, and compactness).
Let C ⊂ Rm be a cone. A set Y ⊂ Rm is said to be
(i) C-convex if Y + C is convex,
(ii) C-closed if Y + clC is closed,
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(iii) C-bounded if Y ⊂ z + clC for some z ∈ Rm, and
(iv) C-compact if (y − clC) ∩ Y is compact for all y ∈ Y .
Proposition 2.1.15 (Cone convexity). A set Y ⊂ Rm is convex if and only if it
is {0}-convex. Moreover, if Y is convex, then Y is C-convex for any convex cone
C ⊂ Rm.
While the notion of C-boundedness in Definition 2.1.14 (iii) is given in
Tanino and Sawaragi (1980), Sawaragi et al. (1985) provide an alternative char-
acterization for convex sets based on the concept of a recession cone.
Definition 2.1.16 (Recession cone). Let Y ⊂ Rm be a convex set. The set
recY := {z ∈ Rm : y + λz ∈ Y for all y ∈ Y and λ > 0} (2.18)
is called the recession cone of Y .
The recession cone is a convex cone and contains the origin.
Proposition 2.1.17 (Cone boundedness). A nonempty closed convex set Y ⊂ Rm
is bounded if and only if recY = {0}. Moreover, if Y is C-bounded, then
recY ∩ (− clC) = {0} (2.19)
The latter is used as definition for C-boundedness in Sawaragi et al. (1985)
and equivalent with Definition 2.1.14 (iii) if C is pointed, closed, and convex.
Proposition 2.1.18 (Cone closedness, boundedness, and compactness). Let C ⊂
Rm be a pointed closed convex cone. A convex set Y ⊂ Rm is C-compact if and only
if it is C-closed and C-bounded, or equivalently, if recY ∩ (−C) = {0}.
To prevent any confusion, we emphasize that the next definition is correct.
Definition 2.1.19 (Dual and strict dual cone). Let C ⊂ Rm be a set (!). The sets
C∗ := {d ∈ Rm : 〈c, d〉 ≥ 0 for all c ∈ C} (2.20a)
C∗s := {d ∈ Rm : 〈c, d〉 > 0 for all c ∈ C \ {0}} (2.20b)
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are called the dual and strict dual cone of C, respectively. If C∗ = C, then C is said
to be self-dual.
Remark 2.1.20 (Convexity of dual cones). Dual and strict dual cones are closed
convex and convex cones, respectively. In particular, a strict dual cone does not
contain the origin, and C∗s ∪ {0} is a closed convex cone. Compare Remark 2.1.10.
Proposition 2.1.21 (Dual and strict dual cone). Let C, C1, C2 ⊂ Rm be sets (!).
If C1 ⊆ C2, then C∗2 ⊆ C∗1 . Moreover
(intC)∗ = C∗ = (clC)∗ and (intC)∗s = C
∗ \ {0} (2.21)
Definition 2.1.22 (Hyperplane and halfspace). A setH ⊂ Rm is called a hyperplane
if there exist a ∈ Rm \ {0} and b ∈ R so that
H = H(a, b) := {y ∈ Rm : 〈a, y〉 = b} (2.22)
In this case, the vector a is called a normal vector to H. Moreover, the sets
H(a, b)+ := {y ∈ Rm : 〈a, y〉 ≥ b} (2.22a)
H(a, b)− := {y ∈ Rm : 〈a, y〉 ≤ b} (2.22b)
are called the positive and negative halfspaces associated with H, respectively.
Definition 2.1.23 (Supporting hyperplane). Let Y ⊂ Rm be a set. A hyperplane
H ⊂ Rm is called a supporting hyperplane to Y if
Y ⊆ H+ (or Y ⊆ H−) and clY ∩H 6= ∅ (2.23)
Theorem 2.1.24 (Supporting hyperplane theorem). Let Y ⊂ Rm be a convex set
and z ∈ bdY be a boundary point of Y . Then there exists a supporting hyperplane
H ⊂ Rm to Y with normal vector a ∈ Rm \ {0} so that
〈a, y − z〉 ≥ 0 for all y ∈ Y (2.24)
Similar to halfspaces in Definition 2.1.22, we define polyhedral sets and cones.
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Definition 2.1.25 (Polyhedral set and cone). A set D ⊂ Rm is called a polyhedral
set if there exist a matrix A ∈ Rl×m \ {0} and a vector b ∈ Rl so that
D = D(A, b) := {y ∈ Rm : Ay ≧ b} (2.25a)
If b = 0, then
C = C(A) := D(A, 0) = {y ∈ Rm : Ay ≧ 0} (2.25b)
is called a polyhedral cone.
Proposition 2.1.26 (Polyhedral set). A set D ⊂ Rm is a polyhedral set if and only
if it is the intersection of a finite number of halfspaces
D = {y ∈ Rm : 〈ai, y〉 ≥ bi, i = 1, 2, . . . , l} (2.26)
In particular, if A = (a1, a2, . . . , al)T ∈ Rl×m and b = (b1, b2, . . . , bl)T ∈ Rl, then
D = D(A, b).
Definition 2.1.27 (Linear independence and matrix rank). A set of real vectors
{a1, a2, . . . , al} ⊂ Rm is said to be linearly independent if
l∑
i=1
λia
i = 0 if and only if λi = 0 for all i = 1, . . . , l (2.27)
The rank of a matrix A = (a1, a2, . . . , al)T ∈ Rl×m is the maximal number of linearly
independent vectors from {a1, a2, . . . , al} and denoted by rankA.
Proposition 2.1.28 (Pointed convex polyhedral cone). A polyhedral set D =
D(A, b) ⊂ Rm is always convex. Moreover, a polyhedral cone C = C(A) ⊂ Rm
is pointed if and only if rankA = m.
Proposition 2.1.29 (Farkas’ lemma). Let C = C(A) ⊂ Rm be a polyhedral cone
with matrix A ∈ Rl×m. Then
C∗ = {d ∈ Rm : d = λTAT , λ ∈ Rm, λ ≥ 0} (2.28)
The next result states the relationship between matrices and linear functions.
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Proposition 2.1.30 (Linear function and matrix). A function f : Rm → Rl is
linear if and only if there exists a matrix A ∈ Rl×m such that f(x) = Ax, and f is
injective if and only if rankA = m.
2.1.3 Binary Relations and Partial Orders
We first define the notion of a binary relation on an arbitrary set Z and
collect some of the most important properties.
Definition 2.1.31 (Binary relation). A binary relation R on a set Z is a subset of
the Cartesian product Z × Z. It is said to be
(i) reflexive if (z, z) ∈ R for all z ∈ Z,
(ii) irreflexive if (z, z) /∈ R for all z ∈ Z,
(iii) symmetric if (z1, z2) ∈ R ⇔ (z2, z1) ∈ R for all z1, z2 ∈ Z,
(iv) asymmetric if (z1, z2) ∈ R ⇒ (z2, z1) /∈ R for all z1, z2 ∈ Z,
(v) antisymmetric if (z1, z2) and (z2, z1) ∈ R ⇒ z1 = z2 for all z1, z2 ∈ Z,
(vi) transitive if (z1, z2) and (z2, z3) ∈ R ⇒ (z1, z3) ∈ R for all z1, z2, z3 ∈ Z,
(vii) negatively transitive if (z1, z2) and (z2, z3) /∈ R ⇒ (z1, z3) /∈ R for all
z1, z2, z3 ∈ Z,
(viii) weakly connected if (z1, z2) /∈ R and z1 6= z2 ⇒ (z2, z1) ∈ R for all z1, z2 ∈
Z, and
(ix) (strongly) connected or complete if (z1, z2) /∈ R ⇒ (z2, z1) ∈ R for all
z1, z2 ∈ Z.
Different from the above definitions which are taken from Sawaragi et al.
(1985), Yu (1985) calls a binary relation irreflexive or asymmetric if it is not reflexive
or not symmetric, respectively, and nontransitive if it is not transitive.
Proposition 2.1.32 (Relationships between properties of binary relations). Let
R ⊆ Z × Z be a binary relation on a set Z.
(i) If R is asymmetric, then it is irreflexive.
(ii) If R is transitive and irreflexive, then it is asymmetric.
(iii) If R is negatively transitive and asymmetric, then it is transitive.
(iv) If R is transitive, irreflexive, and weakly connected, then it is negatively
transitive.
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Definition 2.1.33 (Equivalence relation and orders). A binary relation R ⊆ Z×Z
on a set Z is called
(i) an equivalence relation if it is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive,
(ii) a preorder if it is reflexive and transitive,
(iii) a total preorder if it is reflexive, transitive, and connected,
(iv) a partial order if it is reflexive, transitive, and antisymmetric,
(v) a strict partial order if it is irreflexive and transitive,
(vi) a weak order if it is asymmetric and negatively transitive, and
(vii) a total order if it is asymmetric, transitive, and weakly connected.
Proposition 2.1.34 (Strict partial, weak, and total order). Let R ⊆ Z × Z be a
binary relation on a set Z. If R is a total order, then it is is a weak order, and if
it is a weak order, then it is a strict partial order.
If R is a binary relation and (z1, z2) ∈ R, then we also write z1Rz2. In
particular, if R is a partial order on Z, then (Z,R) is called a partially ordered
set, and we write z1  z2 and z1  z2 instead of (z1, z2) ∈ R and (z1, z2) /∈ R,
respectively. Furthermore, in this case
z1 ≺ z2 :⇐⇒ z1  z2 and z2  z1 (2.29a)
z1 ∼ z2 :⇐⇒ z1  z2 and z2  z1 (2.29b)
are a strict partial order and an equivalence relation, respectively, and we call ≺ the
strict partial order associated with  on (Y,R).
Remark 2.1.35 (Componentwise order). The binary relations ≧ and ≦ in Equa-
tion 2.4 are preorders on Rm, and ≥ and ≤ are the associated strict partial orders,
respectively. Furthermore, > and < are also strict partial orders.
In this text, we use the concept of binary relations to introduce orders onto
sets Y ⊂ Rm, and for convenience we usually define these orders on the complete
Euclidean space Rm. In particular, this allows the definition of two further properties
based on the operations of real vector addition and scalar multiplication.
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Definition 2.1.36 (Compatibility with addition and scalar multiplication). A bi-
nary relation R on Rm is said to be compatible with
(i) addition if (y1, y2) ∈ R ⇒ (y1 + z, y2 + z) ∈ R for all y1, y2, z ∈ Rm, and
(ii) scalar multiplication if (y1, y2) ∈ R ⇒ (λy1, λy2) ∈ R for all y1, y2 ∈ Rm
and λ > 0.
The next few results relate the concept of binary relations to cones.
Definition 2.1.37 (Cone relation). Let C ⊂ Rm be a cone. The binary relation
RC :=
{
(y1, y2) ∈ Rm × Rm : y2 − y1 ∈ C} (2.30)
is called the cone relation on Rm induced by C.
Proposition 2.1.38 (Cone relation). Let C ⊂ Rm be a cone and RC be the induced
cone relation. Then RC is compatible with addition and scalar multiplication and
(i) reflexive if and only if 0 ∈ C,
(ii) transitive if and only if C is convex, and
(iii) antisymmetric if and only if C is pointed.
In particular, from Definition 2.1.33 and Proposition 2.1.38, we obtain that
for a pointed convex cone C, the cone relation RC is a partial or strict partial order
if and only if 0 ∈ C or 0 /∈ C, respectively. Hence, a pointed convex cone is also
called an ordering cone, and
y1 C y2 :⇐⇒ y2 − y1 ∈ C (2.31a)
y1 ≺C y2 :⇐⇒ y2 − y1 ∈ C \ {0} (2.31b)
are called the partial and strict partial order induced by C, respectively.
We can reverse the results in Proposition 2.1.38 under the assumption that
R is compatible with addition and scalar multiplication.
Proposition 2.1.39 (Relation cone). Let R be a binary relation on Y ⊂ Rm that
is compatible with scalar multiplication. Then
CR :=
{
y2 − y1 ∈ Rm : (y1, y2) ∈ R} (2.32)
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is a cone. In this case, if R is also compatible with addition, then
(i) 0 ∈ CR if and only if R is reflexive,
(ii) CR is convex if and only if R is transitive, and
(iii) CR is pointed if and only if R is antisymmetric.
In particular, using the componentwise orders from Equation 2.4 or Re-
mark 2.1.35, the nonnegative, nonzero, and positive orthant of Rm
Rm≧ := C≦ = {y ∈ Rm : y ≧ 0} (2.33a)
Rm≥ := C≤ = {y ∈ Rm : y ≥ 0} (2.33b)
Rm> := C< = {y ∈ Rm : y > 0} (2.33c)
are pointed convex cones and play an important role in the following discussion of
multiobjective programming and optimization. For reasons that become apparent
later, we name these cones Pareto cones.
2.2 Multiobjective Programming and Optimization
In this section, we use the concepts of partial orders and ordering cones so far
introduced in the previous discussion to define the notions of domination and non-
dominance for multiobjective programming and real-vector optimization problems.
For clarity of our presentation, in Section 2.2.1 we initially restrict our attention to
the latter and wait until we formulate the multiobjective program in Section 2.2.2 to
address the conceptual relationship between efficiency in the domain and nondom-
inance in the image of a vector-valued objective function. Several commonly used
optimization methods that are based on objective scalarization are then reviewed
in Section 2.2.3 and characterized in terms of their ability to generate efficient or
nondominated solutions and their associated tradeoffs. While we also mention some
more specific references throughout the following text, most of the presented ma-
terial can similarly be found in various standard monographs on multiobjective
programming or optimization (Chankong and Haimes, 1983; Sawaragi et al., 1985;
Yu, 1985; Steuer, 1986; Miettinen, 1999; Jahn, 2004; Ehrgott, 2005, among others).
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2.2.1 Domination and the Nondominated Set
We first introduce the fundamental concepts of domination sets and dom-
ination structures that are adopted in this text and address their relationships to
pointed convex cones as established by Yu (1974). Furthermore, we define the non-
dominated set, compare our notion to the original definition in the former reference,
present some basic results and then point to several extensions and related concepts
that can be found in the literature. As before, all given results are also contained
and proven in Sawaragi et al. (1985) or Yu (1985).
Definition 2.2.1 (Domination set and domination structure). Let Y ⊂ Rm be a
nonempty set, R ⊂ Y ×Y be a partial order on Y , and ≺ be the strict partial order
associated with R. For every y ∈ Y , the set
D(y) := {d ∈ Rm : y − d ≺ y} (2.34a)
is called the domination set or set of dominated directions at y, and the collection
D := {D(y) ⊂ Rm : y ∈ Y } (2.34b)
is called the associated domination structure on Y .
If y1 ≺ y2, then y1 is said to dominate y2 or, equivalently, y2 is said to be
dominated by y1. With the same meaning, Yu (1974) also says that y1 is preferred
to y2, but we postpone the notion of preference until later in this chapter.
Remark 2.2.2 (Domination set in the sense of Yu (1974)). In the original definition
by Yu (1974), the domination set D(y) is defined as
D(y) := {d ∈ Rm : y ≺ y + d} (2.35)
which coincides with D(y + d) rather than with D(y) in Definition 2.2.1. However,
if the strict partial order ≺ is compatible with addition, then y − d ≺ y ⇔ y =
y+d−d ≺ y+d and thus D(y) = D(y+d) for all d ∈ Rm. In particular, in this case
D(y) = D(y′) for all y′ ∈ Y , and Definition 2.2.1 is equivalent with the definition
by Yu (1974) because all domination sets are identical.
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If the sets of dominated directions in Definition 2.2.1 vary for different y ∈ Y ,
so that D(y) 6= D(y′) for y 6= y′, in general, then we call the collection D =
{D(y) : y ∈ Y } a variable domination structure for Y . Otherwise, if D(y) = D
for all y ∈ Y , then we usually write D = D instead of D = {D} and say that
the domination structure is constant. In particular, the following special case for a
constant domination structure is implied by Proposition 2.1.39.
Proposition 2.2.3 (Domination cone). Let R be a partial order that is compatible
with addition and scalar multiplication, and ≺ be the strict partial order associated
with R. Then
D(y) = C≺ := {d ∈ Rm : 0 ≺ d} for all y ∈ Y (2.36)
In particular, C≺ is a pointed convex cone that does not contain the origin.
In this case, we also say that the constant domination structure D is a
constant cone and call C≺ the domination cone. In particular, for the special case
of the componentwise order D reduces to the nonzero Pareto cone Rm≥ .
Based on Proposition 2.1.38, we can also reverse Proposition 2.2.3 and use
any pointed convex cone to induce a constant domination structure that is defined
by the underlying cone relation from Equation 2.31.
Proposition 2.2.4 (Domination cone). Let C ⊂ Rm be a pointed convex cone. If
D(y) ⊂ Rm is defined by the strict partial order induced by C, then D(y) = C \ {0}
for all y ∈ Y .
In this case, D = C \ {0} is again a constant cone, and if y1 ≺C y2, then y1
is also said to dominate y2, or y2 is said to be dominated by y1 with respect to C.
Definition 2.2.5 (Nondominated and weakly nondominated set). Let Y ⊂ Rm be
a nonempty set, and D = {D(y) : y ∈ Y } be a domination structure on Y . The sets
N(Y,D) := {yˆ ∈ Y : (yˆ −D(yˆ) \ {0}) ∩ Y = ∅} (2.37a)
Nw(Y,D) := {yˆ ∈ Y : (yˆ − intD(yˆ) \ {0}) ∩ Y = ∅} (2.37b)
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are called the nondominated and weakly nondominated set of Y with respect to D,
respectively.
We note that Nw(Y,D) = N(Y,D◦), where D◦ := {intD(y) : y ∈ Y }. In
particular, if D = C is a constant cone, then Nw(Y,C) = N(Y, intC) so that, for
large parts of this text, we can restrict our discussion to the nondominated set
only. Moreover, since Definition 2.2.5 explicitly excludes the zero vector from each
domination set, we do not need to further distinguish whether C does or does not
contain the origin. Finally, if C = Rm
≧
is the Pareto cone, then we usually simplify
notation and call
N(Y ) := N(Y,Rm≥ ) = N(Y,R
m
≧) (2.38)
the Pareto set of Y . For illustration, Figure 2.1 depicts the Pareto set and the
nondominated set for a cone C ⊂ R2, corresponding to the highlighted bold curves,
for the indicated set Y as subset of R2.
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Figure 2.1 Pareto set N(Y,R2
≧
) and nondominated set N(Y,C) for a cone C ⊂ R2
For nondominance with respect to constant domination cones, Figure 2.1
indicates that a smaller set of dominated directions produces a larger nondominated
set, and it turns out that this observation holds as a general result.
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Proposition 2.2.6 (Nondominance relationship for two domination structures).
Let Y ⊂ Rm be nonempty, and D1 = {D1(y) : y ∈ Y } and D2 = {D2(y) : y ∈ Y } be
two domination structures on Y . Then
D1(y) ⊆ D2(y) for all y ∈ Y =⇒ N(Y,D2) ⊆ N(Y,D1) (2.39)
In many proofs in this text, we make implicit use of the following equivalent
statements for the nondominance of yˆ ∈ Y and usually choose the most convenient
notion without any further explanation.
Proposition 2.2.7 (Equivalent conditions for nondominance). Let yˆ ∈ Y and
D(yˆ) ∈ D be the domination set at yˆ. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) (yˆ −D(yˆ) \ {0}) ∩ Y = ∅;
(ii) there does not exist y ∈ Y such that yˆ − y ∈ D(yˆ) \ {0};
(iii) there does not exist y ∈ Y \ {yˆ} and d ∈ D(yˆ) \ {0} such that yˆ = y + d.
Remark 2.2.8 (Nondominance in the sense of Yu (1974)). As emphasized in Re-
mark 2.2.2, for a variable domination structure D = {D(y) : y ∈ Y }, the concept of
domination adopted in this text differs from the original notion in Yu (1974) who
defines the nondominated set similar to the conditions in Proposition 2.2.7 as
N(Y,D) := {yˆ ∈ Y : there is no y ∈ Y such that yˆ ∈ y +D(y) \ {0}} (2.40)
We note that the fundamental difference between our concept of domination
and the original definition by Yu (1974) is that, in our case, nondominance of yˆ can
be verified based on the domination set D(yˆ) at yˆ alone and does not depend on
the domination sets D(y) at all the remaining other y ∈ Y \ {yˆ}. Furthermore, if
D = D is a constant domination structure, then both notions again are equivalent
and the nondominated set in Remark 2.2.8 coincides with Definition 2.2.5.
Throughout the complete text, we usually assume that both Y and the
nondominated set N(Y,D) are nonempty, and for the most typical case in which
the domination structure D is described by a constant cone C, the following result
establishes conditions that guarantee that our assumption is satisfied, in general.
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Proposition 2.2.9 (Nonemptiness of N(Y,C)). Let C ⊂ Rm be a pointed convex
cone, and Y ⊂ Rm be a nonempty C-compact set. Then N(Y,C) 6= ∅.
In addition, several stronger results than Proposition 2.2.9 exist and replace
pointedness of C by the weaker assumption of acuteness (Hartley, 1978) or C-
compactness of Y by C-semicompactness (Corley, 1980), then relying on Zorn’s
Lemma, or equivalently, the Axiom of Choice (Zermelo, 1904; Ciesielski, 1997).
Other authors derive conditions using the concept of a projecting cone (Benson,
1978) or recession cone (Borwein, 1977; Bitran and Magnanti, 1979; Henig, 1982),
and a recent comparative survey of these and many other results is provided by
Sonntag and Zalinescu (2000). In addition to the above results, Naccache (1978)
and Bitran and Magnanti (1979) also study connectedness and Tanino and Sawaragi
(1978, 1980) examine stability properties of the nondominated set. From among the
few results for domination structures that are not constant cones, Proposition 2.2.9
is extended by Hazen and Morin (1983a,b, 1984) who also derive some first-order
necessary and sufficient conditions for nonconical nondominance.
Two other large parts of the literature deal with questions of duality (pio-
neered by Isermann, 1978; Tanino and Sawaragi, 1979; Corley, 1981; Bitran, 1981;
Jahn, 1983; Hsia and Lee, 1988, and others) with a recent overview provided by
Nakayama (1999) and, in extension of earlier definitions by Kuhn and Tucker (1951)
and Geoffrion (1968), with various notions of proper nondominance (including Bor-
wein, 1977; Hartley, 1978; Benson, 1979, 1983; Coladas Ur´ıa, 1981; White, 1982;
Henig, 1982, 1990), some of which are further analyzed in Miettinen and Ma¨kela¨
(2001). As before, in the majority of these references, the domination structure is
defined as a constant convex cone, and some more specific results for polyhedral
cones are obtained by Tamura and Miura (1979), Corley (1985), and Fujita (1996).
A smaller portion also follows the original definition by Yu (1973, 1974) and
considers domination structures that are not necessarily cones but convex sets, in-
cluding some works involving the same author (Yu and Leitmann, 1974; Yu, 1975;
Bergstresser et al., 1976; Bergstresser and Yu, 1977) that, together with several
23
of the above results, are comprehensively discussed in Yu (1985). Further exten-
sions of domination structures to more general spaces are proposed by Chew (1979)
and Weidner (1985, 1987, 2003) who also investigates domination sets in more gen-
eral vector optimization. Finally, only two but very recent papers by Chen and
Yang (2002) and Chen et al. (2005a) characterize variable domination structures for
vector-variational inequalities in the context of generalized quasi-vector equilibrium
problems, and some additional references of more specific relevance for our later
discussion are mentioned throughout the remaining text.
2.2.2 Multiobjective Programs and Efficiency
With the concept of domination and the definition of the nondominated set
at hand, we can define the general multiobjective program for which we assume that
the set Y ⊂ Rm is the image of some set X ⊆ Rm under a vector-valued function f .
Definition 2.2.10 (Multiobjective Program). Let X ⊆ Rn be a nonempty set,
f : X → Rm be a vector-valued function, and D = {D(y) ⊂ Rm : y ∈ Y } be a
domination structure on the image Y = f(X) ⊂ Rm of X under f . The triple
(X, f,D) (2.41)
is called the multiobjective program (MOP) with feasible decision set X and objective
function f .
If m = 1 or m = 2, then we usually refer to the triple (X, f,D) as single
objective program (SOP) or biobjective program (BOP), respectively. Throughout
this text, however, we always assume that m ≥ 2 and then say that the objective
function f maps the set of feasible decisions X from the decision space Rn to the set
of outcomes Y = f(X) in the outcome or objective space Rm. We treat the feasible
set X in a mostly generic manner and implicitly assume its representation either as
a finite or countable list
X = {x1, x2, . . . xN} or X = {x1, x2, x3, . . .} (2.42a)
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for some of our practical considerations or, for all theoretical discussion, as a con-
strained set
X = {x ∈ Rn : g(x) ≦ 0, h(x) = 0} (2.42b)
where the functions g = (g1, . . . , gk) : Rn → Rk and h = (h1, . . . , hl) : Rn → Rl
describe k inequality and l equality constraints, respectively.
Definition 2.2.11 (Efficiency). Let (X, f,D) be MOP, Y = f(X) be its outcome
set, and N(Y,D) be the nondominated set of Y with respect to D. The sets
E(X, f,D) := {xˆ ∈ X : f(xˆ) ∈ N(Y,D)} (2.43a)
Ew(X, f,D) := {xˆ ∈ X : f(xˆ) ∈ Nw(Y,D)} (2.43b)
are called the efficient and weakly efficient set for MOP, respectively.
Hence, a feasible decision xˆ ∈ X is (weakly) efficient for MOP if and only
if its outcome yˆ = f(xˆ) is (weakly) nondominated with respect to the domination
structure D. In particular, then E(X, f,D) 6= ∅ if and only if N(Y,D) 6= ∅, and for
D = C a constant pointed convex cone, Corley (1980) shows that Proposition 2.2.9
can also be formulated for the efficient set if X 6= ∅ is compact and if f is C-
semicontinuous (for details, see the original reference or Sawaragi et al., 1985).
For the special case where D = Rm
≧
is the Pareto cone andN(Y ) is the Pareto
set, we usually reformulate Definition 2.2.11 for the definition of Pareto efficiency.
Definition 2.2.12 (Pareto efficiency). Let X ⊆ Rn be a nonempty feasible set,
f : X → Rm be an objective function, and Y = f(X) ⊂ Rm be the set of outcomes
of X under f . A feasible decision xˆ ∈ X is said to be
(i) strictly Pareto efficient if there is no x ∈ X \ {xˆ} such that f(x) ≦ f(xˆ),
(ii) Pareto efficient if there does not exist x ∈ X such that f(x) ≤ f(xˆ), and
(iii) weakly Pareto efficient if does not exist x ∈ X such that f(x) < f(xˆ).
In these cases, the outcome yˆ = f(xˆ) ∈ Y is said to be a (strict) Pareto, Pareto, or
weak Pareto outcome, respectively.
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This definition essentially repeats Proposition 2.2.7 for the three Pareto
cones defined in Equation 2.33. Moreover, it is clear (otherwise use Proposition 2.2.6)
that strict Pareto efficiency implies Pareto efficiency, and that Pareto efficiency im-
plies weak Pareto efficiency. In particular, if f is injective, then Pareto and strict
Pareto efficiency are equivalent, and in general, this distinction becomes irrelevant
for Pareto outcomes in the objective space.
Since Definition 2.2.12 does not depend on an explicit domination structure
or domination cone but the componentwise order, in this case we also denote MOP
as the pair (X, f) and usually formulate
MOP: Minimize f(x) subject to x ∈ X (2.44)
Similarly, and analogous to Definitions 2.2.5 and 2.2.11, in this case we denote the
sets of strictly Pareto, Pareto, and weakly Pareto efficient decisions by Es(X, f),
E(X, f), and Ew(X, f), and let N(Y ) and Nw(Y ) be the sets of Pareto and weak
Pareto outcomes, respectively.
The predominant literature on multiobjective programming is based on the
minimization (or an equivalent maximization) formulation in (2.44) which allows
the definition of numerous additional concepts of which we only introduce the few
needed within the context of our own results. In particular, by separately solving
the single objective programs
Minimize fi(x) subject to x ∈ X (2.45)
for all i = 1, . . . ,m and combining the optimal objective function values, we obtain
the ideal point of MOP.
Definition 2.2.13 (Ideal and utopia point). Let (X, f) be MOP with feasible deci-
sion set X ⊆ Rn and objective function f : X → Rm. The point z = (z1, . . . , zm) ∈
Rm with
zi = inf{fi(x) : x ∈ X} for all i = 1, . . . ,m (2.46a)
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is called the ideal point, and any r ∈ Rm with
r ≤ f(x) for all x ∈ X (2.46b)
is called a utopia point of MOP.
Whenever needed, we assume that the ideal point exists and is finite, or
equivalently, that the set of utopia points is nonempty.
Remark 2.2.14 (Existence of the ideal point). If Y = f(X) is Rm
≧
-compact, then
the ideal point exists and is finite. In particular, in this case the infimum in (2.46a)
can be replaced by the minimum and a point r ∈ Rm is utopia if and only if r ≤ z.
It is clear that if z = f(x) for some x ∈ X, then x is optimal for all single
objective programs in (2.45) and, consequently, Pareto efficient for MOP. Since the
different objectives are typically in conflict with each other, however, the minimum
values zi in (2.46a) are usually attained by different x
i ∈ X for which fj(xi) >
fj(x
j) = zj for all j 6= i, in general. Therefore, to find any decision x ∈ X that
further reduces the objective value of xi with respect to fj to some fj(x) < fj(x
i) =
zi, we need to accept a corresponding increase in fi to some new value fi(x) >
fi(x
i). The ratio between such two changes defines the important general notion of
a tradeoff which is further discussed in Chankong and Haimes (1983).
Definition 2.2.15 (Tradeoff and tradeoff rate). Let (X, f) be MOP and x1, x2, xˆ ∈
X be feasible decisions. If fj(x
2)− fj(x1) 6= 0, then the ratio
Tij(x
1, x2) :=
fi(x
1)− fi(x2)
fj(x2)− fj(x1) (2.47a)
is called the tradeoff between x1 and x2 involving fi and fj . If f is continuously
differentiable at xˆ, then
Tij(xˆ) := −∂fi(x)
∂fj
∣∣∣∣
x=xˆ
(2.47b)
is called the tradeoff rate at xˆ involving fi and fj .
Kaliszewski (1994) generalizes this definition to the notion of a global trade-
off, and Miettinen (1999) draws the connection between these concepts and the
27
marginal rate of substitution from economics. Furthermore, the extension of trade-
off rates to tradeoff directions based on cones is investigated for convex MOP by
Henig and Buchanan (1997), followed by Lee and Nakayama (1997) for the differ-
entiable case and Miettinen and Ma¨kela¨ (2002) for the nondifferentiable case.
Finally, various other notions refine the definition of Pareto efficiency and
include the concepts of proper efficiency by Kuhn and Tucker (1951) and Geoffrion
(1968) to guarantee tradeoff rates that are bounded, and several concepts of approx-
imate or ε-efficiency originally defined by Kutateladze (1979). While the former are
of no particular relevance for our discussion and therefore omitted, the latter play an
important role in many following parts of this text so that we present two possible
definitions and review significant parts of the relevant literature in further detail.
Definition 2.2.16 ((Additive) Epsilon efficiency). Let (X, f) be MOP and ε ∈ Rm,
ε ≧ 0, be a nonnegative vector. A feasible decision xˆ ∈ X is said to be
(i) strictly ε-Pareto efficient if there is no x ∈ X \{xˆ} such that f(x) ≦ f(xˆ)−ε,
(ii) ε-Pareto efficient if there is no x ∈ X such that f(x) ≤ f(xˆ)− ε, and
(iii) weakly ε-Pareto efficient if there is no x ∈ X such that f(x) < f(xˆ)− ε.
In these cases, the outcome yˆ = f(xˆ) ∈ Y is said to be a strict ε-Pareto, ε-Pareto
or weak ε-Pareto outcome, respectively.
Similar to Definition 2.2.11, we immediately obtain that strict ε-Pareto effi-
ciency implies ε-Pareto efficiency, and that ε-Pareto efficiency implies weak ε-Pareto
efficiency. In particular, if ε = 0, then these two conditions coincide and ε-Pareto
efficiency reduces to the previous notion of Pareto efficiency. We denote the sets of
strictly ε-Pareto, ε-Pareto, and weakly ε-Pareto efficient decisions of X under f by
Es(X, f, ε), E(X, f, ε), and Ew(X, f, ε), and let N(Y, ε) and Nw(Y, ε) be the sets of
ε-Pareto and weak ε-Pareto outcomes, respectively.
If f(x) ≧ 0 for all x ∈ X, then the following version of ǫ-efficiency is also
possible and motivated by a similar notion in Papadimitriou and Yannakakis (2000).
Definition 2.2.17 ((Multiplicative) Epsilon efficiency). Let (X, f) be MOP with
f(x) ≧ 0 for all x ∈ X and 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1. A feasible decision xˆ ∈ X is said to be
28
(i) strictly ǫ-Pareto efficient if there is no x ∈ X \ {xˆ} s.t. f(x) ≦ (1− ǫ)f(xˆ),
(ii) ǫ-Pareto efficient if there is no x ∈ X such that f(x) ≤ (1− ǫ)f(xˆ), and
(iii) weakly ǫ-Pareto efficient if there is no x ∈ X such that f(x) < (1− ǫ)f(xˆ).
In these cases, the outcome yˆ = f(xˆ) ∈ Y is said to be a strict ǫ-Pareto, ǫ-Pareto or
weak ǫ-Pareto outcome, respectively.
In this text and the following review of the literature, we restrict our at-
tention to the first notion of (additive) ε-efficiency, which is originally defined by
Kutateladze (1979) and independently introduced into multiobjective programming
first by Loridan (1984) and later by White (1986) who also studies six alternative
definitions and establishes their corresponding relationships. Following either Lori-
dan or White, related definitions or examinations of these concepts are given by
Lemaire (1992), Helbig and Pateva (1994), Tanaka (1996), Yokoyama (1996, 1999)
and Li and Wang (1998) for multiobjective programs and extended to more gen-
eral vector optimization problems by Va´lyi (1985), Ne´meth (1989), Tammer (1994),
Loridan et al. (1999) and Rong and Wu (2000).
In particular, Yokoyama (1992, 1994) and Deng (1997) derive several op-
timality conditions for convex MOP and Liu (1996) for nondifferentiable MOP
based on the use of penalty functions. Rong (1997) proposes a notion for proper ε-
efficiency, and Kazmi (2001) derives conditions for the existence of epsilon-minima.
Similar to the latter, Dutta and Vetrivel (2001) introduce quasi-epsilon-weak minima
and also establish necessary and sufficient optimality conditions for their existence.
Liu and Yokoyama (1999) and recently Gupta et al. (2005) investigate ε-efficiency
for multiobjective fractional programs, and Gutie´rrez et al. (2006a,b,c) study ε-
efficient solutions in the context of scalarization approaches that we introduce in
Section 2.2.3 and later address in Section 3.3.3.
In addition to these mostly theoretical results, the concept of ε-efficiency
is also used in a number of practical applications, including the approximation of
biobjective Pareto sets and the formulation of approximation algorithms for min-
imum cost flows (Ruhe and Fruhwirth, 1990), as well as the study of problems
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in transportation (White, 1998a), finance (White, 1998b), location (Blanquero and
Carrizosa, 2002), and scheduling (Angel et al., 2003). Finally, Fadel et al. (2002) em-
ploy the concept of ε-efficiency as a measure of sensitivity to examine the curvature
of Pareto curves of biobjective problems for applications in engineering design.
2.2.3 Scalarization Approaches and Tradeoffs
A great variety of solution methods exist for generating Pareto efficient deci-
sions and are extensively discussed in many monographs on multiobjective program-
ming and optimization (Miettinen, 1999; Jahn, 2004; Ehrgott, 2005, and others). In
particular, Ehrgott and Wiecek (2005) provide a recent comprehensive survey of
many of these methods and propose their classification into scalarization methods
and nonscalarizing approaches. The methods that we here present are chosen as a
subset of the former and provide a parametric characterization of the set of efficient
decisions by combining the individual objective function components into one real-
valued function which attains its optimal value if and only if the associated decision
is (weakly) efficient for the original problem.
Definition 2.2.18 (Increasing function). Let Y ⊂ Rm be nonempty. A real-valued
function s : Y → R is said to be increasing on Y if
y1 ≤ y2 =⇒ s(y1) ≤ s(y2) and y1 < y2 =⇒ s(y1) < s(y2) (2.48a)
for all y1, y2 ∈ Y , and it is said to be strictly increasing if
y1 ≤ y2 =⇒ s(y1) < s(y2) (2.48b)
For the purpose of this text, we call any increasing function s on Y or a
suitable subset T ⊆ Y a scalarization function for MOP. To change the domain of s
from the outcome set Y in Rm to the feasible set X in Rn, we introduce the function
composition s ◦ f : Rn → R as the associated value function of s on Rn. Finally, if
Π is a set of additional scalarization parameters and s = s(π) for some π ∈ Π, then
we write s(π, y) instead of s(π)(y) or also drop the parameter π as in Equation 2.48
if the specific choice of π ∈ Π is fixed or irrelevant.
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Definition 2.2.19 (Scalarized multiobjective program). Let (X, f) be MOP with
feasible set X ⊆ Rn and objective function f : X → Rm. Let S ⊆ X, T = f(S) ⊆ Y ,
and s(π) : T → R be a scalarization function for MOP with scalarization parameter
π ∈ Π. The parametric single objective program
SOP(π): Minimize s(π, f(x)) subject to x ∈ S ⊆ X (2.49)
is called the associated scalarization problem for MOP.
Since SOP is a single objective program, the notions of optimality and ap-
proximate optimality are standard and follow from the canonical order of real num-
bers. The latter is also discussed in Loridan (1982) and, although not needed in our
current context, introduced here for our later discussion in Section 3.3.3.
Definition 2.2.20 (Epsilon-Optimality and Optimality). Let SOP be given, and
let ǫ ∈ R, ǫ ≥ 0. A solution xˆ ∈ S ⊆ X is called
(i) strictly ǫ-optimal for SOP if s(f(xˆ)) < s(f(x)) + ǫ for all x ∈ X \ {xˆ}, and
(ii) ǫ-optimal for SOP if s(f(xˆ)) ≤ s(f(x)) + ǫ for all x ∈ X.
If ǫ = 0, then xˆ is also called strictly optimal or optimal, respectively.
By definition, we note that each optimal solution for SOP is in particular
strictly ǫ-optimal, and each strictly ǫ-optimal solution is also ǫ-optimal. In particu-
lar, if 0 ≤ ǫ1 ≤ ǫ2, then optimality implies ǫ1-optimality, and ǫ1-optimality implies
ǫ2-optimality. However, for now we postpone all further discussion of ǫ-optimality
until our later investigation of approximate nondominance and summarize various
results that relate optimality and efficiency for SOP and MOP, respectively.
Proposition 2.2.21 (Relationship between SOP optimality and MOP efficiency).
Let (X, f) be MOP, Y = f(X) be its set of outcomes, s : Y → R be an increasing
scalarization function, and xˆ ∈ X be optimal for the associated SOP.
(i) If xˆ ∈ X is strictly optimal for SOP, then xˆ ∈ Es(X, f).
(ii) If s is strictly increasing, then xˆ ∈ E(X, f).
In any case, xˆ ∈ Ew(X, f).
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This result is similarly established in Wierzbicki (1986) and its proof there-
fore omitted. Furthermore, if s = s(π) depends on some additional scalarization
parameter, then for different choices of π ∈ Π, in general we obtain different opti-
mal solutions for SOP and, thus, different efficient decisions for MOP. While some
scalarization methods are capable to generate every efficient decision and thus com-
pletely characterize the efficient set, others also depend on certain properties of the
underlying outcome set and are restricted to generate only a smaller subset. For
questions addressing these issues we refer to the discussion in Wierzbicki (1986).
The probably most common scalarization method combines all objective
functions in the form of a nonnegative linear combination or weighted sum and is
attributed variously to Gass and Saaty (1955), Zadeh (1963), or Geoffrion (1968).
Definition 2.2.22 (Weighted-sum scalarization). Let (X, f) be MOP and w ∈
Rm, w ≥ 0. The single objective program
WS(w): Minimize
m∑
i=1
wifi(x) subject to x ∈ X (2.50)
is called the weighted-sum scalarization (WS) of MOP with weighting parameter w.
The geometric interpretation of this method is that it finds that boundary
point of the outcome set Y at which the weighting vector w is normal to a supporting
hyperplane to Y .
Proposition 2.2.23 (Weighted-sum sufficient condition for efficiency). Let (X, f)
be MOP and xˆ ∈ X be optimal for WS(w) with weighting parameter w ∈ Rm, w ≥ 0.
(i) If xˆ is strictly optimal, then xˆ ∈ Es(X, f).
(ii) If w > 0, then xˆ ∈ E(X, f).
In any case, xˆ ∈ Ew(X, f).
Based on its geometric interpretation, this method is limited to finding only
those efficient decisions whose associated outcomes occur in convex regions of the
Pareto set. If Y is Rm
≧
-convex, however, then there exists a supporting hyperplane
at every Pareto outcome by Theorem 2.1.24 (supporting hyperplane theorem), and
the next result follows.
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Proposition 2.2.24 (Weighted-sum necessary condition for efficiency). Let (X, f)
be MOP and Y = f(X) be Rm
≧
-convex.
(i) If xˆ ∈ Ew(X, f), then there exists w ≥ 0 such that xˆ is optimal for WS(w).
(ii) If xˆ ∈ E(X, f), then there exists w > 0 such that xˆ is optimal for WS(w).
Li et al. (1999) establish the following result for the tradeoff rate from Defini-
tion 2.2.15 at an optimal solution for the weighted-sum scalarization, which can also
be derived as special case of the tradeoff rates for the general hyperplane method
proposed by Sakawa and Yano (1990).
Proposition 2.2.25 (Weighted-sum tradeoff rates). Let (X, f) be MOP and xˆ ∈ X
be optimal for WS(w). If f is continuously differentiable at xˆ and wi 6= 0, then
Tij(xˆ) := −∂fi(x)
∂fj
∣∣∣∣
x=xˆ
=
wj
wi
(2.51)
Another important scalarization method is the constrained-objective scalar-
ization, also called the epsilon-constraint method, which is originally introduced by
Haimes et al. (1971) and well known from the detailed discussion in Chankong and
Haimes (1983). Instead of combining the individual objectives, this method con-
verts all objectives into constraints, imposes additional objective bounds, and then
chooses only a single objective for actual minimization.
Definition 2.2.26 (Constrained-objective scalarization). Let (X, f) be MOP, fk
be any single objective of f = (f1, . . . , fm), and b ∈ Rm be a vector. The single
objective program
COk(b): Minimize fk(x) subject to f(x) ≦ b and x ∈ X (2.52)
is called constrained-objective scalarization (CO) of MOP with objective bound b.
While the original problem formulation drops the kth constraint fk(x) ≤
bk from f(x) ≦ b, for later convenience we can also keep this constraint without
changing any of the original results.
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Proposition 2.2.27 (Constrained-objective necessary condition for efficiency). Let
(X, f) be MOP, b ∈ Rm, and xˆ ∈ X be optimal for COk(b).
(i) If xˆ is strictly optimal, then xˆ ∈ Es(X, f).
(ii) If xˆ is optimal for COk(b) for all k = 1, . . . ,m, then xˆ ∈ E(X, f).
In any case, xˆ ∈ Ew(X, f).
Other than a weighted sum, the constrained-objective scalarization is not
limited by convexity but can be used to find any efficient decision for MOP.
Proposition 2.2.28 (Constrained-objective necessary and sufficient condition for
efficiency). Let (X, f) be MOP and xˆ ∈ X. Then xˆ ∈ E(X, f) if and only if xˆ is
optimal for COk(f(xˆ)) for all k = 1, . . . ,m.
Based on the well known sensitivity theorem from nonlinear programming
(Luenberger, 1973, 1984), Chankong and Haimes (1983) also establish a correspond-
ing result for the tradeoff rate at an optimal solution xˆ for the constrained-objective
scalarization. For a precise definition of the concepts stated in the assumptions of
the following proposition, we refer to the original references.
Proposition 2.2.29 (Constrained-objective tradeoff rates). Let (X, f) be MOP, f
be twice continuously differentiable, b ∈ Rm, and xˆ ∈ X be optimal for COk(b). If
(i) xˆ is a regular point of the constraints f(x) ≦ b in COk(b),
(ii) the second-order sufficiency conditions are satisfied at xˆ, and
(iii) there are no degenerate constraints at xˆ, then
Tki(xˆ) := −∂fk(x))
∂fi(x)
∣∣∣∣
x=xˆ
= λki for all i = 1, . . . ,m, i 6= k (2.53)
where the λki are the Lagrangean multipliers associated with each of the constraints
fi(xˆ) ≤ bi of COk(b).
We can also combine the weighted-summethod and the constrained-objective
scalarization into the following hybrid method which is similarly introduced by Wen-
dell and Lee (1977), Corley (1980), and Guddat et al. (1985).
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Definition 2.2.30 (Hybrid scalarization). Let (X, f) be MOP, w ∈ Rm, w ≥ 0, and
b ∈ Rm. The single objective program
HB(w, b): Minimize
m∑
i=1
wifi(x) subject to f(x) ≦ b and x ∈ X (2.54)
is called the hybrid scalarization (HB) of MOP with weighting parameter w and
objective bound b.
In particular, Guddat et al. (1985) choose the parameter b as an outcome
f(x◦) for some feasible decision x◦ ∈ X with an underlying interpretation as aspi-
ration of reference point. The following results, however, hold in further generality
and essentially repeat the statements of Propositions 2.2.23 and 2.2.28.
Proposition 2.2.31 (Hybrid necessary condition for efficiency). Let (X, f) be MOP
and xˆ ∈ X be optimal for HB(w, b) with weighting vector w ∈ Rm, w ≥ 0, and
objective bound b ∈ Rm.
(i) If xˆ is strictly optimal, then xˆ ∈ Es(X, f).
(ii) If w > 0, then xˆ ∈ E(X, f).
In any case, xˆ ∈ Ew(X, f).
Proposition 2.2.32 (Hybrid necessary and sufficient condition for efficiency). Let
(X, f) be MOP and w ∈ Rm, w ≥ 0. Then xˆ ∈ E(X, f) if and only if xˆ is optimal
for HB(w, f(xˆ)).
Remark 2.2.33 (Relationship between hybrid, weighted-sum, and constrained-ob-
jective scalarization). If f(x) ≦ b for all x ∈ X, then the constraints in HB(w, b) are
always satisfied and the hybrid scalarization reduces to the weighted-sum scalariza-
tion WS(w). Furthermore, if w = ek is the kth unit vector, then
∑m
i=1 wifi(x) =
fk(x) and HB(e
k, b) reduces to the constrained-objective scalarization COk(b).
Hence, the hybrid scalarization generalizes both the weighted-sum and the
constrained-objective scalarization methods. Furthermore, if we let w = (1, . . . , 1)T
be the vector with all components equal to one and choose b = f(x◦) for some
feasible decision x◦ ∈ X, then we obtain the scalarization method that is originally
introduced by Benson (1978) in the following formulation.
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Definition 2.2.34 (Benson scalarization). Let (X, f) be MOP and x◦ ∈ X. The
single objective program
B(f(x◦)): Maximize
m∑
i=1
li subject to f(x
◦)− l = f(x) ∈ f(X) and l ≧ 0 (2.55)
is called the Benson scalarization (B) of MOP with reference point f(x◦).
Proposition 2.2.35 (Benson condition for efficiency). Let (X, f) be MOP, x◦ ∈ X
and (lˆ, xˆ) be optimal for B(f(x◦)). Then xˆ ∈ E(X, f), and in particular, x◦ ∈
E(X, f) if and only if l = 0.
We note that the geometric idea behind this method is to start from the
reference point f(x◦) in the outcome set Y = f(X) and then project this point along
a nonnegative direction l of maximum length onto the Pareto set N(Y ). Based on a
similar geometric interpretation, first Roy (1971), then Gembicki and Haimes (1975),
and later Pascoletti and Serafini (1984) use a similar direction-based approach for
the generation of efficient decisions with respect to a general pointed convex cone.
Definition 2.2.36 (Pascoletti-Serafini scalarization). Let (X, f,C) be MOP with
C ⊂ Rm a pointed convex cone, r ∈ Rm be a vector, and v ∈ intC be an element of
the cone interior. The single objective program
PS(r, v): Minimize µ subject to r + µv − c ∈ f(X), c ∈ C and µ ∈ R (2.56)
is called the Pascoletti-Serafini scalarization (PS) of MOP with reference point r
and reference direction v.
Proposition 2.2.37 (Pascoletti-Serafini condition for efficiency). Let (X, f,C) be
MOP. If µˆ is optimal for PS(r, v) and yˆ = r + µˆv − c ∈ Y , then
(i) yˆ ∈ Nw(Y,C), and
(ii) there exists cˆ ∈ C such that yˆ = r + µˆv − cˆ ∈ N(Y,C).
For the special case in which C = R2
≧
is the Pareto cone, Figure 2.2 illustrates
the principle idea of the Pascoletti-Serafini method with four different choices of the
reference point r ∈ Rm and two different direction vectors v ∈ Rm> .
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Figure 2.2 The Pascoletti-Serafini method PS(r, v) for Y ⊂ R2 and the Pareto
cone R2
≧
with four choices of reference point r ∈ R2 and direction vector v ∈ R2>
The Pascoletti-Serafini scalarization method can also be derived as a special
application of the results in Gerth and Weidner (1990) who investigate separa-
tion theorems in general topological spaces and is analyzed in some further detail
in Schandl (1999). Besides a generalization of the weighted-sum scalarization for
closed convex cones (Gearhart, 1983; Jahn, 1984; Sawaragi et al., 1985, among oth-
ers), however, we are not aware of any other common scalarization method that
is formulated for a general cone and propose some possible extensions also for the
constrained-objective, hybrid, and Benson scalarization in Section 3.1.3.
For the Pareto case, we present two further scalarization methods of rele-
vance for this text that belong to the important class of approaches that utilize
weighted-ℓp norms and are originally introduced by Zeleny (1973) to approximate
the ideal point in the context of compromise programming. In particular, we only
consider the special case of the probably most important weighted-ℓ∞, or equiva-
lently, the weighted-Chebyshev norm scalarization commonly accredited to Bowman
(1976), Choo and Atkins (1983), or Steuer (1986).
Definition 2.2.38 (Weighted-Chebyshev norm scalarization). Let (X, f) be MOP,
r ∈ Rm with r ≤ f(x) for all x ∈ X be a utopia point, and w ∈ Rm, w ≥ 0 be a
nonnegative vector of weights. The single objective program
CN(r, w): Minimize max
i=1,...,m
{wi(fi(x)− ri)} subject to x ∈ X (2.57)
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is called the weighted-Chebyshev norm scalarization (CN) of MOP with reference
point r and weighting parameter w.
Proposition 2.2.39 (Weighted-Chebyshev norm necessary and sufficient condition
for (weak) efficiency). Let (X, f) be MOP and xˆ ∈ X. Then xˆ ∈ Ew(X, f) if and
only if there exists w > 0 such that xˆ is optimal for CN(r, w).
Hence, we can use the weighted-Chebyshev norm scalarization method to
find all efficient and weakly efficient decisions for any MOP. Furthermore, Steuer
and Choo (1983) and Steuer (1986) also propose an augmented-Chebyshev norm
and Kaliszewski (1987) formulates a modified-Chebyshev norm to guarantee that
all generated solutions are also always efficient.
Remark 2.2.40 (Weighted-Chebyshev norm tradeoff rates). The weighted-Chebyshev
norm scalarization CN(r, w) can equivalently be written as
Minimize α subject to α ≥ wi(fi(x)− ri) for all i = 1, . . . ,m and x ∈ X (2.58)
so that, under conditions corresponding to those for the constrained-objective method
in Proposition 2.2.29, the tradeoff rate at an optimal solution xˆ is given by
Tij(xˆ) := −∂fi(x)
∂fj
∣∣∣∣
x=xˆ
=
λjwj
λiwi
(2.59)
where λi and λj are the Lagrangean multipliers associated with the constraints
α ≥ wi(fi(x)− ri) and α ≥ wj(fj(x)− rj) in (2.58), respectively.
In further generalization of weighted-ℓp norms, Schandl et al. (2002a) intro-
duce the notion of oblique norms and develop norm-based approximation methods
for both BOP and MOP (Schandl et al., 2001, 2002b). For the general class of scalar-
ization approaches that are based on norm minimization, Lin (2005) investigates the
consequences on the generated solutions when choosing different locations for the
reference point. In particular, if r = 0 and w = 1, then the weighted-Chebyshev
norm scalarization CN(0, 1) reduces to the max-norm scalarization, which is also
known as the max-ordering approach (Kouvelis and Yu, 1997; Ehrgott, 2005).
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Definition 2.2.41 (Max-norm scalarization). Let (X, f) be MOP. The single ob-
jective program
MN: Minimize max
i=1,...,m
{fi(x)} subject to x ∈ X (2.60)
is called the max-norm scalarization (MN) of MOP.
Proposition 2.2.42 (Max-norm sufficient condition for weak efficiency). Let (X, f)
be MOP. If xˆ ∈ X is optimal for MN, then xˆ ∈ Ew(X, f).
In particular, analogous to Remark 2.2.40 we can obtain the tradeoff rate at
an optimal solution xˆ for MN as
Tij(xˆ) := −∂fi(x)
∂fj
∣∣∣∣
x=xˆ
=
λj
λi
(2.61)
In summary, we conclude that a large number of scalarization approaches
exist which can be defined based on linear combinations of objectives in the form of
weighted sums, objective constraints and bounds, reference points, directions, and
various norms and norm variants. As we mention at the very beginning, of course
there are also many other scalarization approaches in addition to the ones described,
but we decide to limit our list to the ones that actually reappear in later parts of this
dissertation and defer to the provided references for any additional information.
2.3 Critique of Multiple Criteria Decision Making
As indicated in the introduction and formalized in Definition 2.2.10, a mul-
tiobjective program MOP is a mathematical model that describes the decisions and
objectives of a multiobjective optimization or decision problem as a set of real vec-
tors X ⊆ Rn and a vector-valued function f : X → Rm, respectively. Moreover,
to enable the partial comparison of different decisions in terms of their resulting
outcomes y ∈ Y = f(X) ⊂ Rm, we can additionally specify a domination structure
D = {D(y) : y ∈ Y } to equip the associated outcome space with a notion of domi-
nation or, by default, adopt an underlying concept of objective minimization as the
special case of Pareto optimality. In any case, throughout this text we constantly
assume that X and f are given explicitly, and we are primarily interested in the
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characterization, generation, or approximation of the efficient and nondominated
sets E(X, f,D) and N(Y,D) associated with different concepts of domination.
Clearly, in doing so we in large part ignore that for practical decision making
problems many additional steps are required before we obtain a model in the form
of a multiobjective program, including the preliminary problem analysis, data col-
lection, handling of uncertainties, and the final model formulation. Being well aware
of the frequent difficulties and crucial importance of all these aspects, however, we
decide not to expose any of these additional details, which are extensively discussed
in numerous monographs on multiple criteria decision making (Keeney and Raiffa,
1976; Zeleny, 1982; Chankong and Haimes, 1983; Yu, 1985) and multiobjective opti-
mization (Sawaragi et al., 1985; Steuer, 1986; Miettinen, 1999; Jahn, 2004; Ehrgott,
2005). In particular, two very recent and comprehensive collections of bibliographic
state-of-the-art surveys (Ehrgott and Gandibleux, 2002; Figueira et al., 2005) pro-
vide excellent overviews over the general field, and many other works exist that also
focus on more specific aspects of multiobjective programming models in the engi-
neering and management sciences (Goicoechea et al., 1982; Osyczka, 1984, 1985;
Stadler, 1984, 1988; Eschenauer et al., 1990; Stadler and Dauer, 1992; Collette and
Siarry, 2003, and many others).
2.3.1 Optimization versus Decision Making
In critical review of some existing ideas in the literature, in this section we
briefly address some of the more practical aspects of multiobjective programming as
they pertain to multiple criteria decision making and the general discussion within
this text. Henceforth assuming that the decision problem is modeled by a feasible
decision set and vector-valued objective function, we first take the traditional and
still typical viewpoint and consider the resulting multiobjective program with re-
spect to Pareto efficiency. In this case, the literature of multiobjective programming
and optimization contains a vast amount of theoretical results that characterize the
efficient or the Pareto set and, moreover, provides us with a great variety of different
solution methods for its generation. From a practical point of view, however, it is
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not immediately clear what the solution of a multiobjective programming problem
is actually meant to be.
For a mathematical program with a single objective, solving this problem is
clearly understood as the process of either finding a decision for which the corre-
sponding scalar outcome attains a minimal value, or coming to the conclusion that
such an outcome does not exist. In particular, although in certain instances still a
very challenging task, we can frequently use an appropriate technique from linear or
nonlinear programming or optimization to actually compute or at least sufficiently
closely approximate such an optimal solution. For a multiobjective program, how-
ever, there usually does not exist a unique optimal outcome, but a nondominated set
which consists of many and possibly infinitely many points. Hence, while it is theo-
retically possible to generate each nondominated outcome based on the scalarization
approaches discussed in Section 2.2.3, for practical purposes this is clearly impos-
sible so that we need to restrict the computation to only a subset of the complete
nondominated set in the form of a discrete representation (Armann, 1989; Benson
and Sayin, 1997; Sayin, 2000; Mattson et al., 2004) or finite approximations (for a
recent survey, see Ruzika and Wiecek, 2005).
In principle, there exist two different approaches to finding suitable repre-
sentations of the nondominated set of a multiobjective programming problem. The
first approach relies on scalarization and uses a parametrized real-valued function
so that, by varying the associated scalarization parameters and solving the series of
resulting single objective programs, different nondominated outcomes and efficient
decisions can be obtained. In particular, the arguably best known scalarization
method is to aggregate all multiple objectives into a single objective in the form of
a linear combination or weighted sum, which we introduce and characterize in Def-
inition 2.2.22 and Propositions 2.2.23 and 2.2.24, respectively. Although seemingly
convenient to handle and therefore still the most widely used method in business
and engineering applications, several drawbacks of this method are recognized (Das
and Dennis, 1997; Fliege, 2004; Scott and Antonsson, 2005) which most prominently
include its failure to generate points in nonconvex regions of the Pareto set. Many
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of the alternative methods that we describe in Section 2.2.3, however, remove these
limitations and, in principle, can be used to find representations of the complete
nondominated set to essentially any desired accuracy.
Of course, in the above discussion we again implicitly assume that the so-
lution of each scalarized single objective program is sufficiently simple so to enable
the generation of many and possibly a quite large number of efficient decisions and
nondominated outcomes. For many realistic problems, however, we also face the
challenge of high computational complexities that frequently impede the successful
use of the aforementioned scalarization approaches. In particular, and especially
in engineering applications, the computation of objective values is often based on
underlying finite element or simulation codes which impose severe restrictions on
the number of permissible function evaluations and, thus, on the number and type
of optimization problems that we can actually solve. Consequently, a recent alter-
native trend to generate nondominated points is the development of new heuristic
approaches such as multiobjective evolutionary and genetic algorithms (Deb, 2001;
Zitzler et al., 2001; Coello Coello et al., 2002; Coello Coello and Romero, 2002; Yen,
2003) that can also be applied if the evaluation of function values or gradients is
computationally too expensive to allow the use of scalarization methods that are
based on traditional optimization. Although typically very problem dependent and
without a rigorous theoretical foundation, these approaches frequently show very
good performance in practice (Narayanan and Azarm, 1999; Gunawan et al., 2004;
Deb and Tiwari, 2005; Gantovnik et al., 2006, and many more).
In any case, from an optimization point of view, we can conclude that the
most common interpretation of solving a multiobjective program is the computation
of a suitable subset of the corresponding efficient and nondominated sets, subject to
certain properties or characteristics such as representation accuracy or approxima-
tion quality (Ruzika and Wiecek, 2005). From the perspective of a decision maker,
however, this optimization stage and the resulting set of potential candidates is
again only a preliminary step to prepare the selection of a final preferred decision
which then constitutes the overall solution to the multiobjective programming model
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and, after translation into the real-life problem context, the original decision mak-
ing problem. In particular, while the solution set in the optimization sense can be
clearly defined based on rigorous mathematical concepts, decision making by nature
involves a decision maker with subjective preferences, priorities, expectations and
personal aspirations which are often not easily described or readily articulated in
terms of the chosen mathematical model.
Hence, we conclude that in the case of decision making, finding a final solu-
tion can still be quite difficult if preferences are not completely modeled or known
and if the numbers of potential candidates and objectives are too large to make
use of existing enumeration or visualization techniques. In remedy of these two
difficulties, we essentially see two possible ways out which we address in the fol-
lowing two Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 with reference to several related approaches in
the literature. The first idea is to refine the concept of Pareto optimality by new
preference assumptions and to introduce new domination structures to include some
of the decision maker’s preferences already into the optimization stage, thereby re-
ducing the set of candidate decisions that are presented to the decision maker for
further consideration. The second idea is to support the decision maker in the pro-
gressive articulation of preferences by interactive decision making procedures and
several decomposition strategies that facilitate the overall conceptual perception of
a large-scale multiobjective program. Based on some of the approaches that we re-
view in the following discussion, we initiate our own contributions with our research
statement in the concluding section of this chapter.
2.3.2 Preference Principles and Domination
The notion and modeling of preferences play an important role in many
aspects of economics, sociology, psychology, and clearly, multiple criteria decision
making, and are extensively researched during the past century (for a comprehensive
recent survey, see O¨ztu¨rk et al., 2005) and discussed at great length in numerous
fundamental monographs (Fishburn, 1964, 1970; Krantz et al., 1971; Keeney and
Raiffa, 1976; Roberts, 1979; Roubens and Vincke, 1985; Roy, 1996; Aleskerov and
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Monjardet, 2002). Without going into any particular detail, however, again we only
provide a rather informal discussion of some of these general concepts and then
point to some more specific approaches that explicitly use domination structures to
model preferences in the context of multiobjective programming.
In the previous section, we describe how to use a parametrized scalarization
function to generate a representation of the nondominated set by varying the associ-
ated scalarization parameters and solving the resulting collection of single objective
programs. These parameters are usually weights, reference points, or bounds on ob-
jectives which, as indicated in several results in Section 2.2.3, also carry an inherent
meaning of tradeoffs or relative importances between the different criteria. Hence,
the maybe most elegant approach to model the decision maker’s preferences is in
terms of a real-valued function s : Y → R so that
y1 ≺ y2 if and only if s(y1) < s(y2) for all y1, y2 ∈ Y (2.62)
For deterministic choice problems, such a function is usually called a value function,
whereas the term utility function is commonly used for decision problems that also
involve risks and uncertainties. Consequently, the theory that is concerned with
this approach is typically known as value and utility theory (Fishburn, 1964, 1970;
Keeney and Raiffa, 1976) and due to its significant interdisciplinary impacts still a
very active field of study (compare part IV in Figueira et al., 2005).
The formulation of a value or utility function has the main advantage that
it enables the direct assessment of the complete preference structure of the decision
maker and thus does not require the aforementioned distinction between optimiza-
tion and decision making. However, it is also clear that the construction of such a
function is usually quite difficult if not impossible, as the decision maker is usually
not capable to precisely specify all his preferences in terms of the required scalar-
ization parameters. Therefore, another approach is to merely assume some more
generic preference assumptions to yield a set of potential candidates from among
which the decision maker may choose based on additional preferences revealed dur-
ing the decision process or further criteria not included in the original optimization
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model. Many of these assumptions have their origin in the study of social wealth,
economic welfare, and the distribution of incomes, and we restrict our discussion to
only three of the most common principles with an immediate relevance to multiob-
jective programming and some later aspects in this text.
Already highlighted in Definition 2.2.12, the traditional and still most com-
mon solution concept in multiobjective programming is that of Pareto efficiency
which stems from the economic Edgeworth-Pareto Principle
y1 ≺ y2 if y1i < y2i for some 1 ≤ i ≤ m and y1j ≤ y2j for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m (2.63)
that is independently introduced into the economic literature by Edgeworth (1881)
and Pareto (1896). The predominant use of this principle indicates its wide ac-
ceptance and validity for multiobjective programming, optimization, and decision
making, although it usually requires further refinement for the latter as it usually
does not imply a unique preferred decision but only a set of efficient decisions or
nondominated outcomes. In particular, since this principle equates overall improve-
ment with improvement in any individual component, it does not model any tradeoff
between objectives, say that a relatively large reduction in one objective may be able
to compensate a small increase in some other objective component.
One possible refinement of the Edgeworth-Pareto Principle is commonly
known as the Principle of Transfers and independently formulated by Pigou (1912,
1932) and Dalton (1920). This principle states that given an outcome y with yi < yj
for two different indices i and j, then
y + δei − δej ≺ y for all 0 < δ < yj − yi (2.64)
with the interpretation that any outcome with two unequal objective components
can be improved by transferring a certain amount from the larger to the smaller
objective so to reduce the difference between these two components. In particular,
if all objective components are identical, then further improvement with respect
to this principle is not possible so that we usually combine the Edgeworth-Pareto
Principle with the Principle of Transfers. Recently, this approach is also studied
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in the context of multiobjective programming as the concept of equitable efficiency
(Kostreva and Ogryczak, 1999; Kostreva et al., 2004; Baatar and Wiecek, 2006).
Very similar to the max-norm scalarization, Rawls (1958, 1971) essentially
formulates the same idea as a Principle of Justice
y1 ≺ y2 if max{y1i : 1 ≤ i ≤ m} < max{y2i : 1 ≤ i ≤ m} (2.65)
so that an outcome y1 is preferred over y2 as long as the maximal component of y1
is smaller than the maximal component of y2. The partial order associated with this
principle is also called themax-order and can further be modified to the lexicographic
order introduced by Debreu (1954) and Georgescu-Roegen (1954)
y1 ≺ y2 if and only if y1i < y2i for some 1 ≤ i ≤ m
and y1j = y
2
j for all 1 ≤ j ≤ i− 1
(2.66)
which, in fact, establishes a total order on the set of outcomes. While preference
with respect to the max-order is defined based on the smaller of the maximum com-
ponents, for the lexicographic order we usually assume that all objectives are ranked
according to their relative importances so that we can identify a preferred outcome
yˆ based on a sequential elimination of outcomes using lexicographic optimization
yˆi := min{yi : yj = yˆj for all 1 ≤ j ≤ i− 1 and y ∈ Y } for all i = 1, . . . ,m (2.67)
In particular, similar to the approach using a value or utility function, a lexicographic
order gives rise to a unique preferred outcome, and some of the relationships between
utility theory and lexicographic orders are discussed in Fishburn (1974). Recently,
Ehrgott (2005) also combines lexicographic optimization with the max-order to de-
fine a lexicographic max-ordering approach for multiobjective programming, and
many other variants of objective ranking and elimination methods exist (compare
part III in Figueira et al., 2005) but are not needed in the context of this text.
The existing literature on other preference models in multiple criteria de-
cision making is extensive and also includes many recent developments for more
general decision rules (Greco et al., 2000; Fortemps et al., 2004), rough sets (Greco
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et al., 1999; Fortemps et al., 2004), and fuzzy measures (S lowin´ski, 1998; Greco et al.,
1999; Fodor et al., 2000; Grabisch and Labreuche, 2005). Nevertheless, we also omit
the exposition of any of these approaches as they are of no immediate relevance
to our discussion. Instead, we now briefly highlight the few existing works that
model preferences based on the concept of domination or domination structures in
an interplay of multiple criteria decision making with multiobjective programming.
Following his original definition of a domination structure and the closer
investigation of the special case of cones, Yu (1973, 1974, 1975) also describes some
specific applications of either completely or partially known domination cones for
decision making under certainty and uncertainty, respectively. In further general-
ization, Bergstresser et al. (1976) investigate the consequences of extending domina-
tion structures from convex cones to convex sets and derive conditions that require
the underlying domination structure be constant, and Lin (1976) compares these
new concepts to traditional Pareto optimality and shows how domination struc-
tures can also be used to generalize the notion of utility functions. The relevance
of domination structures for solution concepts in multicriteria games is examined in
Bergstresser and Yu (1977), and Tanino et al. (1980) again study domination cones
for preferences in the context of cardinal utility theory and group decision making.
In the general context of fuzzy set theory, Yu and Leitmann (1977) discuss
relationships between domination and confidence structures for Bayesian decision
making, whereas the new notions of fuzzy cones and fuzzy dual cones are introduced
by Takeda and Nishida (1980) to model preferences that are not known precisely but
only fuzzily determined. Also for the case of unknown preferences, Ramesh et al.
(1988, 1989) and independently Ko¨ksalan (1989) extend an earlier deterministic
method (Korhonen et al., 1984; Ko¨ksalan et al., 1988) that uses pairwise comparisons
and sequential elimination to construct a convex domination cone that describes the
underlying preference structure of the decision maker. Several other modifications to
this approach are later proposed by Prasad et al. (1997) to improve its convergence
and further reduce some of the required preference information that need to be
obtained from or specified by the decision maker.
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Based on the notion of tradeoffs between and relative importances of the
different objectives, Noghin (1997) proposes the use of convex polyhedral cones to
refine the traditional concept of Pareto optimality, and following his work Hunt and
Wiecek (2003) and Hunt (2004) formulate and study two general classes of convex
polyhedral cones to model both preferences and tradeoffs as specified by the decision
maker. Also within the more recent literature, Wu (2004) again uses convex cones to
describe preferences for fuzzy multiobjective programs, and Yun et al. (2004) finally
suggest a new model that incorporates various preference structures of decision
makers in the context of data envelopment analysis.
In the majority of these reviewed papers that use the concept of domination
structures for modeling preferences of the decision maker, we find that the chosen
model is described by a constant domination set and typically by a constant convex
cone. Based on the results in Section 2.1.3, however, this implies that the set of dom-
inated directions is identical for every outcome which usually imposes quite severe
restrictions on the underlying preference assumptions. In particular, the principles
of both transfers (2.64) and justice (2.65) cannot be modeled by a constant cone
(Baatar and Wiecek, 2006), and the occurrence of variable or changing preferences
is long recognized also in many other economic choice and practical decision making
situations (Basmann, 1956; Hammond, 1976; Grout, 1982; Sprumont, 1996; Gul and
Pesendorfer, 2005, among others).
To our best knowledge, however, we are aware of only two current papers that
explicitly address variable domination structures for multiobjective programming,
namely in the context of nonlinear scalarization for multicriteria decision making
problems and variational inequalities (Chen and Yang, 2002; Chen et al., 2005a).
These papers, however, do not discuss the possible role of domination structures for
the modeling of preferences, and we also do not know of any other paper that can
directly be related to preference modeling using a variable domination structure.
Hence, this situation motivates one of our own particular research objectives that is
further addressed at the end of this chapter in Section 2.4.
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2.3.3 Interactive and Decomposition Methods
We emphasize in the earlier sections that the ultimate task in solving a
multiple criteria decision making problem is the selection of a final alternative which
usually depends on the subjective evaluation and preferences of a decision maker. We
also point out that this selection can be quite difficult if this preference information is
not articulated or described in a quantitative manner, possibly hindered by too many
decisions to choose from or too many objectives to simultaneously take into account.
With reference to various parts of the decision making and engineering literature, we
now give a brief overview of two different approaches that are suggested to facilitate
the articulation of preferences and enable the consideration of multiple criteria using
interactive and decomposition methods, respectively.
Based on the presentation in Miettinen (1999, 2002) and Korhonen (2005),
we generally distinguish the following four cases for the collection of preferences from
the decision maker. First, several methods exist that do no depend on any subjective
input but find a final decision based on a completely determined set of decision
rules or a globally valid optimality concept. In fact, some of these methods are used
quite commonly and include the important methods of compromise programming
(Yu, 1972; Zeleny, 1973) to approximate the ideal point or the approaches based
on max-norms and max-orders (Ehrgott, 2005) which we present in Section 2.3.2.
While not of primary interest for practical decision making, however, these methods
are particularly useful for implementation into computer software and automated
decision making when preferences are not available or completely unknown.
On the other hand, if the decision maker is fully knowledgeable about all his
preferences, then we can formulate an associated value function and directly find the
preferred decision without further decision making but based on the optimal solu-
tion of the corresponding single objective program. Since, in this case, the complete
preference information is revealed before we actually generate any efficient decision,
these methods are also known as a priori methods. Alternatively, although based on
the solution of multiple optimization problems, this class also includes several out-
ranking methods such as lexicographic max-ordering or lexicographic optimization
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(Ehrgott, 2005) together with approaches based on the analytic hierarchy process
(Saaty, 1980) or goal programming (Charnes and Cooper, 1977; Ignizio, 1983; Lee
and Olson, 1999). Clearly, these methods are convenient and computationally effi-
cient because we do not need to generate any decision that is not preferred by the
decision maker, but usually not very useful in practice if preferences are partially
unknown or not readily articulated by the decision maker.
Hence, a more common approach is to merely assume a set of general prefer-
ence principles, model the underlying preference or domination structure, and then
find a finite representation of the corresponding efficient or nondominated set for
further consideration by the decision maker, essentially following our discussion in
Section 2.3.1. In these cases, we usually assume that the decision maker is capable to
further specify his preferences after the preliminary optimization stage based on pair-
wise comparisons, ranking procedures, or suitable visualization techniques, provided
their practicality for a reasonable number of generated alternatives. Consequently,
since the decision making stage now succeeds the optimization, in distinction to the
former we also call these approaches a posteriori methods. These methods, how-
ever, often share the common drawback that many solutions may be generated that
eventually are of no real interest to the decision maker.
Several procedures that are based on a progressive articulation of prefer-
ences attempt to overcome the drawbacks of a priori and a posteriori methods by
gathering partial preference information already during the optimization stage. In
these interactive methods, only one or very few initial solutions are generated and,
possibly together with additional information such as their associated tradeoffs, pre-
sented to the decision maker for his subsequent consideration. Since the number of
solutions is kept sufficiently small, we usually assume that the decision maker is
able to evaluate and select the most preferred among these solutions and possibly
specify further preference information revealed during this decision process. Based
on the current and past choices of the decision maker, we then generate a new set
of solutions and iterate the procedure until the decision maker finds a satisfying
solution or decides to otherwise terminate the overall decision making process.
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One of the major advantages of this interactive decision making scheme is
that the decision maker does not need to specify all preferences a priori, but can
still influence the generation of efficient decisions and to a certain degree explore the
nondominated set by progressively revealing preferences after learning more about
the proposed alternatives and the overall problem in general. Some of the classic
and best known interactive methods include the Geoffrion-Dyer-Feinberg or GDF
method by Geoffrion et al. (1972), the interactive surrogate worth tradeoff method
by Chankong and Haimes (1978, 1983), the methods by Zionts and Wallenius (1983)
for linear problems and by Steuer and Choo (1983) and Steuer (1986) who make
prominent use of the weighted-Chebyshev norm. Jaszkiewicz and S lowin´ski (1995)
formulate an approach based on the analogy of a light beam search, and the methods
by Narula et al. (1994) and Wierzbicki (1999) also make use of reference directions
and points, respectively. Highlighting the proximal-bundle method originally intro-
duced by Miettinen and Ma¨kela¨ (1995), most recently Hakanen (2006) also reviews
several other interactive methods (see Miettinen, 1999, 2002; Korhonen, 2005, for
many more) and examines their potential for real-life applications with a particular
focus on chemical process design.
Hence, we summarize that the main idea of interactive methods is to organize
the complete decision making process as a sequence of more manageable selection
problems with only a small number of possible alternatives to support decision
makers in both learning about and articulation of their individual preferences when
initially unknown or only difficult to reveal. Instead of reducing the number of
alternatives, however, we can also choose to restrict the number of objectives that
we consider simultaneously by adopting a suitable decomposition technique. While
many different decomposition approaches exist, the common underlying idea again is
to simplify an original and relatively difficult problem as a collection of auxiliary and
comparably more tractable subproblems that can be solved separately and properly
coordinated so so obtain an optimal solution for the original problem.
Besides the conceptual simplification of the original problem and its over-
all reduction in dimensionality, Michelena and Papalambros (1997) also enumerate
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several other reasons for decomposing a general problem which primarily include
various computational benefits in terms of both reliability and algorithm speed, the
enhancement of parallel and distributed computing, reduced programming and de-
bugging effort, and the possibility of employing different solution techniques for the
different decomposed subproblems. To review some of the existing methods and
address their relevance to decision problems with multiple criteria, we now span
a wide variety of decomposition techniques from mathematical and multiobjective
programming as well as design optimization and systems engineering. Since the lit-
erature for especially the latter is extremely vast, however, we only highlight some of
the methods of most relevance to our own work and, at the same time, point to a few
selected papers that emphasize the general versatility of decomposition approaches
in multiobjective programming, decision making, and engineering design.
In the context of single objective mathematical programming, most decom-
position approaches are based on the early results by Dantzig and Wolfe (1961) for
linear and Benders (1962) for mixed-variable programs and utilize a special struc-
ture of the underlying decision set to decompose the problem with respect to its
decision variables or constraints (Conejo et al., 2006). While Burkard et al. (1985)
provide a fundamental exposition of general decomposition principles which also
apply to multiobjective programs and decision problems (Bogetoft and Tind, 1989),
the specific cases of Dantzig-Wolfe and Benders decomposition are further extended
to multiobjective programs with block diagonal structure (Yang et al., 1988) and
cone constraints (Csergo˝ffy, 2001, among others). For decision making in a fuzzy
environment (Bellman and Zadeh, 1970), these two methods are also combined with
interactive decision making procedures (Sakawa and Kato, 1997, 1998), genetic al-
gorithms (Kato and Sakawa, 1997, 1998), and multilevel optimization (see Sakawa,
2002, and references therein). Finally, a more general decomposition technique
based on a hybrid method that combines the principle of optimality for dynamic
programming with fuzzy set theory is discussed in Hussein and Abo-Sinna (1993).
While the above mentioned approaches are motivated from single objec-
tive programming for which decompositions are naturally restricted to the decision
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space, for a multiobjective program we can also decompose its outcome and prefer-
ence space and, additionally, an associated parameter space if we solve the problem
using a parametrized scalarization function. For the latter, Zeleny (1974) studies
multiparametric decompositions and develops a weight decomposition method for
linear multiobjective programs which Solanki and Cohon (1989) combine with the
noninferior set estimation method proposed by Cohon (1978). Parameter decompo-
sitions for generalized Chebyshev norms are studied by Dauer and Osman (1985) for
convex problems and by Kassem (1997) in the context of fuzzy multiobjective pro-
gramming. Furthermore, Lam and Choo (1995) employ a linear goal programming
method to determine objective weights used for a decomposition of the preference
space, and Benson and Sun (2000, 2002) again consider parameter decompositions
for weighted sums that result in corresponding decompositions of the outcome space.
Another classification of decomposition approaches for multiobjective pro-
grams distinguishes multilevel or hierarchical decomposition from nonhierarchical
optimization based on the coordination or linking mechanisms and coupling relation-
ships between the different decomposed subproblems (for an overview, see Lieber-
man, 1992). In hierarchical coordination approaches, all subproblems are solved
independently as separate optimization problems and then communicate their so-
lutions to a coordinating master problem that achieves an overall optimal solution
by determination of linking or coupling variables (Mesarovic´ et al., 1970a,b). In
nonhierarchical methods, two or more subproblems typically coordinate with each
other by bidirectional interventions but without a superior master problem (Shankar
et al., 1993), and, in addition, several combinations of these two approaches exist
and include the hierarchical overlapping coordination by Macko and Haimes (1978)
and its later modification proposed by Shima (1991).
In the context of multiple criteria decision making, Lazimy (1986) proposes
an interactive decomposition scheme that decomposes the original problem into
a collection of biobjective subproblems that are coordinated by a standard linear
program as master problem to facilitate preference assessments and tradeoffs. In
a fundamental research monograph, Haimes et al. (1990) describe and examine a
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variety of different hierarchical decomposition and coordination strategies for multi-
objective programs and large-scale systems. As one possible application, they focus
on organizational decompositions that involve multiple decision makers for which
different subproblems model the individual subunits with their private objectives,
while the coordination of the overall solution is assigned to a superior unit which
harmonizes the behavior of the subordinate subsystems. Based on its practical rel-
evance for many real organizations with departmental decision making hierarchies
and various other large-scale systems in many different disciplines, much attention
is dedicated to these particular approaches (Findeisen et al., 1980; Onana, 1989;
Haimes et al., 1990; Go´mez et al., 2001; Caballero et al., 2002).
In addition, a countless number of ad-hoc decomposition strategies is pro-
posed for specific applications in management, including resource allocation (Lee
and Rho, 1985), transportation (Korchemkin, 1986), or plant location (Ferna´ndez
and Puerto, 2003), as well as in engineering, for example, machine tool spindle sys-
tems (Montusiewicz and Osyczka, 1990), proprotor aerodynamics (Tadghighi, 1998),
or wing design (Wrenn and Dovi, 1988; Tribes et al., 2005). Other decomposition
approaches exist in the context of structural and multidisciplinary optimization
(Sobieszczanski-Sobieski et al., 1985; Sobieszczanski-Sobieski and Kodiyalam, 2001;
Blouin et al., 2004; Mehr and Tumer, 2006) and include traditional collaborative
optimization (Kroo, 1996; Tappeta and Renaud, 1997; Chen et al., 2005b; Haftka
and Watson, 2006; Rabeau et al., 2006) or, more recently, concurrent subspace op-
timization (Huang and Bloebaum, 2004) and analytical target cascading (Lassiter
et al., 2005). For problems in engineering design, a model-based decomposition is
proposed in distinction to object, aspect, and sequential decomposition (Michelena
and Papalambros, 1997; Wagner and Papalambros, 1999) and uses a decomposi-
tion analysis to find an optimal decomposition based on sets of criteria that can be
computed in parallel or need to be evaluated in sequence (Yoshimura et al., 2003).
In the same context, we also find some decomposition methods for which
the subsequent coordination is accomplished in the form of an interactive decision
making procedure (Tappeta and Renaud, 1999; Tappeta et al., 2000; Azarm and
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Narayanan, 2000; Verma et al., 2005) or enhanced by providing preference infor-
mation such as tradeoffs (Kasprzak and Lewis, 2000) obtained from a sensitivity
analysis (Gunawan and Azarm, 2005; Li et al., 2005). Furthermore, several related
studies emphasize the importance of visualizing the optimization process (Messac
and Chen, 2000), the design data (Eddy and Lewis, 2002; Stump et al., 2002, 2003,
2004) and the Pareto frontiers (Agrawal et al., 2004, 2005; Lotov et al., 2004, 2005;
Mattson and Messac, 2005) for facilitated problem perception and decision making.
Three surveys on general coordination approaches are given by Coates et al. (2000),
Whitfield et al. (2000), and with a special focus on decentralized design by Whitfield
et al. (2002). In case of the latter, the issue of convergence is addressed in Chanron
and Lewis (2005) and Chanron et al. (2005) who use game theoretic concepts to
model and analyze the competing interest of the different decision makers.
For many interactive and decomposition methods, however, convergence is
frequently not addressed among the major topics of interest as especially the former
depend on subjective input by the decision maker who might also change his mind
and adjust his preferences throughout the overall decision making process. Hence,
since the final preferred decision is in large part problem dependent, the only con-
ditions that are usually imposed on any decision making procedure is that every
proposed solution is in fact efficient for the overall problem and that, in principle,
every efficient decision can be found by suitable coordination and based on the in-
put received by the decision maker. These two requirements stimulate our later
investigation of objective decompositions for multiobjective programs and the cor-
responding research objective now outlined in the concluding section of this chapter.
2.4 Research Statement and Objectives
After the acquisition of some fundamentals from multiobjective program-
ming, the discussion of its relevance for practical decision making, and a broad
review of several ideas within the mathematical, economic, and engineering liter-
ature, we can draw the first conclusion that in spite of numerous advances in all
these fields the selection of preferred alternatives for decision problems with multiple
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criteria remains subject to various persistent challenges. As we all know from our
personal experience and exposure to the real world, making an ultimate decision
among several possibilities is still a very demanding task and often complicated by
the fact that we are not fully aware of our underlying preferences for a too large
number of competing objectives to be considered simultaneously. We develop our
research objectives from these two observations and their extensive motivation in
our preceding critique of multiple criteria decision making in Section 2.3.
In this dissertation, we devote one chapter each to our ideas in theory,
methodology, and selected applications of multiobjective programming. Whenever
suitable, we intend to first formulate a mathematical framework that provides a rig-
orous foundation for our approaches and then use or combine concepts and results
from convex analysis, linear algebra, and mathematical programming to derive our
own and original contributions. Throughout the text, we also offer some additional
discussion and remarks to draw the connections of our results to the aforementioned
challenges in decision making, which we now highlight in further detail to prepare
the precise statement of the research questions that we subsequently plan to address.
Because preferences, in general, are not precisely known, there is a great need
for the formulation of simplified yet realistic preference models which enable the re-
duction of an initial set of alternatives to a smaller subset of potential candidates of
particular interest to the decision maker. Based on our discussion in Section 2.2.2,
the economic literature provides a series of possible preference principles in exten-
sion of the classical Pareto concept that can be used to induce new domination
structures in further refinement of the traditional Pareto cones. Related approaches
in the mathematical literature, however, are currently restricted to the use of con-
stant convex cones and, in particular, polyhedral cones and, therefore, motivate our
investigation of several new domination structures pursued in Chapter 3.
In particular, our objective in Section 3.1 is the general exploration of non-
polyhedral cones in multiobjective programming with respect to possible cone rep-
resentations and properties as well as the characterization and generation of the
corresponding nondominated sets. In further extension of constant nonpolyhedral
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cones, in Section 3.2 we first study some of the inherent shortcomings of current
models that are based on domination cones that are constant, set out to examine
the implications of replacing constant by variable cones, and then derive one specific
variable domination cone in remedy of the previously recognized model limitations.
Finally, and based on the high relevance of approximations, our focus in Section 3.3
is on the investigation of domination structures that can be used to also describe
a notion of approximate nondominance and the development of a wide variety of
approaches for the computational approximation of both the resulting efficient and
nondominated sets.
We anticipate that the accomplishment of these goals can successfully en-
hance current decision making by providing new and more flexible means to model
preferences and finding more relevant representations or approximations for those
outcomes of actual interest to the decision maker. Furthermore, and as discussed in
Section 2.2.3, the selection of the final decision can then be achieved by any suitable
enumeration, exploration, or visualization technique in possible combination with
an interactive or decomposition-based decision making procedure to further reduce
burden associated with a large number of decision criteria. Our inquiry in Chapter 4
is placed within this general framework.
In particular, our objective in Section 4.1 is to examine the consequences
of decomposing a multiobjective program with respect to its objective function and
the analysis of the corresponding efficiency relationships between the original and
resulting decomposed subproblems. In Section 4.2, we investigate how to use our
obtained results for the formulation of different interactive decision making proce-
dures that are proposed to support decision makers in finding preferred solutions
to potentially large-scale problems by merely solving the collection of smaller-sized
subproblems. Finally, we assess the practicality of our methods on an example in
Section 4.3 and several real-life applications in Chapter 5.
In the concluding Chapter 6 we view our objectives in retrospect.
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CHAPTER 3
DOMINATION CONES AND THE NONDOMINATED SET
In this chapter, we study the concept of domination in multiobjective pro-
gramming and focus on the characterization and generation of the nondominated
set when the underlying domination structure is defined in terms of different cones.
In particular, in each of the three following sections we investigate one particular
generalization of polyhedral and constant domination cones, namely to nonpolyhe-
dral cones in Section 3.1, to variable cones in Section 3.2, and to domination sets
that are translated cones in Section 3.3. The material in the first two sections is
adapted and in parts amended from the similar presentation in Engau and Wiecek
(2006) and Engau (2006), respectively, and in the third section we combine several
aspects of approximate nondominance that are initially addressed in Engau (2004)
and further developed in Engau and Wiecek (2007b,c,d). At the end of this chap-
ter, we offer a summarizing discussion of our findings together with an outlook on
possible further work in the concluding Section 3.4.
3.1 Constant Polyhedral and Nonpolyhedral Cones
Based on the fundamental observation in Section 3.1.1 that every cone can
be described by a positively homogeneous function, we derive several results that
characterize properties of cones based on the corresponding properties of the under-
lying function that can be sublinear or superlinear. We then show in Section 3.1.2
how this new cone representation can be used to establish relationships between
nondominated points with respect to a general cone and Pareto points, in general-
ization of a well known result for the polyhedral case. In Section 3.1.3, we examine
possible modifications of several scalarization methods that are originally formu-
lated for finding Pareto points to also generate nondominated points for a general
polyhedral or nonpolyhedral cone, and we illustrate our findings on three biobjective
examples in Section 3.1.4. The last Section 3.1.5 establishes some further results for
an alternative cone representation that is formulated as a special case of our pre-
vious characterization and, in this vein, also provides examples for multiobjective
programs with more than two objectives.
3.1.1 General Cone Representation and Characterization
We begin with the fundamental theorem in this section and establish the
relationship between cones and positively homogeneous functions.
Theorem 3.1.1 (Cone representation theorem). A set C ⊂ Rm is a cone if and
only if there exists a positively homogeneous function Γ : Rm → Rl such that
C ∪ {0} = C(Γ) := {c ∈ Rm : Γ(c) ≧ 0} (3.1)
Proof. We first derive that C(Γ) is indeed a cone, and then we show how every cone
that contains the origin can be described by a positively homogeneous function.
(⇐) Let Γ : Rm → Rl be a positively homogeneous function and c ∈ C(Γ).
It follows that Γ(c) ≧ 0 by definition of C(Γ) and λΓ(c) = Γ(λc) ≧ 0 for all λ > 0
because Γ is positively homogeneous. Hence, we obtain that λc ∈ C(Γ), showing
that C(Γ) is a cone.
(⇒) Let C ⊂ Rm be a cone and define Γ = (Γ1, . . . ,Γm) : Rm → Rm by
Γi(c) :=


|ci| if c ∈ C
−|ci| if c /∈ C
(3.2a)
for all i = 1, . . . ,m. The function Γ is positively homogeneous, because
Γi(λc) =


|λci| = λ|ci| = λΓi(c) if c ∈ C
−|λci| = −λ|ci| = λΓi(c) if c /∈ C
(3.2b)
and thus Γ(λc) = λΓ(c) for all λ > 0. In particular, Γ(c) ≧ 0 if and only if
c ∈ C ∪ {0}, and thus, C(Γ) = C ∪ {0}. 
After introducing the notion of a cone in Definition 2.1.9, we indicate in
Remarks 2.1.10 and 2.1.20 why we do not require that a cone necessarily contains
the origin. As a consequence of this decision, however, we now need to explicitly add
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the origin to every cone in Theorem 3.1.1 because, for any positively homogeneous
function Γ, it follows that
Γ(0) = Γ(λ · 0) = λΓ(0) for all λ > 0 (3.3)
and thus Γ(0) = 0. While a different cone definition would result in a somewhat
more elegant cone representation theorem, however, this distinction is essentially
irrelevant for all our remaining discussion.
Definition 3.1.2 (Cone induced by a positively homogeneous function). Let Γ :
Rm → Rl be a positively homogeneous function. The set
C(Γ) := {c ∈ Rm : Γ(c) ≧ 0} (3.4)
is called the cone induced by Γ.
Remark 3.1.3 (Nonuniqueness of cone representation). If the cone C = C(Γ) is
induced by a positively homogeneous function Γ, then C = C(λΓ) for all λ > 0.
Following Definition 3.1.2, we highlight four specific classes of cones that we
study in further detail throughout this complete chapter. While the first two are also
introduced in (2.33a) and (2.25b) of Definition 2.1.25, respectively, for completeness
and further comparison we again repeat their definition.
Definition 3.1.4 (Pareto cone). Let Γ : Rm → Rm be the identity Γ(c) = c. The
induced cone C(Γ) is denoted by
Rm≧ := {c ∈ Rm : c ≧ 0} (3.5)
and called the m-dimensional Pareto cone.
Definition 3.1.5 (Polyhedral cone). Let A ∈ Rl×m be a matrix and Γ : Rm → Rl
be the linear function Γ(c) = Ac. The induced cone C(Γ) is denoted by
C(A) := {c ∈ Rm : Ac ≧ 0} (3.6)
and called the polyhedral cone C(A) induced by A.
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In particular, for A = Im ∈ Rm×m the m-dimensional identity matrix, Defi-
nition 3.1.5 reduces to Definition 3.1.4 and C(Im) = Rm
≧
is the Pareto cone.
Definition 3.1.6 (P th-order cone). Let Γ : Rm → R be defined by Γ(c) = c1 −
‖c−1‖p where c−1 := (c2, . . . , cm)T ∈ Rm−1. The induced cone C(Γ) is denoted by
Cmp := {c ∈ Rm : c1 ≥ ‖c−1‖p} (3.7)
and called the m-dimensional pth-order cone.
For p = 2, Stern and Wolkowicz (1991) refer to the second-order cone Cm2
as ice-cream cone, and Ben-Tal and Nemirovski (2001) call Cm2 a Lorentz cone and
investigate its approximation by cones that are polyhedral.
The next cone is originally introduced by Bishop and Phelps (1963) and
Phelps (1974) and studied by Bednarczuk (1996) in the context of vector optimiza-
tion in more general topological spaces.
Definition 3.1.7 (Bishop-Phelps cone). Let d ∈ Rm \ {0} be a nonnegative vector,
0 < γ < 1 be a real number, and Γ : Rm → R be defined by Γ(c) = 〈c, d〉− γ‖c‖‖d‖.
The induced cone C(Γ) is denoted by
Cγ,d := {c ∈ Rm : 〈c, d〉 ≥ γ‖c‖‖d‖} (3.8)
and called the Bishop-Phelps cone over d with parameter γ.
In the following results, we first establish sufficient conditions for convexity
and pointedness of C(Γ) and, since the pointedness conditions is not satisfied for
Cmp and Cγ,d, we then show separately that both pth-order and Bishop-Phelps cones
are also convex and pointed.
Proposition 3.1.8 (Sufficient conditions for convexity and pointedness). Let Γ :
Rm → Rl be a positively homogeneous function and C(Γ) ⊂ Rm be the cone induced
by Γ. Then
(i) C(Γ) is convex if Γ is superlinear, and
(ii) C(Γ) is pointed if Γ is superlinear and Γ(c) = 0⇔ c = 0.
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Proof. Let Γ : Rm → Rl be a positively homogeneous function and C(Γ) ⊂ Rm be
its induced cone.
For (i), let c1 ∈ C(Γ) and c2 ∈ C(Γ), so Γ(c1) ≧ 0 and Γ(c2) ≧ 0. Since Γ is
superlinear, it follows that
Γ(c1 + c2) ≧ Γ(c1) + Γ(c2) ≧ 0 (3.9a)
and thus c1 + c2 ∈ C(Γ), showing that C(Γ) is convex.
For (ii), let Γ(c) = 0⇔ c = 0 and ∑ki=1 ci = 0 with ci ∈ C, so Γ(ci) ≧ 0 for
all i = 1, . . . , k. Since Γ is superlinear, it follows that
0 = Γ(0) = Γ
(
k∑
i=1
ci
)
≧
k∑
i=1
Γ(ci) ≧ 0 (3.9b)
so Γ(ci) = 0 and all ci = 0, showing that C(Γ) is pointed. 
Remark 3.1.9 (Equivalent pointedness condition for polyhedral cones). The con-
dition Γ(c) = 0 ⇔ c = 0 is always satisfied if the function Γ is injective. If Γ is
linear and thus described by a matrix, then these conditions are also equivalent and
Proposition 3.1.8 reduces to the well known characterization of pointed polyhedral
cones in Proposition 2.1.28.
Hence, it again follows that all polyhedral cones C(A) are convex, and
pointed if and only if rankA = m, or equivalently, if the linear function Γ(c) = Ac is
injective. In particular, we obtain that the Pareto cone Rm
≧
is convex and pointed,
and the same holds true for all pth-order and Bishop-Phelps cones. In these later
cases, however, only convexity follows immediately from Proposition 3.1.8 because
both Γ(c) = c1 − ‖c−1‖p and Γ(c) = 〈c, d〉 − γ‖c‖‖d‖ are superlinear, whereas in
general Γ(c) = 0 ; c = 0. Nevertheless, since Cmp and Cγ,d are convex, we can
easily show their pointedness using Proposition 2.1.13.
Proposition 3.1.10 (Convexity and pointedness of pth-order and Bishop-Phelps
cones). Every pth-order cone Cmp ⊂ Rm and every Bishop-Phelps cone Cγ,d ⊂ Rm
is convex and pointed.
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Proof. Based on our previous remarks, we only need to show that Cmp and Cγ,d are
pointed. Hence, to show that Cmp is pointed, let c ∈ Cmp and −c ∈ Cmp , so
c1 ≥ ‖c−1‖p ≥ 0 and − c1 ≥ ‖−c−1‖p = ‖c−1‖p ≥ 0 (3.10a)
It follows that c1 = 0 and c−1 = 0 which implies c = 0, showing that Cmp is pointed.
To show that Cγ,d is pointed, let c ∈ Cγ,d and −c ∈ Cγ,d, so
〈c, d〉 ≥ γ‖c‖‖d‖ ≥ 0 and 〈−c, d〉 = −〈c, d〉 ≥ γ‖c‖‖d‖ ≥ 0 (3.10b)
In this case, it follows that 〈c, d〉 = 0 and, thus, ‖c‖ = 0 which implies c = 0, showing
that Cγ,d is pointed. 
Proposition 3.1.11. Let Γ : Rm → Rl be a positively homogeneous function. If Γ
is sublinear, then
−C(−Γ) ⊆ C(Γ) (3.11)
Furthermore, the above inclusion holds in reverse if Γ is superlinear, and with equal-
ity if Γ is a linear function.
Proof. Let Γ : Rm → Rl be sublinear and c ∈ −C(−Γ), so −Γ(−c) ≧ 0. It follows
that
0 = Γ(0) = Γ(c− c) ≦ Γ(c) + Γ(−c) (3.12)
which implies Γ(c) ≧ −Γ(−c) ≧ 0, showing that c ∈ C(Γ). If, instead, Γ is super-
linear, then −Γ is sublinear and, thus, −C(Γ) ⊆ C(−Γ), or C(Γ) ⊆ −C(−Γ). If Γ
is linear, then Γ is both sublinear and superlinear and the result follows. 
3.1.2 Mapping Theorems for the Nondominated Set
In the following theorem, we establish the relationships between the image
of the nondominated set N(Y,C(Γ)) under the mapping Γ and the Pareto set of the
image Γ(Y ), based on the properties of the positively homogeneous function Γ.
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Theorem 3.1.12 (Nondominance mapping theorem). Let Y ⊂ Rm be a nonempty
set, Γ : Rm → Rl be a positively homogeneous function, and C(Γ) ⊂ Rm be the cone
induced by Γ.
(i) If Γ is sublinear, then
Γ[N(Y,C(Γ))] ⊆ N(Γ[Y ],Rl≧) (3.13a)
(ii) If Γ is superlinear and injective, then
Γ[N(Y,C(Γ))] ⊇ N(Γ[Y ],Rl≧) (3.13b)
Both inclusions become equality if Γ is linear and injective.
Proof. We only show the first two statements which then immediately imply the
third. Hence, for (i), let uˆ ∈ Γ[N(Y,C(Γ))], so uˆ = Γ(yˆ) with yˆ ∈ N(Y,C(Γ)). Then
Y ∩ (yˆ − C(Γ) \ {0}) = ∅, and hence, there does not exist y ∈ Y \ {yˆ} such that
yˆ−y ∈ C(Γ), or Γ(yˆ−y) ≧ 0. Now suppose by contradiction that uˆ /∈ N(Γ[Y ],Rl
≧
),
then there exists u = Γ(y), u 6= uˆ, so y 6= yˆ, with u ∈ Γ(Y ) ∩ (uˆ − Rl
≧
), thus
uˆ− u ∈ Rl
≧
, or Γ(yˆ)− Γ(y) ≧ 0. However, by sublinearity of Γ,
Γ(yˆ − y) + Γ(y) ≧ Γ(yˆ) =⇒ Γ(yˆ − y) ≧ Γ(yˆ)− Γ(y) ≧ 0 (3.14a)
in contradiction to the non-existence of y ∈ Y \ {yˆ} with Γ(yˆ − y) ≧ 0.
For (ii), let uˆ = Γ(yˆ) ∈ N(Γ[Y ],Rl
≧
). Then Γ[Y ] ∩ (uˆ − Rl
≧
\ {0}) = ∅, and
hence, there does not exist u ∈ Γ[Y ] \ {uˆ} such that uˆ − u ∈ Rl
≧
, or uˆ − u ≧ 0.
Since Γ is injective, Γ(y) 6= Γ(yˆ) if and only if y 6= yˆ, and so there does not exist
y ∈ Y \{yˆ} such that Γ(yˆ)−Γ(y) ≧ 0. Now suppose by contradiction that uˆ = Γ(yˆ) /∈
Γ[N(Y,C(Γ))], or yˆ /∈ N(Y,C(Γ)). Then there exists y 6= yˆ with y ∈ Y ∩ (yˆ−C(Γ)),
thus yˆ − y ∈ C(Γ), or Γ(yˆ − y) ≧ 0. However, by superlinearity of Γ,
Γ(yˆ) ≧ Γ(yˆ − y) + Γ(y) =⇒ Γ(yˆ)− Γ(y) ≧ Γ(yˆ − y) ≧ 0 (3.14b)
in contradiction to the non-existence of y ∈ Y \ {yˆ} with Γ(yˆ)− Γ(y) ≧ 0. 
In particular, if Γ is a linear function, then Γ(c) = Ac for some matrix
A ∈ Rl×m and Theorem 3.1.12 reduces to a well known result for polyhedral cones
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that is widely established throughout the literature (see Yu, 1985; Sawaragi et al.,
1985; Weidner, 1990; Noghin, 1997; Cambini et al., 2003; Hunt and Wiecek, 2003,
among several others).
Theorem 3.1.13 (Nondominance mapping theorem for polyhedral cones). Let Y ⊂
Rm be a nonempty set, A ∈ Rl×m be a real l ×m matrix, and C(A) ⊂ Rm be the
polyhedral cone induced by A. Then
A[N(Y,C(A))] ⊆ N(A[Y ],Rl≧) (3.15a)
If C(A) is pointed, or equivalently, if rankA = m or c→ Ac is injective, then
A[N(Y,C(A))] = N(A[Y ],Rl≧) (3.15b)
Hence, the problem of finding the nondominated set of Y with respect to
a pointed polyhedral cone C(A) is equivalent to finding the Pareto set of A[Y ]
which, in principle, can be accomplished using a suitable scalarization method from
Section 2.2.3. In general, however, if the cone C(Γ) is not polyhedral, then equality
in Theorem 3.1.12 cannot be expected so that we need to find alternative or more
direct means to generate nondominated outcomes for a general cone.
3.1.3 Scalarization Methods for General Cones
In this part, we discuss several of the scalarization methods from Section 2.2.3
that are originally formulated for finding Pareto outcomes and show how these meth-
ods can be modified to also allow for a general (polyhedral or nonpolyhedral) cone
C. In particular, we first establish this generalization for the hybrid scalariza-
tion method and then derive the corresponding results for the weighted-sum, the
constrained-objective, and the Benson method as special cases.
Proposition 3.1.14 (Hybrid scalarization). Let Y ⊂ Rm be a set, C ⊂ Rm be a
convex cone, w ∈ C∗ \{0} (a nonzero element of the dual cone in Definition 2.1.19),
b ∈ Rm, and yˆ ∈ Y be optimal for the hybrid scalarization
HB(w, b): Minimize 〈w, y〉 subject to b− y ∈ C and y ∈ Y (3.16)
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(i) If yˆ is strictly optimal, then yˆ ∈ N(Y,C).
(ii) If w ∈ C∗s , then yˆ ∈ N(Y,C).
In any case, yˆ ∈ Nw(Y,C).
Proof. Let yˆ ∈ Y be optimal for HB(w, b) with w ∈ C∗ \{0} and, by contradiction,
assume that yˆ /∈ N(Y,C). Then there exists y ∈ (yˆ −C \ {0}) ∩ Y , so yˆ = y + c for
some c ∈ C \{0}. The point y is feasible for HB(w, b), because b− y = b− yˆ+ c ∈ C
by feasibility of yˆ for HB(w, b) and convexity of C, but
〈w, yˆ〉 = 〈w, y + c〉 = 〈w, y〉+ 〈w, c〉


≥ 〈w, y〉 in case (i) as w ∈ C∗
> 〈w, y〉 in case (ii) as w ∈ C∗s
(3.17)
in contradiction to the (in case (i): strict) optimality of yˆ for HB(w, b).
In any case, if w ∈ C∗ \ {0} and yˆ is optimal for HB(w, b), then w ∈ (intC)∗s
by Proposition 2.1.21 and yˆ ∈ N(Y, intC) = Nw(Y,C) by (ii). 
After dropping the constraints b − y ∈ C in the hybrid method, we obtain
the corresponding result for the weighted-sum scalarization.
Proposition 3.1.15 (Weighted-sum scalarization). Let Y ⊂ Rm be a set, C ⊂ Rm,
w ∈ C∗ \ {0}, and yˆ ∈ Y be optimal for the weighted-sum scalarization
WS(w): Minimize 〈w, y〉 subject to y ∈ Y (3.18)
(i) If yˆ is strictly optimal, then yˆ ∈ N(Y,C).
(ii) If w ∈ C∗s , then yˆ ∈ N(Y,C).
In any case, yˆ ∈ Nw(Y,C).
This result is similarly established in Sawaragi et al. (1985), and its proof
follows as for the hybrid scalarization in Proposition 3.1.14. In particular, while
the previous result requires that C is a convex cone to guarantee feasibility of the
contradicting outcome y for the additional cone constraints b − y ∈ C, we drop
these constraints for the weighted-sum method so that C does not need to be convex
anymore and, moreover, can also be a general domination set.
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For specific choices of the weighting parameter w, we can also derive the
corresponding results for the constrained-objective and the Benson method as special
cases, again under the assumption that C is a convex cone.
Proposition 3.1.16 (Constrained-objective scalarization). Let Y ⊂ Rm be a set,
C ⊂ Rm be a convex cone, ek ∈ C∗ be the kth unit vector, b ∈ Rm, and yˆ ∈ Y be
optimal for the constrained-objective scalarization
COk(b): Minimize yk subject to b− y ∈ C and y ∈ Y (3.19)
(i) If yˆ is strictly optimal, then yˆ ∈ N(Y,C).
(ii) If ek ∈ C∗s , then yˆ ∈ N(Y,C).
In any case, yˆ ∈ Nw(Y,C).
The proof is clear from Proposition 3.1.14 with w = ek. In particular, we
note that the conditions ek ∈ C∗ and ek ∈ C∗s are equivalent to ck ≥ 0 and ck > 0
for all c ∈ C, respectively. Similarly, for w = (1, . . . , 1)T ∈ C∗, or ∑mi=1 ci ≥ 0 for
all c ∈ C, and if b = y◦ ∈ Y is chosen as reference point, then the hybrid method
reduces to the scalarization proposed by Benson but for a general convex cone C.
Proposition 3.1.17 (Benson scalarization). Let Y ⊂ Rm be a set, C ⊂ Rm be a
convex cone, w = (1, . . . , 1)T ∈ C∗ be the vector with all components equal to 1,
y◦ ∈ Y , and cˆ ∈ C be optimal for the Benson scalarization
B(y◦): Maximize
m∑
i=1
ci subject to y
◦ − c = y ∈ Y and c ∈ C (3.20)
(i) If cˆ is strictly optimal, then yˆ = y◦ − cˆ ∈ N(Y,C).
(ii) If w ∈ C∗s , then yˆ = y◦ − cˆ ∈ N(Y,C).
In any case, yˆ = y◦ − cˆ ∈ Nw(Y,C).
Proof. Since the constraints y◦ − c = y ∈ Y and c ∈ C can equivalently be written
as y◦ − y = c ∈ C and y ∈ Y , and because the maximization of
m∑
i=1
ci =
m∑
i=1
(y◦i − yi) =
m∑
i=1
y◦i −
m∑
i=1
yi (3.21)
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is equivalent to the (negative) minimization of
∑m
i=1 yi, Proposition 3.1.17 follows
from Proposition 3.1.14 with w = (1, . . . , 1)T . 
Hence, in addition to the Pascoletti-Serafini scalarization in Definition 2.2.36,
we now can also use the the hybrid, the constrained-objective, and the Benson
method to generate nondominated outcomes for a general domination cone C, or
the weighted-sum method for an arbitrary domination set D.
3.1.4 Graphical Examples for Biobjective Programs
We illustrate the use of the nondominance mapping theorems in Section 3.1.2
and the scalarization methods in Section 3.1.3 for finding the nondominated set of
the unit disk Y = {y ∈ R2 : y21 + y22 ≤ 1} for the three choices of C ⊂ R2 depicted
in Figure 3.1, namely the two-dimensional Pareto cone C1 = R2
≧
(on the left), the
polyhedral cone C2 = C(A) with matrix A = ( 1 01 1 ) ∈ R2×2 (in the center), and any
two-dimensional pth-order cone C3 = C2p = {c = (c1, c2) ∈ R2 : c1 ≥ ‖c2‖p} (on
the right). Furthermore, the boundary of Y is the unit circle which we denote by
bdY = {y ∈ R2 : y21 + y22 = 1} for later convenience.
y1
y2
Y
C1
y1
y2
Y
C2
y1
y2
Y
C3
Figure 3.1 The unit disk as outcome set Y ⊂ R2 and the two-dimensional Pareto
(left), polyhedral (center), and pth-order cone (right) in Examples 3.1.18–3.1.20
Example 3.1.18 (Pareto cone). Let Γ1 : R2 → R2 with Γ1(c) = c be the identity,
so C(Γ1) = C(I2) = R2
≧
be the Pareto cone depicted in Figure 3.1 (left). Then
Γ1[N(Y,C(Γ1))] = N(Y,C(I2)) = N(Y,R2≧) (3.22a)
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and Theorems 3.1.12 and 3.1.13 apply trivially. In particular, in this case it imme-
diately follows that
N(Y,C(Γ1)) = N(Y,R2≧) = {y ∈ bdY : y ≤ 0} (3.22b)
as shown in Figure 3.2 (left). Furthermore, since the Pareto cone is both con-
vex and self-dual so that, in particular, ek ∈ C∗ = Rm
≧
for all k = 1, . . . ,m and
w = (1, . . . , 1)T ∈ Rm
≧
, Propositions 3.1.14 (hybrid), 3.1.15 (weighted-sum), 3.1.16
(constrained-objective) and 3.1.17 (Benson) apply to all four scalarization methods
in their original formulation for the Pareto case. For further illustration, Figure 3.3
(left) again depicts the Pareto cone together with three possible choices for the
weighting vector for both the hybrid and the weighted-sum scalarization method.
y1
y2
Y
N(Y,R2≥)
y1
y2
Y
A[Y ]
N(Y,C(A))
N(A[Y ],R2≥)
y1
y2
Y
B[Y ]
N(Y,C(B))
N(B[Y ],R2≥)
 
 
@
@
Figure 3.2 Nondominance mapping of N(Y,C(Γ)) and N(Γ[Y ],R2
≧
) for Pareto
(left), polyhedral (center), and pth-order cone (right) in Examples 3.1.18–3.1.20
Example 3.1.19 (Polyhedral cone). Let Γ2 : R2 → R2 with Γ2(c) = Ac for A =
( 1 01 1 ) ∈ R2×2 be a linear function, so C(Γ2) = C(A) be the induced polyhedral cone
shown in Figure 3.1 (center). Since rankA = 2, it follows that C(A) is pointed and
Γ2 is injective, so that both Theorem 3.1.12 and 3.1.13 apply and give that
Γ2[N(Y,C(Γ2))] = A[N(Y,C(A))] = N(A[Y ],R2≧) (3.23a)
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In particular, mapping these sets under the inverse A−1 =
(
1 0
−1 1
)
of Γ2 we find that
N(Y,C(Γ2)) = A−1[N(A[Y ],R2≧)] = {y ∈ bdY : y2 ≤ 0 and y1 − y2 ≤ 0} (3.23b)
as shown in Figure 3.2 (center). Furthermore, since C(A) is convex with dual
cone C(A)∗ = C(A∗) for A∗ =
(−1 1
0 1
) ∈ R2×2, Propositions 3.1.14 and 3.1.15
apply respectively for the hybrid and the weighted-sum scalarization with possible
weighting vectors w ∈ C(A∗) \ {0} as illustrated in Figure 3.3 (center). However,
since A∗e1 = ( 00 ) ≯ 0 and A
∗e2 = A∗1 = ( 01 ) ≯ 0, only (i) of Propositions 3.1.16
and 3.1.17 apply to the constrained-objective and Benson method, respectively. In
particular, the formulation of the hybrid scalarization becomes
Minimize 〈w, y〉 subject to A(y◦ − y) ≧ 0 and y ∈ Y (3.24)
and thus, together with the constrained-objective and Benson method as special
cases, can be solved as a linear program in the outcome space.
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Figure 3.3 Dual cones and possible choices of the weighting vector for the Pareto
(left), polyhedral (center), and pth-order cone (right) in Examples 3.1.18–3.1.20
Example 3.1.20 (P th-order cone). Let Γ3 : R2 → R2 with Γ3(c) = c1 − ‖c2‖p =
c1 − |c2| be a superlinear function and C(Γ3) = C2p be the induced pth-order cone,
shown in Figure 3.1 (right). Since Γ3(c1, c2) = Γ
3(c1,−c2) for all c = (c1, c2)T ∈ R2,
however, Γ3 is not injective so that both Theorems 3.1.12 and 3.1.13 do not apply
to the pth-order cone C2p when induced by the superlinear function Γ
3.
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However, since c1 − |c2| ≥ 0 can equivalently be written as c1 − c2 ≥ 0
and c1 + c2 ≥ 0, let Γ4(c) = Bc with B =
(
1 −1
1 1
) ∈ R2×2 be a linear function, so
C(Γ3) = C(Γ4) = C(B). Then rankB = 2, C(B) is pointed and, in this case, Γ4 is
also injective so that both Theorems 3.1.12 and 3.1.13 apply and give that
Γ4[N(Y,C(Γ4))] = B[N(Y,C(B))] = N(B[Y ],R2≧) (3.25a)
Now mapping these sets under the inverse B−1 = 12
(
1 1
−1 1
)
of Γ4, it follows that
N(Y,C(Γ3)) = N(Y,C(Γ4)) = B−1[N(B[Y ],R2≧)]
= {y ∈ bdY : y1 + y2 ≤ 0 and y1 − y2 ≤ 0}
(3.25b)
as shown in Figure 3.2 (right). Furthermore, since C(B) is convex and self-dual,
Propositions 3.1.14 and 3.1.15 apply to hybrid method and weighted-sum with w ∈
C(B) \ {0}, illustrated in Figure 3.3 (right). However, since Be1 = ( 00 ) ≯ 0 and
Be2 = B1 = ( 02 ) ≯ 0, again only part (i) of Propositions 3.1.16 and 3.1.17 apply to
the constrained-objective and Benson method, while the hybrid method becomes
Minimize 〈w, y〉 subject to B(y◦ − y) ≧ 0 and y ∈ Y (3.26)
and, as before, can be solved as a linear program.
We note that since all cones in the three above examples eventually turn
out to be polyhedral, in each case the general nondominance mapping theorem in
Theorem 3.1.12 reduces to the special case for polyhedral cones in Theorem 3.1.13.
In fact, Eichfelder (2006) recently shows that every closed convex cone C ⊂ R2 is
polyhedral, and while we already know from Remark 3.1.3 that cone representations
are not unique, in general, we can further conclude that every closed convex cone
C in R2 can also be induced by a linear function or matrix. In particular, it follows
that both Theorems 3.1.12 and 3.1.13 can be applied to all biobjective programs for
which the underlying domination cone is closed and convex and suitably described
in terms of an injective linear function or matrix with full column rank m = 2.
Consequently, to also illustrate situations in which Theorem 3.1.12 provides
a true generalization of Theorem 3.1.13, it is not sufficient to only discuss biobjective
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programs but we need to study multiobjective programs N(Y,C) with Y ⊂ Rm and
m > 2. Since in these cases, however, a convenient graphical illustration is usually
not possible, we choose an alternative path and derive some further analytical results
for truly nonpolyhedral cones in the following section.
3.1.5 Other Cone Representations and Further Results
In conclusion of our discussion of polyhedral and nonpolyhedral cones, we
derive some more specific results for the class of cones that are induced by positively
homogeneous functions Γ = (Γ1, . . . ,Γl) : Rm → Rl of the form
Γi(c) = 〈ai, c〉 − αi‖Bic‖p (3.27)
where the αi ∈ R are real numbers, ai ∈ Rm are real vectors, and Bi ∈ R·×m are
real matrices with m columns for all i = 1, . . . , l.
Remark 3.1.21 (Conditions for sublinearity, superlinearity, and linearity). It is
clear that Γ is sublinear if αi ≤ 0 and superlinear if αi ≥ 0 for all i = 1, . . . , l. In
particular, if all αi = 0, then Γ is linear and its induced cone C(Γ) = C(A) with
A = (a1, . . . , al)T ∈ Rl×m is polyhedral.
Furthermore, if we choose Γ : Rm → R as a real-valued function with a = e1
the first unit vector, α = 1, and B = (0, Im−1) ∈ R(m−1)×m with 0 ∈ Rm−1 a vector
of zeros and Im−1 ∈ R(m−1)×(m−1) the (m− 1)-dimensional identity matrix, then
Γ(c) = 〈a, c〉 − α‖Bc‖p = 〈e1, c〉 − ‖(0, Im−1)c‖p = c1 − ‖c−1‖p (3.28)
and C = Cmp is the m-dimensional pth-order cone. Hence, we can use the new cone
representation in (3.27) to induce all pth-order and polyhedral cones, including the
Pareto cone as special case.
Our first result is an immediate consequence of the nondominance mapping
theorem for general cones and Remark 3.1.21.
Proposition 3.1.22 (Nondominance mapping for new cone representation I). Let
αi ∈ R, ai ∈ Rm, and Bi ∈ R·×m for i = 1, . . . , l, and let C(Γ) ⊂ Rm be the
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nonpolyhedral cone induced by Γ = (Γ1, . . . ,Γl) : Rm → Rl with Γi(c) = 〈ai, c〉 −
αi‖Bic‖p. If all αi ≤ 0, then
Γ[N(Y,C(Γ))] ⊆ N(Γ[Y ],Rl≧) (3.29)
The proof follows directly from Theorem 3.1.12 and Remark 3.1.21 and is
omitted. Moreover, if all αi ≥ 0, then the reverse inclusion in Proposition 3.1.22
holds if the function Γ is also injective, or if C(Γ) is pointed. For special cases, this
can be verified easily.
Proposition 3.1.23 (Condition for convexity and pointedness). Let α ≥ 0 and
C(Γ) ⊂ Rm be the nonpolyhedral cone induced by Γ = (Γ1, . . . ,Γm) : Rm → Rm with
Γi(c) = ci − α‖c‖p. If αm1/p < 1, then the function Γ is injective, and the cone
C(Γ) is convex and pointed.
Proof. To show that Γ is injective, let Γ(c) = Γ(d) and, without loss of generality,
assume that ε = α (‖c‖p − ‖d‖p) ≥ 0 (otherwise switch c and d). Then ci−α‖c‖p =
di − α‖d‖p, or ci − di = α (‖c‖p − ‖d‖p) = ε, and thus, c = d + ε1. Hence, ‖c‖p =
‖d + ε1‖p ≤ ‖d‖p + ε‖1‖p, or ε = α (‖c‖p − ‖d‖p) ≤ εα‖1‖p = εαm1/p, and thus,
ε = 0 and c = d, showing that Γ is injective. As Γ, in particular, is superlinear,
Proposition 3.1.8 then gives that C(Γ) is convex and pointed. 
Corollary 3.1.24 (Nondominance mapping for new cone representation II). Let
α ≥ 0, αm1/p < 1, and C(Γ) ⊂ Rm be the nonpolyhedral cone induced by Γ =
(Γ1, . . . ,Γm) : Rm → Rm with Γi(c) = ci − α‖c‖p. Then
N(Γ[Y ],Rm≧) ⊆ Γ[N(Y,C(Γ))] (3.30)
Our last result pertains to the possible application of scalarization methods
based on the conditions for nondominance that we establish in Propositions 3.1.14
(hybrid), 3.1.15 (weighted-sum), 3.1.16 (constrained-objective), and 3.1.17 (Ben-
son). Since the validation of these conditions requires to know (at least a subset of)
the dual cone C(Γ)∗, the next result provides a partial characterization of the dual
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cone associated with a cone that is slightly more general than the one discussed in
Proposition 3.1.23 and Corollary 3.1.24.
Proposition 3.1.25 (Dual cone for new cone representation). Let αi ≥ 0 for all
i = 1, . . . ,m, and C(Γ) ⊂ Rm be the convex nonpolyhedral cone induced by Γ =
(Γ1, . . . ,Γm) : Rm → Rm with Γi(c) = ci − αi‖c‖p. Then C(Γ) belongs to its dual
C(Γ) ⊆ C(Γ)∗ (3.31)
Moreover, ek ∈ C(Γ)∗s if αk > 0 for k = 1, . . . ,m, and 1 ∈ C(Γ)∗s if some αi > 0.
Proof. To show that C(Γ) is contained in its dual cone, let w ∈ C(Γ) and choose
any c ∈ C(Γ), so wi − αi‖w‖p ≥ 0 and ci − αi‖c‖p ≥ 0. Then
〈w, c〉 =
m∑
i=1
wici ≥
m∑
i=1
α2i ‖w‖p‖c‖p ≥ 0 (3.32a)
yielding w ∈ C(Γ)∗ and thus C(Γ) ⊆ C(Γ)∗. Furthermore, if c 6= 0 and αk > 0, then
〈ek, c〉 = ck ≥ αk‖c‖p > 0 (3.32b)
and it follows that ek ∈ C(Γ)∗s. Similarly, if some αi > 0, then
〈1, c〉 =
m∑
i=1
ci ≥
m∑
i=1
αi‖c‖p > 0 (3.32c)
which again implies that 1 ∈ C(Γ)∗s to conclude the proof. 
Hence, in this case Propositions 3.1.14 and 3.1.15 apply to the hybrid and the
weighted-sum scalarization with w ∈ C(Γ) \ {0}, and Propositions 3.1.16 and 3.1.17
apply to the constrained-objective and Benson method if αk > 0 or some αi > 0,
respectively. In particular, the hybrid method becomes
Minimize 〈w, y〉 subject to y◦i − yi ≥ αj‖y◦ − y‖p for i = 1, . . . ,m, y ∈ Y (3.33)
and, in this case, can be solved as a pth-order cone program.
Some consequences of these results and possible topics for further investiga-
tion are summarized in the discussion section that concludes this chapter.
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3.2 Variable and Ideal-Symmetric Convex Cones
In this section, we return to the original notion of domination in Defini-
tion 2.2.1 and inquire both relevance and consequences of domination structures
that are variable and, thus, defined by a collection of different domination sets. To-
gether with the new discussion in Section 3.2.1 that revists the relationships between
partial orders and cones, we highlight some inherent model limitations of constant
cones and then introduce the new notion of ideal-symmetry to derive a variable-
cone model in remedy of these recognized shortcomings in Section 3.2.2. Based on
the subsequent generalization of scalarization approaches for variable domination
cones, the characterization of the nondominated set with respect to this new model
is addressed in Section 3.2.3, and some alternative conditions are established for
biobjective cases in Section 3.2.4 and applied to three examples in Section 3.2.5.
3.2.1 Assumptions and Limitations of Constant Cones
We begin our investigation by adding some more details to the discussion in
Section 2.1.3 in which we describe the relationship between convex cones and partial
orders. In particular, in Propositions 2.1.38 and 2.1.39 we establish the equivalence
between a general cone and binary relations that are compatible with scalar multi-
plication and show that this equivalence can be extended to pointed convex cones
and (strict) partial orders under the additional assumption of compatibility with
addition. However, in this case Proposition 2.2.3 implies that the induced domina-
tion structure is described by a constant pointed convex cone, and in order to also
study variable cones we first relax the latter of these two assumptions by the similar
notion of additivity. Hence, different from the partial and strict partial orders 
and ≺ in Section 2.1.3 which distinguish between reflexive and irreflexive binary
relations, we denote the underlying order or relation without this distinction by 4
and, for further convenience, let this order be defined on the complete space Rm.
Definition 3.2.1 (Additivity). A binary relation 4 on Rm is said to be additive if
y1 4 y3 and y2 4 y4 =⇒ y1 + y2 4 y3 + y4 for all y1, y2, y3, y4 ∈ Rm (3.34)
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Remark 3.2.2 (Generalized additivity). If yi ∈ Rm for i = 1, . . . , 2k and yj 4 yj+k
for j = 1, . . . , k, then additivity implies that also
k∑
j=1
yj 4
k∑
j=1
yj+k (3.35)
In particular, if y1 = y2 = . . . = yk and yk+1 = yk+2 = . . . = y2k, then additivity
includes compatibility with scalar multiplication for all integer scalars λ = k.
Proposition 3.2.3 (Additivity, reflexivity, and transitivity). If a binary relation is
additive and reflexive on Rm, then it is compatible with addition and transitive.
Proof. To show that an additive and reflexive binary relation is compatible with
addition, let y1 4 y2 and z ∈ Rm. It follows that z 4 z by reflexitivity, and then
additivity implies that y1 + z 4 y2 + z, showing compatibility with addition.
Similarly, to show transitivity, let y1 4 y2 and y2 4 y3. Again −y2 4 −y2
by reflexivity, and then additivity implies that y1 + y2− y2 4 y2 + y3− y2 and thus
y1 4 y3, showing transitivity and concluding the proof. 
Hence, we find that a reflexive additive binary relation is also compatible
with addition and transitive and thus, under the additional assumption of compati-
bility with scalar multiplication, that C4 is a convex cone from Proposition 2.1.39.
This result, however, can also be derived directly from the assumption of additivity.
Proposition 3.2.4 (Relation cone under additivity). If the binary relation 4 is
additive and compatible with scalar multiplication, then
C4 := {y2 − y1 ∈ Rm : y1 4 y2} (3.36)
is a convex cone.
Proof. To show that the set C4 is a cone, let c ∈ C4 and λ > 0. Then there
exist y1, y2 ∈ Rm so that c = y2 − y1 and y1 4 y2, and compatibility with scalar
multiplication implies that also λy1 4 λy2 and thus λy2−λy1 = λ(y2−y1) = λc ∈ C4
showing that C4 is a cone.
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To show that the cone C4 is convex, let c
1, c2 ∈ C4. Then there exist
y1, y2, y3, y4 ∈ Rm so that c1 = y3 − y1, c2 = y4 − y2 and y1 4 y3, y2 4 y4,
and additivity implies that also y1 + y2 4 y3 + y4 and thus y3 + y4 − (y1 + y2) =
(y3−y1)+ (y4−y2) = d1+d2 ∈ C4 showing convexity and concluding the proof. 
By dropping the assumption of compatibility with addition, however, Propo-
sition 2.2.3 does not imply anymore that the induced domination structure is neces-
sarily constant and thus motivates to introduce the following notions to subsequently
define the corresponding domination sets D(y) separately at every outcome y.
Definition 3.2.5 (Additivity and compatibility with scalar multiplication at a
point). A binary relation is said to be additive and compatible with scalar multi-
plication at y ∈ Rm if respectively
y − d1 4 y and y − d2 4 y =⇒ y − (d1 + d2) 4 y for all d1, d2 ∈ Rm (3.37a)
y − d 4 y =⇒ y − λd 4 y for all d ∈ Rm and λ > 0 (3.37b)
Based on this definition, the next result essentially repeats Proposition 3.2.4.
Proposition 3.2.6 (Relation cone at a point). If the binary relation 4 is additive
and compatible with scalar multiplication at y ∈ Rm, then
D(y) := {d ∈ Rm : y − d 4 y} (3.38)
is a convex cone.
Proof. To show that the set D(y) is a cone, let d ∈ D(y) and λ > 0. If d = 0, then
λd = 0 ∈ D(y), otherwise y − d 4 y and compatibility with scalar multiplication
implies that also y − λd 4 y and, thus, λd ∈ D(y), showing that D(y) is a cone.
To show that the cone D(y) is convex, let d1, d2 ∈ D(y). If d1 = 0 or d2 = 0,
then d1 + d2 ∈ D(y), otherwise y − d1 4 y, y − d2 4 y and additivity implies that
also y − (d1 + d2) 4 y and, thus d1 + d2 ∈ D(y), showing that the cone D(y) is
convex and concluding the proof. 
Following the above discussion, however, the cones D(y) in Proposition 3.2.6
do not necessarily need to be identical so that the resulting domination structure
78
can also be defined as a variable cone. Before we continue to pursue this observation,
we first introduce the additional notion of monotonicity.
Definition 3.2.7 (Monotonicity). A binary relation is said to be monotonic if
y − ei 4 y for all i = 1, . . . ,m and ei ∈ Rm the ith unit vector (3.39)
The interpretation of monotonicity in the context of multiobjective program-
ming is immediate: provided we are interested in objective minimization and reduce
any single component of some original outcome y, then the resulting outcome is
preferred to that original outcome. In particular, the assumption of monotonicity
is equivalent to the Edgeworth-Pareto principle that we introduce in (2.63) in Sec-
tion 2.3.2, and under this additional assumption we now show that the convex cone
in Proposition 3.2.6 always contains all (nonzero) elements of the Pareto cone.
Proposition 3.2.8 (Pareto compatibility). If a monotonic binary relation is addi-
tive and compatible with scalar multiplication at y ∈ Rm, then
D(y) := {d ∈ Rm : y − d 4 y} ∪ {0} (3.40)
is a convex cone that contains the Pareto cone.
Proof. The proof that D(y) is a convex cone follows exactly as in Proposition 3.2.6.
Hence, to show that the convex cone D(y) contains the Pareto cone, let d ∈ Rm
≧
,
so d =
∑m
i=1 die
i = (d1, . . . , dm) ≧ 0. From monotonicity, y − ei 4 y and, thus,
d = y − (y − ei) = ei ∈ D(y). If di = 0, then diei = 0 ∈ D(y), otherwise di > 0
and die
i ∈ D(y) also, because D(y) is a cone. Convexity of D(y) then implies that
d =
∑m
i=1 die
i ∈ D(y), showing that D(y) contains the Pareto cone. 
In Proposition 3.2.8, if a domination set or cone D(y) contains the Pareto
cone, then we say that D(y) is Pareto compatible. Hence, the assumptions on 4 in
Proposition 3.2.8 imply that the underlying domination structure can be described
by a collection of Pareto compatible convex cones but, so far, do not impose any
condition that also guarantees that this domination structure is in fact variable.
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In preparation of such a condition for the definition of our variable-cone
model in the next section, we now present two examples that do not only highlight
several of the model limitations of a constant cone but also provide intuitive insight
into the later formulation of the corresponding variability assumption.
Example 3.2.9 (Model limitation of constant convex cones). Let Y = {y ∈ R2 :
y1 + y2 ≥ 1, y1 ≥ 0, y2 ≥ 0} be as depicted in Figure 3.4 and C ⊂ R2 be a
Pareto compatible convex cone. In particular, denote z1 = (1, 0), z2 = (0, 1), and
let c1 = z2 − z1 = (−1, 1) and c2 = z1 − z2 = (1,−1). Then we can distinguish the
following four cases that are also shown in Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.4 Nondominated set N(Y,C) in each of the four cases in Example 3.2.9
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(i) If c1 and c2 /∈ C, then N(Y,C) = {y ∈ Y : y1 + y2 = 1} is the Pareto set.
(ii) If c1 ∈ C and c2 /∈ C, then N(Y,C) = {z1} reduces to a singleton.
(iii) Similarly, if c1 /∈ C and c2 ∈ C, then N(Y,C) = {z2}.
(iv) Finally, if c1 and c2 ∈ C, then N(Y,C) = ∅.
Hence, in this case, the nondominated set of Y is either empty, a singleton, or the
complete Pareto set N(Y,R2
≧
) = {y ∈ R2 : y1 + y2 = 1, y1 ≥ 0, y2 ≥ 0}. In
particular, it is not possible to obtain a nondominated set that excludes the two
extreme points z1 and z2 or parts of the extreme ends while maintaining a set of
nondominated outcomes in the middle region of the Pareto set.
The previous example illustrates that constant cone models are limited in
that directions are either dominated or nondominated at all outcomes y ∈ Y so
that, in particular, the vectors c1 and c2 in Figure 3.4 are either contained in all
cones or do not belong to any domination cone D(y) = C. Consequently, in this
case it is not possible that a Pareto outcome in the middle region of the Pareto set
dominates both z1 and z2 without also being dominated by z2 and z1, respectively,
which furthermore precludes to impose a preference principle of transfers (2.64) or
justice (2.65), or a concept of equitable efficiency as described in Section 2.3.2.
Figure 3.5, on the other hand, illustrates how a variable cone, in principle,
is capable to remove this current limitation by changing its orientation and shape
and, thus, the set of dominated directions for every individual outcome.
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Figure 3.5 A variable cone in remedy of the model limitation in Example 3.2.9
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In the next example, we address another shortcoming of preference models
that are defined based on constant cones, similar to the discussion in Example 3.2.9.
Example 3.2.10 (Another model limitation of constant cones). Let Y ⊂ R2 and y1,
y2, y3, y4 ∈ Y with y1+ y4 = y2+ y3 be as depicted in Figure 3.6 (left). Restricting
consideration to these four outcomes, we find that y1, y2, and y3 are nondominated
with respect to the Pareto cone, while y4 is dominated by y1 but neither dominated
by nor preferred to y2 and y3. Although arguable, in principle we expect that in
a practical decision making context, y1 is preferred to y2 and y3 and, thus, the
overall best outcome. Hence, an underlying preference model should enable that
y1 is preferred to all the three other outcomes, but it should not introduce any
additional preference relationships between y2, y3 and y4.
Using a constant cone C ⊂ R2, however, y1 4 y2 and y1 4 y3 are equivalent
with y2 − y1 and y3 − y1 ∈ C and, thus, also imply that y4 − y2 = y3 − y1 and
y4 − y3 = y2 − y1 ∈ C, or y2 4 y4 and y3 4 y4, respectively. In particular, it is not
possible to define a preference model that allows to individually specify one or both
of the preference relationships y1 4 y2 and y1 4 y3 between y1, y2, and y3, without
also affecting those between y2, y3 and y4.
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Figure 3.6 Four outcomes discussed in Example 3.2.10 (left) and the geometric
interpretation of ideal-symmetry in Definition 3.2.14 and Remark 3.2.15 (right)
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Hence, to remove the shortcoming in Example 3.2.10, again we need to allow
for a variable cone to specify the dominated directions and thus the corresponding
preference relationships separately for every individual or pair of outcomes, respec-
tively. Similar to Figure 3.5 and our earlier discussion, Figure 3.6 (right) indicates
how we may define such a variable cone and also provides the pictorial intuition for
the derivation of our variable-cone model now pursued in the following section.
3.2.2 Ideal-Symmetry Assumption and Model Derivation
Motivated by our previous discussion, we derive a variable domination struc-
ture that can be described by a collection of convex cones for which we introduce
variability by the technical assumption that the set of dominated directions at any
outcome y ∈ Y is symmetric with respect to the direction pointing to (or leading
from) the ideal point. The general idea behind this assumption is illustrated in
Figure 3.6 and made precise in the following definitions.
Definition 3.2.11 (Ideal point and partially ideal outcome). Let Y ⊂ Rm be a
nonempty set. The point z = (z1, . . . , zm) ∈ Rm with
zi = inf{yi : y ∈ Y } for all i = 1, . . . ,m (3.41)
is called the ideal point of Y . An outcome y ∈ Y with yi = zi for some index i is
said to be partially ideal.
Note that this definition is the exact equivalent to Definition 2.2.13, and as
before, we again assume that the ideal point z ∈ Rm \ Y exists and is finite but
not itself contained in the outcome set. In this case, we define the ideal domination
vector at every outcome y as shown in Figure 3.6.
Definition 3.2.12 (Ideal domination vector). Let Y ⊂ Rm be nonempty and z ∈
Rm be the ideal point of Y . For every y ∈ Y , the vector
y¯ := y − z ∈ Rm (3.42)
is called the ideal domination vector at y.
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It is clear that the ideal domination vector at every outcome y ∈ Y is
nonnegative, and positive if and only if y is not partially ideal.
Proposition 3.2.13 (Nonnegativity of ideal domination vector). Let Y ⊂ Rm be
nonempty and z ∈ Rm be the ideal point of Y . Then
(i) y¯ ≥ 0 for all y ∈ Y , and
(ii) y¯ > 0 if and only if y ∈ Y is not partially ideal.
Next, we give the fundamental definition of your model.
Definition 3.2.14 (Ideal-symmetry). Let Y ⊂ Rm be nonempty and z ∈ Rm be
the ideal point of Y . A set D ⊂ Rm is said to be ideal-symmetric at y ∈ Y if
〈d1, y¯〉 = 〈d2, y¯〉, ‖d1‖ = ‖d2‖ ⇒ d1 ∈ D if and only if d2 ∈ D for all d1, d2 ∈ Rm
(3.43)
Remark 3.2.15 (Geometric interpretation of ideal-symmetry). In Definition 3.2.14,
if d1, d2 6= 0, 〈d1, y¯〉 = 〈d2, y¯〉, and ‖d1‖ = ‖d2‖, then
〈d1, y¯〉
‖d1‖‖y¯‖ =
〈d2, y¯〉
‖d2‖‖y¯‖ (3.43a)
and concepts from analytic geometry provide the possible interpretation of each
ratio as the cosine of the angle formed by one of the vectors d1 or d2 and y¯, so
cos∡(d1, y¯) = cos∡(d2, y¯) or ∡(d1, y¯) = ∡(d2, y¯) (3.43b)
This geometric intuition is depicted for the biobjective case (m = 2) in Figure 3.6,
remains valid for three objectives (m = 3) as the angle interpretation of the ratios in
Equation 3.43a still holds in spatial analytic geometry, and is naturally generalized
for m > 3 by the definition chosen.
Furthermore, similar to the notion of ideal-symmetry, we call a cone C ⊂ Rm
symmetric over s ∈ Rm if c ∈ C implies that c′ ∈ C for all c′ ∈ Rm with 〈c, s〉 = 〈c′, s〉
and ‖c‖ = ‖c′‖. For notational brevity, and although slightly ambivalent to its
previous meaning, in the following lemma we use the parameter γ to denote the
cosine of any corresponding angle γ1, γ2, γ3 in Figure 3.6.
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Lemma 3.2.16 (Symmetric cone). Let γ ∈ R, s ∈ Rm, s ≥ 0, and define
Cγ,s :=
{
c ∈ Rm \ {0} : 〈c, s〉‖c‖‖s‖ ≥ γ
}
∪ {0} (3.44)
Then Cγ,s is a cone that is symmetric with respect to s.
(i) If γ ≥ 0, then Cγ,s is convex.
(ii) If γ > 0, then Cγ,s is convex and pointed.
(iii) If γ ≤ mini{si}‖s‖−1, then Cγ,s contains the Pareto cone.
Proof. To show that Cγ,s is a cone, let c ∈ Cγ,s and λ > 0. If c = 0, then
λc = 0 ∈ Cγ,s, otherwise
〈λc, s〉
‖λc‖‖s‖ =
λ〈c, s〉
λ‖c‖‖s‖ =
〈c, s〉
‖c‖‖s‖ ≥ γ (3.44a)
and thus λc ∈ Cγ,s, showing that Cγ,s is a cone.
To show that the cone Cγ,s is symmetric with respect to s, let c ∈ Cγ,s and
c′ ∈ Rm with 〈c, s〉 = 〈c′, s〉 and ‖c‖ = ‖c′‖. If c = 0, then c′ = 0 ∈ Cγ,s, otherwise
〈c′, s〉
‖c′‖‖s‖ =
〈c, s〉
‖c‖‖s‖ ≥ γ (3.44b)
and thus c′ ∈ Cγ,s, showing the the cone Cγ,s is symmetric with respect to s.
For (i), let γ ≥ 0. To show that the cone Cγ,s is convex, let c1, c2 ∈ Cγ,s. If
c1 = c2 = 0, then c1 + c2 = 0 ∈ Cγ,s, otherwise
〈c1 + c2, s〉
‖c1 + c2‖‖s‖ ≥
〈c1, s〉+ 〈c2, s〉
(‖c1‖+ ‖c2‖)‖s‖ ≥
γ‖c1‖+ γ‖c2‖
(‖c1‖+ ‖c2‖) = γ (3.44c)
and thus c1 + c2 ∈ Cγ,s, showing that the cone Cγ,s is convex.
For (ii), let γ > 0, then γ ≥ 0 and the cone Cγ,s is convex. To show that the
convex cone Cγ,s is pointed, let c ∈ Cγ,s \ {0}, then
〈−c, s〉
‖−c‖‖s‖ = −
〈c, s〉
‖c‖‖s‖ ≤ −γ < γ (3.44d)
and thus −c /∈ Cγ,s, c /∈ −Cγ,s, or Cγ,s∩−Cγ,s ⊂ {0}, showing that the convex cone
Cγ,s is pointed.
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For (iii), let γ ≤ mini{si}‖s‖−1. To show that the cone Cγ,s contains the
Pareto cone, let c =
∑m
i=1 cie
i = (c1, . . . , cm) ≥ 0. If c = 0, then c ∈ Cγ,s, otherwise
〈c, s〉
‖c‖‖s‖ =
〈∑ciei, s〉
‖∑ciei‖‖s‖ ≥
∑
ci〈ei, s〉∑
ci‖ei‖‖s‖ =
∑
cisi∑
ci‖s‖ ≥
mini{si}
‖s‖ ≥ γ (3.44e)
and thus c ∈ Cγ,s, showing that the cone Cγ,s contains the Pareto cone. 
Remark 3.2.17 (Relationship to Bishop-Phelps cone). If 0 < γ < 1, then the sym-
metric cone Cγ,s in Lemma 3.2.16 is in particular a Bishop-Phelps cone as defined in
Definition 3.1.7, and convexity and pointedness also follow from Proposition 3.1.10.
Based on Lemma 3.2.16, we now replace s by y¯ to define our variable-cone
model as a collection of ideal-symmetric convex cones that contain the Pareto cone.
In particular, and mostly for further notational convenience, we denote y¯min :=
mini{y¯i} so that y¯min ≥ 0 for all y ∈ Y , and y¯min = 0 if and only if y is partially
ideal from Proposition 3.2.13. Moreover, we choose the parameter γ so to replace
the previous term γ‖s‖ with 0 ≤ γ ≤ smin‖s‖−1 by γ · y¯min with 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1.
Proposition 3.2.18 (Variable-cone model). Let Y ⊂ Rm be a nonempty set, z ∈
Rm be the ideal point of Y , and D := {Dγ(y) : y ∈ Y } be a variable domination
structure with domination sets
Dγ(y) := {d ∈ Rm : 〈d, y¯〉 ≥ γ‖d‖y¯min} for all y ∈ Y (3.45)
where y¯ := y − z, y¯min := mini{y¯i}, and 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. For every y ∈ Y , Dγ(y) is an
ideal-symmetric convex cone that contains the Pareto cone. In particular, Dγ(y) is
pointed if and only if y is not partially ideal and γ > 0.
The proof is clear with Lemma 3.2.16.
3.2.3 Scalarization Methods for Variable-Cone Model
In Section 3.1.3, we show that several scalarization methods that are orig-
inally formulated for the Pareto case can be modified to also find nondominated
outcomes with respect to general cones. In this section, we investigate some related
results when the domination structure is described by a variable cone and, at the
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same time, derive some more specific results for the variable-cone model that we
derive in the previous section and which is completely defined in Proposition 3.2.18.
We begin with the weighted-sum method for a variable domination structure.
While the following statement essentially repeats Proposition 3.1.15 in Section 3.1.3,
which there we do not prove but derive from the result for the hybrid scalarization
in Proposition 3.1.14, we now include the proof and then point to a subtle difference
in the formulation of these two results.
Proposition 3.2.19 (Weighted-sum scalarization for a variable domination struc-
ture). Let Y ⊂ Rm be nonempty, D = {D(y) : y ∈ Y } be a domination structure,
w ∈ Rm \ {0} be a nonzero weighting parameter, and yˆ ∈ Y be optimal for the
weighted-sum scalarization
WS(w): Minimize 〈w, y〉 subject to y ∈ Y (3.46)
(i) If w ∈ D(yˆ)∗ and yˆ is strictly optimal, then yˆ ∈ N(Y,D).
(ii) If w ∈ D(yˆ)∗s, then yˆ ∈ N(Y,D).
(iii) If w ∈ D(yˆ)∗, then yˆ ∈ Nw(Y,D).
Proof. Let yˆ ∈ Y be optimal for WS(w), so 〈w, yˆ〉 ≤ 〈w, y〉 for all y ∈ Y , or
〈w, yˆ〉 < 〈w, y〉 for all y ∈ Y \ {yˆ} if yˆ is strictly optimal.
For (i) and (ii), suppose by contradiction that yˆ /∈ N(Y,D). Then there
exists y ∈ (yˆ −D(yˆ) \ {0}) ∩ Y , or equivalently, yˆ − y = d ∈ D(yˆ) \ {0}, and thus
〈w, yˆ〉 = 〈w, y + d〉 = 〈w, y〉+ 〈w, d〉


≥ 〈w, y〉 in case (i) as w ∈ D(yˆ)∗
> 〈w, y〉 in case (ii) as w ∈ D(yˆ)∗s
(3.47)
in contradiction to the (in case (i): strict) optimality of yˆ for WS(w).
Furthermore for (iii), if w ∈ D(yˆ)∗ \ {0} and yˆ is optimal for WS(w), then
w ∈ (intD(yˆ))∗s by Proposition 2.1.21 and yˆ ∈ Nw(Y,D) by (ii). 
While apparently the same result as Proposition 3.1.15, we note that the
conditions on the weighting parameter w now also depend on the corresponding
solution yˆ which, however, itself depends on the weighting vector w. Hence, in
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practice, we need to first choose w and, after finding yˆ, we still need to explicitly
verify if any of the conditions in Proposition 3.2.19 is actually satisfied, for example
by solving the additional single objective cone program
Minimize 〈w, d〉 subject to d ∈ D(yˆ) \ {0} (3.48)
In this case, if the optimal objective function value is positive or nonnegative, we can
conclude that w ∈ D(yˆ)∗s or D(yˆ)∗ and thus yˆ ∈ N(Y,D) or Nw(Y,D), respectively.
For our variable-cone model in Proposition 3.2.18, the following corollary
to Proposition 3.2.19 is possible based on the observation that, for every outcome
y ∈ Y , the ideal domination vector y¯ is always contained in the dual cone D(y)∗.
Corollary 3.2.20 (Weighted-sum scalarization for variable-cone model). Let Y ⊂
Rm be nonempty, D = {Dγ(y) : y ∈ Y } be defined by Dγ(y) = {d ∈ Rm : 〈d, y¯〉 ≥
γ‖d‖y¯min} with y¯ = y−z, y¯min = mini{y¯i}, and 0 < γ ≤ 1 for all y ∈ Y . Let y◦ ∈ Y ,
and y¯◦ = y◦ − z ∈ Rm be the weighting vector for the weighted-sum scalarization
WS(y¯◦): Minimize 〈y¯◦, y〉 subject to y ∈ Y (3.49)
(i) If y◦ ∈ Y is strictly optimal for WS(y¯◦), then y◦ ∈ N(Y,D).
(ii) If y◦ ∈ Y is optimal for WS(y¯◦) and not partially ideal, then y◦ ∈ N(Y,D).
(iii) If y◦ ∈ Y is optimal for WS(y¯◦), then y◦ ∈ Nw(Y,D).
Proof. Let y◦ ∈ Y be optimal for the weighted-sum method WS(y¯◦) with weighting
parameter y¯◦ ∈ Rm. Since, by definition, 〈d, y¯◦〉 ≥ γ‖d‖y¯◦min ≥ 0 for all d ∈ D(y◦),
this shows that y¯◦ ∈ D(y◦)∗. Moreover, if y◦ is not partially ideal, then y¯◦min > 0 by
Proposition 3.2.13 and, thus, 〈d, y◦〉 ≥ γ‖d‖y¯◦min > 0 for all d ∈ D(y◦)\{0}, showing
that y¯◦ ∈ D(y◦)∗s. The proof now follows from Proposition 3.2.19. 
Hence, to verify nondominance of y◦ ∈ Y under our variable-cone model D,
the problem WS(y¯◦) can be solved and, if y◦ is a unique optimal solution, or if y◦
is optimal and not partially ideal, then y◦ ∈ N(Y,D). In general, however, these
conditions are only sufficient, but not necessary and, in particular, satisfied only if
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the ideal domination vector y¯ at y coincides with the normal vector of a supporting
hyperplane to Y at y◦.
Furthermore, for the generalization of the hybrid method, the constrained-
objective and the Benson method, it turns out that after the modification of the cone
constraints b− y ∈ C to variable cone constraints b− y ∈ D(y), the proof of Propo-
sition 3.1.14 does not hold anymore unless we explicitly choose the cone constraints
at the optimal solution yˆ ∈ Y . In this case, however, we also obtain a necessary
condition for nondominance with respect to a variable domination structure, similar
to the result in Proposition 2.2.32.
Proposition 3.2.21 (Hybrid scalarization for a variable domination cone). Let
Y ⊂ Rm be a nonempty set, D = {D(y) ⊂ Rm : y ∈ Y } be a domination structure for
which each D(y) is a convex cone, w ∈ Rm \ {0} be a nonzero weighting parameter,
and yˆ ∈ Y be optimal for the hybrid scalarization
HB(w, b): Minimize 〈w, y〉 subject to b− y ∈ D(yˆ) and y ∈ Y (3.50)
(i) If w ∈ D(yˆ)∗ and yˆ is strictly optimal, then yˆ ∈ N(Y,D).
(ii) If w ∈ D(yˆ)∗s, then yˆ ∈ N(Y,D).
(iii) If w ∈ D(yˆ)∗, then yˆ ∈ Nw(Y,D).
Moreover, if yˆ ∈ N(Y,D), then yˆ is (strictly) optimal for HB(w, yˆ) and any w ∈ Rm.
Proof. The proof for (i), (ii) and (iii) follows as the proof of Proposition 3.2.19 in
which the contradicting solution y ∈ Y is feasible for HB(w, b) because
b− y = b− yˆ + d ∈ D(yˆ) (3.51)
by feasibility of yˆ for HB(w, b) and convexity of the cone D(yˆ).
Moreover, if yˆ ∈ N(Y,D) is also chosen as the reference point of the hybrid
scalarization, then there does not exist y ∈ Y such that yˆ − y ∈ D(yˆ) \ {0} which
implies that yˆ is the unique and, thus, a strict optimal solution for HB(w, yˆ). 
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The modification of the constrained-objective and Benson method can be
accomplished accordingly and is omitted. Instead, similar to Corollary 3.2.20, we
derive a corresponding result for the variable-cone model from the previous section.
Corollary 3.2.22 (Hybrid scalarization for the variable-cone model). Let Y ⊂ Rm
be a nonempty set, and D = {Dγ(y) : y ∈ Y } be defined by Dγ(y) = {d ∈ Rm :
〈d, y¯〉 ≥ γ‖d‖y¯min} with y¯ = y − z, y¯min = mini{y¯i}, and 0 < γ ≤ 1 for all y ∈ Y .
Let y◦ ∈ Y , and y¯◦ = y◦−z ∈ Rm be the weighting vector for the hybrid scalarization
HB(y¯◦, b): Minimize 〈y¯◦, y〉 subject to b− y ∈ D(y¯◦) and y ∈ Y (3.52)
(i) If y◦ ∈ Y is strictly optimal for HB(y¯◦, b), then y◦ ∈ N(Y,D).
(ii) If y◦ ∈ Y is optimal for HB(y¯◦, b) and not partially ideal, then y◦ ∈ N(Y,D).
(iii) If y◦ ∈ Y is optimal for HB(y¯◦, b), then y◦ ∈ Nw(Y,D).
Moreover, y◦ ∈ N(Y,D) if and only if y◦ is (strictly) optimal for HB(y¯◦, y◦).
Hence, we conclude that the hybrid method can still be used to verify if
any outcome y ∈ Y is nondominated under the variable-cone model D. In par-
ticular, based on the Pareto compatibility of D, Proposition 2.2.6 implies that all
nondominated outcomes can be found within the Pareto set.
Proposition 3.2.23. Let Y ⊂ Rm be a nonempty set, and D = {D(y) : y ∈ Y }
be a domination structure for which each domination set D(y) contains the Pareto
cone, Rm
≧
⊂ D(y) for all y ∈ Y . Then
N(Y,D) ⊆ N(Y,Rm≧) (3.53)
Hence, to find the nondominated set for our variable-cone model D, the
previous discussion suggests to first find the Pareto set N(Y,Rm
≧
) and then check
which Pareto points yˆ ∈ N(Y,Rm
≧
) remain nondominated with respect to D(yˆ).
While the latter, in principle, can be accomplished using the necessary and sufficient
condition in Corollary 3.2.22, in the next section we derive two alternative optimality
conditions based on the geometric interpretation of the underlying ideal-symmetry
assumption provided in Remark 3.2.15 and Figure 3.6.
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3.2.4 Optimality Conditions for Biobjective Cases
For the special case of convex and concave biobjective programs, we derive
two alternative optimality conditions for nondominance with respect to the variable-
cone model derived in Section 3.2.2, based on the geometric interpretation of ideal-
symmetry in Remark 3.2.15 and Figure 3.6. For the convex case, we use the following
version of Theorem 2.1.24 (Rockafellar, 1970).
Lemma 3.2.24 (Supporting hyperplane theorem). Let Y ⊂ Rm be Rm
≧
-convex and
y◦ ∈ N(Y,Rm
≧
). Then there exists a supporting hyperplane to Y at y◦ with normal
vector n ∈ Rm \ {0} so that 〈n, y − y◦〉 ≥ 0 for all y ∈ Y .
Based on this result, our first theorem uses the existence of a supporting
hyperplane and its associated normal vector at every Pareto outcome y◦ ∈ N(Y,R2
≧
).
Theorem 3.2.25 (Nondominance conditions for convex biobjective case). Let Y ⊂
R2 be nonempty, and D = {Dγ(y) : y ∈ Y } be defined by Dγ(y) = {d ∈ R2 : 〈d, y¯〉 ≥
γ‖d‖y¯min} with y¯ = y − z, y¯min = mini{y¯i}, and 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 for all y ∈ Y . Let
N(Y,R2
≧
) be R2
≧
-convex, y◦ ∈ N(Y,R2
≧
), and n ∈ Rm \ {0} be the normal vector of
a supporting hyperplane to Y at y◦ with 〈n, y − y◦〉 ≥ 0 for all y ∈ Y .
(i) If 〈n, y¯◦〉2 + γ2‖n‖2y¯◦2min > ‖n‖2‖y¯◦‖2, then y◦ ∈ N(Y,D).
(ii) If 〈n, y¯◦〉2 + γ2‖n‖2y¯◦2min ≥ ‖n‖2‖y¯◦‖2, then y◦ ∈ Nw(Y,D).
Furthermore, let n satisfy that 〈n, y − y◦〉 > 0 for all y ∈ Y \ {y◦}.
(iii) If 〈n, y¯◦〉2 + γ2‖n‖2y¯◦2min ≥ ‖n‖2‖y¯◦‖2, then y◦ ∈ N(Y,D).
Proof. Let N(Y,R2
≧
) be R2
≧
-convex and y◦ ∈ N(Y,R2
≧
). As shown in Figure 3.7,
let η = ∡(n, y¯◦) be the positive angle between n and y¯◦, so
0 ≤ cos η = cos∡(n, y¯◦) = 〈n, y¯
◦〉
‖n‖‖y¯◦‖ ≤ 1 (3.54a)
and 0 ≤ sin η ≤ 1. Let δ = max{∡(d, y¯◦) : d ∈ Dγ(y◦) \ {0}} be the maximal
positive angle between any d ∈ Dγ(y◦) \ {0} and y¯◦, so
0 ≤ cos δ = min
{ 〈d, y¯◦〉
‖d‖‖y¯◦‖ : 〈d, y¯
◦〉 ≥ γ‖d‖y¯◦min, d 6= 0
}
=
γy¯◦min
‖y¯◦‖ ≤ 1 (3.54b)
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and 0 ≤ sin δ ≤ 1. Finally, let µ = max {∡(n, d) : d ∈ Dγ(y◦) \ {0}} be the maximal
positive angle between n and any d ∈ Dγ(y◦) \ {0} at y, so µ = η + δ and
cosµ = min
{ 〈n, d〉
‖n‖‖d‖ : d ∈ Dγ(y
◦) \ {0}
}
(3.54c)
For (i), the assumption 〈n, y¯◦〉2 + γ2‖n‖2y¯◦2min > ‖n‖2‖y¯◦‖2 is equivalent to
〈n, y¯◦〉2
‖n‖2‖y¯◦‖2 +
γ2y¯◦2min
‖y¯◦‖2 = cos
2 η + cos2 δ > 1 (3.55a)
yielding cos2 η > 1 − cos2 δ = sin2 δ and cos2 δ > 1 − cos2 η = sin2 η. In particular,
this implies that cos η > sin δ and cos δ > sin η, and thus
cos η cos δ − sin η sin δ = cos(η + δ) = cosµ > 0 (3.55b)
and equivalence follows from repeating the same argument with < instead of >.
Hence, by definition of µ, we first conclude that 〈n, y¯◦〉2 + γ2‖n‖2y¯◦2min > ‖n‖2‖y¯◦‖2
if and only if
cosµ = min
{ 〈n, d〉
‖n‖‖d‖ : d ∈ Dγ(y
◦) \ {0}
}
> 0 (3.55c)
or equivalently, 〈n, d〉‖n‖−1‖d‖−1 > 0 and, thus, 〈n, d〉 > 0 for all d ∈ Dγ(y◦) \ {0}.
Since, by assumption, 〈n, y − y◦〉 ≥ 0 for all y ∈ Y , or 〈n, y◦ − y〉 ≤ 0, it therefore
follows that y◦ − y /∈ Dγ(y◦) \ {0}, showing that y◦ ∈ N(Y,D).
For (ii), repeating the same arguments as above yields that the condition
〈n, y¯◦〉2+γ2‖n‖2y¯◦2min ≥ ‖n‖2‖y¯◦‖2 is equivalent to 〈n, d〉 ≥ 0 for all d ∈ Dγ(y◦) and,
thus, 〈n, d〉 > 0 for all d ∈ intDγ(y◦). Analogous to the proof in (i), it now follows
that y◦ − y /∈ intDγ(y◦) \ {0}, showing that y◦ ∈ Nw(Y,D).
Furthermore for (iii), if 〈n, y−y◦〉 > 0 for all y ∈ Y \{y◦}, or 〈n, y◦−y〉 < 0,
then the same conclusion as in (i) already follows if 〈n, d〉 ≥ 0 for all d ∈ Dγ(y◦) as
direct implication of the derivation in (ii). 
Remark 3.2.26 (Extension to multiple objectives). Mainly using trigonometric
concepts from basic analytic geometry, the proof of Theorem 3.2.25 readily extends
to the case with three objectives for which the interpretation of angles remains valid
92
and, in particular, preserves the same geometric meaning as in the proven biobjective
case. Form > 3, however, the argumentation loses this geometric interpretation and,
thus, the theorem might not hold anymore.
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Figure 3.7 Illustration of the nondominance conditions for biobjective programs
in Theorems 3.2.25 (left) and 3.2.27 (right) under the variable-cone model
We derive a similar result for the concave biobjective case for the particular
choice Dγ(y) = D1(y) and under the additional assumption that Y is R2≧-compact.
In this case, the ideal point z = {z1, z2} ∈ R2 can be defined using the minimum,
zi = min{yi : y ∈ Y } for i = 1, 2, so that the two optimal lexicographic solutions
z1 = (z11 , z2) where z
1
1 := min{y1 : y2 = z2, y ∈ Y } (3.56a)
z2 = (z1, z
2
2) where z
2
2 := min{y2 : y1 = z1, y ∈ Y } (3.56b)
belong both to the outcome set and the Pareto set, as depicted in Figure 3.7 (right).
Theorem 3.2.27 (Nondominance condition for concave biobjective case). Let Y ⊂
R2 be nonempty, and D = {D(y) : y ∈ Y } be defined by D(y) = {d ∈ R2 : 〈d, y¯〉 ≥
‖d‖y¯min} with y¯ = y − z and y¯min = mini{y¯i} for all y ∈ Y . Let Y be R2≧-compact,
N(Y,R2
≧
) be R2
≧
-concave (i.e., −R2
≧
-convex), y◦ ∈ N(Y,R2
≧
), and k ∈ {1, 2} be so
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that y¯◦k = y¯
◦
min. Let z = {z1, z2} ∈ R2 be the ideal point of Y and z1 and z2 ∈ Y be
as in (3.56). Then
y◦ ∈ N(Y,D) if and only if y◦ − zk /∈ D(y◦) (3.57)
Proof. Let Y be R2
≧
-compact. As outlined in the discussion preceding the statement
of the theorem, it follows that z1, z2 ∈ N(Y,R2
≧
), and z1 6= z2 as the ideal point
z /∈ Y . Moreover, since z¯1 = (z11 − z1, 0) ≥ 0, it follows that D(z1) = {d = (d1, d2) ∈
R2 : d1 ≥ 0} and, thus, z2 ∈ (z1 −D(z1))∩ Y \ {z1}. This shows that z1 /∈ N(Y,D)
and, by repeating the analogous argument for z2, that z2 /∈ N(Y,D).
(⇐) Now let N(Y,R2
≧
) be R2
≧
-concave and y◦ ∈ N(Y,R2
≧
) \ {z1, z2}, so, in
particular, z1 < y
◦
1 < z
1
1 and z2 < y
◦
2 < z
2
2 . By R
2
≧
-concavity, then there does not
exist y ∈ Y that falls below the two line segments from y◦ to z1 and z2, as indicated
in Figure 3.7. In particular, if we can show that y◦− z1, y◦− z2 /∈ D(y◦), then there
does not exist y ∈ (y◦ −D(y◦)) ∩ Y \ {y◦} which implies that y◦ ∈ N(Y,D).
Hence, without loss of generality, let y¯◦min = y¯
◦
1 ≤ y¯◦2, then y◦ − z1 /∈ D(y◦)
by assumption and it only remains to show that y◦ − z2 /∈ D(y◦). But this follows,
because
〈y◦ − z2, y¯◦〉 − ‖y◦ − z2‖y¯◦1 (3.58a)
= 〈y◦ − z2, y◦ − z〉 − ‖y◦ − z2‖ · y¯◦1 (3.58b)
= (y◦1 − z1)2 + (y◦2 − z22)(y◦2 − z2)−
√
(y◦1 − z1)2 + (y◦2 − z22)2 · y¯◦1 (3.58c)
= y¯◦21 + (y
◦
2 − z22)y¯◦2 −
√
y¯◦21 + (y
◦
2 − z22)2 · y¯◦1 (3.58d)
≤ y¯◦21 + (y◦2 − z22)y¯◦2 − y¯◦21 (3.58e)
= (y◦2 − z22)y¯◦2 (3.58f)
= (y◦2 − z22)(y◦2 − z2) < 0 (3.58g)
from z2 < y
◦
2 < z
2
2 . The reverse direction (⇒) is clear because z1, z2 ∈ Y . 
The point (z11 , z
2
2) ∈ R2 in Theorem 3.2.27 is also known as the nadir point
(see Miettinen, 1999, among others), and more general, for a set Y ⊂ Rm, the nadir
point can defined by zN = {zN1 , . . . , zNm} with zNi := sup{yi : y ∈ N(Y,Rm≧)}.
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Remark 3.2.28 (Extension to multiple objectives). The proof of Theorem 3.2.27
only holds for the biobjective case m = 2, based on the exploited characterization of
the nadir point using the two optimal lexicographic solutions in (3.56). For m > 2,
however, the nadir point cannot be computed by lexicographic optimization but
must be found through optimization over the Pareto set, so that this point is not
readily available (Yamamoto, 2002; Ehrgott and Tenfelde-Podehl, 2003), in general.
3.2.5 Model Illustration on Biobjective Examples
We illustrate the possible application of Theorems 3.2.25 and 3.2.27 for find-
ing the nondominated set for each of the three sets Y ⊂ R2 depicted in Figure 3.8.
In each case, the ideal point lies at the origin so that z = (0, 0) ∈ R2 and y¯ = y
for all y ∈ Y . Furthermore, to apply both Theorem 3.2.25 and 3.2.27, we choose
γ = 1 and, thus, let the domination structure D = {D(y) : y ∈ Y } be defined by
D(y) = {d ∈ R2 : 〈d, y〉 ≥ ‖d‖ymin} for all y ∈ Y .
Y ⊂ R2
6y2
-
y1

*
n
s
s
N(Y,D)
Y ⊂ R26y2
-
y1
c
c
N(Y,D)
Y ⊂ R26y2
-
y1
@
@
@
@
@
@@
 
 
 
c
c@
N(Y,D)
n
Figure 3.8 Nondominated sets N(Y,D) for the variable-cone model and convex
(left), concave (center), and linear (right) Pareto sets as in Examples 3.2.29–3.2.31
Example 3.2.29 (Convex case). Let Y = {y ∈ R2 : (1 − y1)2 + (1 − y2)2 ≤ 1} be
as depicted in Figure 3.8 (left). Then N(Y,R2
≧
) = {y ∈ Y : (1− y1)2 + (1− y2)2 =
1, y1 ≤ 1, y2 ≤ 1} is R2≧-convex, and Theorem 3.2.25 can be used to find N(Y,D).
Hence, let y ∈ N(Y,R2
≧
), so
(1− y1)2 + (1− y2)2 = 1 for 0 ≤ y1 ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ y2 ≤ 1 (3.59a)
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and, without loss of generality, assume that ymin = y1 ≤ y2, so 0 ≤ y1 ≤ 1 − 12
√
2
or 1 − y1 ≥ 12
√
2 > 0. Since the supporting hyperplane at y has the normal vector
n = (1−y1, 1−y2) ∈ R2 that satisfies ‖n‖2 = 1 and 〈n, y−y′〉 > 0 for all y′ ∈ Y \{y},
the condition in Theorem 3.2.25 becomes
〈n, y〉2 + ‖n‖2y2min − ‖n‖2‖y‖2
= [(1− y1)y1 + (1− y2)y2]2 + y21 − (y21 + y22)
= (1− y1 − y2)2 − y22
= (1− y1)2 − 2(1− y1)y2
= (1− y1)(1− y1 − 2y2) ≥ 0
⇔ (1− y1) ≥ 2y2
⇔ (1− y1)2 = 1− (1− y2)2 = 2y2 − y22 ≥ 4y22
⇔ y1 ≤ y2 ≤ 25
Using Equation 3.59a, y1 and y2 can equivalently be restricted from below by
1
5 , so
that 15 ≤ y1 ≤ y2 ≤ 25 and thus, by symmetry of Y in y1 and y2
N(Y,D) = {y ∈ Y : (1− y1)2 + (1− y2)2 = 1, 15 ≤ y1, y2 ≤ 25} (3.59b)
as shown in Figure 3.8 (left).
If Y is R2
≧
-concave, we can use Theorem 3.2.27 instead of Theorem 3.2.25.
Example 3.2.30 (Concave case). Let Y = {y ∈ R2 : y21 + y22 ≥ 1, y1 ≥ 0, y2 ≥ 0}
be as depicted in Figure 3.8 (center). Then N(Y,R2
≧
) = {y ∈ Y : y21+y22 = 1} is R2≧-
concave, and Theorem 3.2.27 can be used to find N(Y,D). Hence, let y ∈ N(Y,R2
≧
)
y21 + y
2
2 = 1 for 0 ≤ y1 ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ y2 ≤ 1 (3.60a)
and, without loss of generality, assume that ymin = y1 ≤ y2, so 0 ≤ y1 ≤ 12
√
2 or
1−y1 ≥ 1− 12
√
2. Since z1 = (1, 0) and z2 = (0, 1), the condition in Theorem 3.2.27
becomes
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〈y − z1, y〉 − ‖y − z1‖y1
= (y1 − 1)y1 + y22 −
√
(y1 − 1)2 + y22 · y1
= 1− y1 −
√
2− 2y1 · y1
=
√
1− y1(
√
1− y1 −
√
2 · y1) < 0
⇔ 2y21 > 1− y1 ⇔ 12 < y1 ≤ y2
Using Equation 3.60a, y1 and y2 can equivalently be restricted from above by
1
2
√
3
so that 12 < y1 ≤ y2 < 12
√
3 and thus, by symmetry of Y in y1 and y2
N(Y,D) =
{
y ∈ Y : y21 + y22 = 1, 12 < y1, y2 < 12
√
3
}
(3.60b)
again shown in Figure 3.8 (center).
The concluding example considers the same set previously discussed in Ex-
ample 3.2.9 and finally shows how the new variable-cone model resolves the limita-
tions highlighted in our earlier discussion.
Example 3.2.31 (Linear case). Let Y = {y ∈ R2 : y1 + y2 ≥ 1, y1 ≥ 0, y2 ≥ 0} be
as depicted in Figure 3.8 (right). Then N(Y,R2
≧
) = {y ∈ Y : y1 + y2 = 1} is both
R2
≧
-convex and R2
≧
-concave so that both Theorems 3.2.25 and 3.2.27 can be used to
find N(Y,D). Hence, let y ∈ N(Y,R2
≧
), so
y1 + y2 = 1 for 0 ≤ y1 ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ y2 ≤ 1 (3.61a)
and, without loss of generality, assume that ymin = y1 ≤ y2, so 0 ≤ ymin = y1 ≤
1
2 ≤ y2. Since the supporting hyperplane at y has the normal vector n = (1, 1) that
satisfies 〈n, y − y′〉 ≥ 0 for all y′ ∈ Y , the condition in Theorem 3.2.25 becomes
〈n, y〉2 + ‖n‖2y2min − ‖n‖2‖y‖2
= (y1 + y2)
2 + 2y21 − 2(y21 + y22) = 1− 2y22 > 0
⇔ y1 ≤ y2 < 12
√
2
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Using Equation 3.61a, y1 and y2 can equivalently be restricted from below by 1− 12
√
2
so that 1− 12
√
2 < y1 ≤ y2 < 12
√
2 and thus, by symmetry of Y in y1 and y2
N(Y,D) =
{
y ∈ Y : y1 + y2 = 1, 1− 12
√
2 < y1, y2 <
1
2
√
2
}
(3.61b)
as shown in Figure 3.8 (right). Alternatively, with z1 = (1, 0) and z2 = (0, 1), the
condition in Theorem 3.2.27 becomes
〈y − z1, y〉 − ‖y − z1‖y1
= (y1 − 1)y1 + y22 −
√
(y1 − 1)2 + y22 · y1
= (y1 − 1)y1 + (1− y1)2 −
√
(y1 − 1)2 + (1− y1)2 · y1
= (y1 − 1)(2y1 − 1)−
√
2(1− y1)y1
= (y1 − 1)(2y1 − 1 +
√
2y1) < 0
⇔ 2y1 − 1 +
√
2 > 0
⇔ y1 > 12+√2 =
2−
√
2
2 = 1− 12
√
2
yielding the same answer as Theorem 3.2.25.
In conclusion, we observe that the variable-cone model derived and studied in
this section principally removes the model limitation highlighted in Example 3.2.9.
Since the underlying assumption of ideal-symmetry, however, is only one among
many possibilities to introduce variability into the domination structure of a multi-
objective program, many further research directions are possible and addressed as
part of the concluding discussion at the end of this chapter.
3.3 Translated Cones and Approximate Nondominance
The purpose of this section is to characterize a notion of approximate non-
dominance, namely the concept of epsilon-nondominance (Kutateladze, 1979; Lori-
dan, 1984; White, 1986), using the framework of cones and to develop various solu-
tion methods for the generation of epsilon-nondominated outcomes. In preparation
for the former and based on the observation that the underlying domination struc-
ture cannot be described by a cone anymore, but needs to be defined as a cone that
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is shifted from the origin, we begin our investigation in Section 3.3.1 with the defini-
tion and possible representations of translated cones. In Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3, we
reexamine several of our previous findings for this new class of cones, including the
nondominance mapping theorem from Section 3.1.2 and the scalarization methods
from Section 3.1.3, respectively, and we derive various additional results in this new
context of approximate nondominance. Sections 3.3.4, 3.3.5 and 3.3.6 finally address
the question of purposely generating ε-nondominated outcomes from a theoretical,
methodological, and practical point of view, respectively.
3.3.1 Representation of Translated Cones
We first introduce the notion of a translated cone and then study some
general properties and possible representations of translated cones as polyhedral
sets, using some of the elementary concepts from linear algebra and convex analysis
that are reviewed in Section 2.1.2.
Definition 3.3.1 (Translated cone). A nonempty set D ⊂ Rm is called a translated
cone if there exists a cone C ⊂ Rm and a vector e ∈ Rm such that
D = Ce := C + e (3.62)
In this case, the vector e is called a translation vector for D.
Following the classical definition by Rockafellar (1970), a translated cone
Ce ⊂ Rm is not necessarily a cone anymore but has its vertex shifted from the origin
to the new point e ∈ Rm. In this case, however, a more general notion presented in
Luenberger (1969) also allows for a cone with an arbitrary vertex and corresponds
to what Rockafellar calls a skew orthant or generalized m-dimensional simplex with
one ordinary vertex and m − 1 directions (or vertices at infinity). Other than the
above two monographs, Nachbin (1996) introduces affine cones to describe mappings
between convex vector spaces, and Bauschke (2003) mentions translated cones in the
context of duality results for Bregman projections onto linear constraints. None of
these references, however, contributes any specific results to the representation of
translated cones as now pursued in the remaining section.
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First, if D is a translated cone, then there exists a unique cone C such that
D = Ce, and the vector e is unique if C is also pointed.
Proposition 3.3.2 (Uniqueness of cone and translation vector). Let C,C1, C2 ⊂
Rm be cones and e1, e2 ∈ Rm.
(i) If C1e1 = C
2
e2, then C
1 = C2.
(ii) If Ce1 = Ce2 and C is pointed, then e
1 = e2.
Proof. For (i), suppose C1e1 = C
2
e2 and let d ∈ C1. Then d + e1 ∈ C1e1 = C2e2 and
thus d+e1−e2 ∈ C2. Since C2 is a cone, we also have that 12(d+e1−e2) ∈ C2, thus
e2 + 12(d+ e
1 − e2) ∈ C2e2 = C1e1 and e2 + 12(d+ e1 − e2)− e1 = 12(d+ e2 − e1) ∈ C1.
The fact that C1 is a cone now gives that also d + e2 − e1 ∈ C1, and we conclude
d + e2 − e1 + e1 = d + e2 ∈ C1e1 = C2e2 and finally d + e2 − e2 = d ∈ C2. Hence
C1 ⊆ C2, and by interchanging the roles of C1 and C2 we obtain the result.
For (ii), let C◦ = C∪{0}, then also C◦e1 = C◦e2 and, in particular, e1 ∈ Ce1 =
Ce2 ∋ e2. Then there must exist vectors d1, d2 ∈ C such that e1 = d2 + e2 and
e2 = d1 + e1, yielding that d1 = −d2 and thus d1 = d2 = 0 as C is pointed, showing
that e1 = e2 and concluding the proof. 
If C is not pointed, then the translation vector is not unique, in general.
Example 3.3.3 (Translated cone with multiple translation vectors). If we let
C = {d = (d1, d2)T ∈ R2 : d1 ≥ 0} (3.63)
then C = Ce for all vectors e ∈ {(e1, e2)T ∈ R2 : e1 = 0}.
Although a translated cone is not necessarily a cone, we also say thatD = Ce
is pointed if the underlying cone C is pointed. In particular, if C = C(A) = {d ∈
Rm : Ad ≧ 0} is a polyhedral cone induced by some matrix A ∈ Rl×m, then we
know from Proposition 2.1.28 that C(A) is pointed if and only if rankA = m. An
equivalent condition uses the concept of the kernel of a polyhedral set or cone which
we introduce in the following definition and then utilize to characterize the set of
suitable translation vectors for translated polyhedral cones.
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Definition 3.3.4 (Kernel). Let D(A, b) ⊂ Rm be the polyhedral set described by
the matrix A ∈ Rl×m and vector b ∈ Rm. The set
kerD(A, b) := {y ∈ Rm : Ay = b} (3.64)
is called the kernel of D(A, b).
If A and b are clear from the context, then we simply write kerD instead
of kerD(A, b). However, since the representation D(A, b) of a polyhedral set is not
unique, in general, the kernel also depends on the specific choices of the matrix
A ∈ Rl×m and the vector b ∈ Rl.
Example 3.3.5 (Dependence of kernel on representation). If we let A = (1, 1)T ∈
R2×1, b = (1, 0)T ∈ R2, and
D1 := D(A, b) = {d ∈ R : d ≥ 1, d ≥ 0} = {d ∈ R : d ≥ 1} (3.65)
be the associated polyhedral set (in this case: cone), then kerD1 = ∅. However, if
we let D2 := D(1, 1), then D1 = D2 but kerD2 = {1}.
Next, we formulate the fundamental result for the characterization and rep-
resentation of translated polyhedral cones as polyhedral sets.
Theorem 3.3.6 (Translated polyhedral cones). Let C = D(A) be the polyhedral
cone induced by some matrix A ∈ Rl×m.
(i) Let e ∈ Rm be a translation vector for a translated polyhedral cone Ce.
Let b = Ae ∈ Rl and D = D(A, b) be the polyhedral set induced by A and b. Then
Ce = D (3.66a)
(ii) Let b ∈ Rl and D = D(A, b) be the polyhedral set induced by A and b.
Let kerD(A, b) 6= ∅ and e ∈ kerD(A, b) be any kernel element of D. Then
D = Ce (3.66b)
In both cases (i) and (ii), C and D are pointed if and only if rankA = m, or
equivalently, if kerC = {0}.
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Proof. For (i), we have to show that Ce = D where C = D(A) and D = D(A, b)
with b = Ae. For the first inclusion, let d = c+e ∈ Ce for some c ∈ C. Then Ac ≧ 0
and it follows that
Ad = A(c+ e) = Ac+Ae ≧ 0 + b = b (3.67a)
which implies that d ∈ D, showing that Ce ⊆ D. For the reversed inclusion, let
d ∈ D. Then Ad ≧ b = Ae and it follows that
Ad−Ae = A(d− e) ≧ 0 =⇒ d− e ∈ C =⇒ d ∈ C + e = Ce (3.67b)
which shows that also D ⊆ Ce and, thus, Ce = D.
For (ii), we have to show that if D = D(A, b) and kerD(A, b) 6= ∅, then
D = Ce where C = D(A) and e ∈ kerD(A, b). Hence, let D = D(A, b) and
e ∈ kerD(A, b). Then Ae = b and it follows that
d ∈ D ⇐⇒ Ad ≧ b = Ae⇐⇒ Ad−Ae = A(d− e) ≧ 0⇐⇒ d− e ∈ C (3.67c)
which implies that D − e = C and therefore D = Ce.
By definition, the translated cone D = Ce is pointed if and only if C is
pointed, or equivalently, if rankA = m or Ac = 0 if and only if c = 0. Clearly , in
this case kerC = {0} and the proof is complete. 
Hence, we conclude that every translated polyhedral cone D = Ce with
C = C(A) can be described as a polyhedral set D = D(A, b), and that a polyhedral
set D = D(A, b) describes a translated polyhedral cone if its kernel kerD(A, b) is
nonempty. In this case, we also call D a polyhedral translated cone.
Based on the interpretation of kerD(A, b) as the solution set of the inho-
mogeneous system of linear equations Ad = b, we can also formulate the following
alternative characterization as our concluding corollary.
Corollary 3.3.7 (Polyhedral translated cones). Let A ∈ Rl×m be a real l × m
matrix, b ∈ Rl be a real vector, and D = D(A, b) ⊂ Rm be the associated polyhedral
set. Then D is a
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(i) polyhedral translated cone if rankA = rank(A, b), and a
(ii) pointed polyhedral translated cone if rankA = rank(A, b) = m.
In both cases, kerD(A, b) 6= ∅ and D = Ce with C = C(A) the polyhedral cone
induced by A and e ∈ kerD(A, b) a (in case (ii): the unique) translation vector.
In particular, we obtain that the polyhedral cone C = C(A) is always unique
from Proposition 3.3.2.
3.3.2 Cone Characterizations of Epsilon-Nondominance
We first introduce the notion of ε-nondominance for general cones in exten-
sion of the concept of additive ε-efficiency in Definition 2.2.16 and similar to the
definition in Helbig and Pateva (1994). We then highlight the relationship to trans-
lated cones, provide various characterizations for the associated ε-nondominated set,
and use the representation of translated cones as polyhedral sets to finally derive
some more specific results for ε-nondominance with respect to a polyhedral cone.
Definition 3.3.8 (Epsilon-Nondominance). Let Y ⊂ Rm be a nonempty set, C ⊂
Rm be a cone, and ε ∈ C be a vector. The sets
Ns(Y,C, ε) := {y ∈ Y : (y − ε− C ∪ {0}) ∩ Y = ∅} (3.68a)
N(Y,C, ε) := {y ∈ Y : (y − ε− C \ {0}) ∩ Y = ∅} (3.68b)
Nw(Y,C, ε) := {y ∈ Y : (y − ε− intC) ∩ Y = ∅} (3.68c)
are called the strictly ε-nondominated, ε-nondominated, and weakly ε-nondominated
set of Y with respect to C, respectively.
We immediately see that Ns(Y,C, ε) ⊆ N(Y,C, ε) ⊆ Nw(Y,C, ε). Moreover,
for ε = 0, we note that N(Y,C, 0) = N(Y,C) and Nw(Y,C, 0) = Nw(Y,C) reduce
to the nondominated and weakly nondominated set, respectively, while the set of
strictly (0-)nondominated outcomes is empty and, thus, originally not defined in
Definition 2.2.5. Similarly, in the special case that C = Rm
≧
is the Pareto cone,
N(Y,Rm
≧
, ε) = N(Y, ε) and Nw(Y,Rm≧, ε) = Nw(Y, ε) correspond to the sets of ε-
Pareto and weak ε-Pareto outcomes that we first introduce after Definition 2.2.16.
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Furthermore, we note that the sets Cε = C + ε and intCε = int(C + ε) =
intC+ ε are translated cones with translation vector ε, so that the ε-nondominated
set with respect to a cone C can also be described as a nondominated set with
respect to the translated cone Cε.
Proposition 3.3.9 (Translated cone nondominance). Let Y ⊂ Rm be a set, C ⊂ Rm
be a pointed convex cone, and ε ∈ C \ {0}. Then
(i) Ns(Y,C, ε) = N(Y,D) for D = C ∪ {0}+ ε,
(ii) N(Y,C, ε) = N(Y,D) for D = C \ {0}+ ε,
(iii) Nw(Y,C, ε) = N(Y,D) for D = intC + ε, or alternatively
(iv) Nw(Y,C, ε) = Nw(Y,D) for D = C + ε.
Proof. Since N(Y,D) := {y ∈ Y : (y − D \ {0}) ∩ Y = ∅} by Definition 2.2.5,
the proof for the first three cases (i), (ii), and (iii) follows immediately from Defini-
tion 3.3.8 if D = D \ {0}, or if we show that the domination sets D do not contain
the origin. In particular, since
intC + ε ⊆ C \ {0}+ ε ⊆ C ∪ {0}+ ε (3.69)
it is sufficient to show that 0 /∈ C ∪ {0}+ ε. Hence, let ε ∈ C \ {0}, then it follows
from Proposition 2.1.13 that −ε /∈ C ∪ {0} because C is a pointed convex cone. In
particular, we obtain that 0 /∈ C ∪ {0}+ ε and the result follows.
Similarly for (iv), we have Nw(Y,D) = N(Y, intD) and the proof follows
directly because int(C + ε) = intC + ε and 0 /∈ intC + ε from the above. 
The following result is an immediate consequence of the previous proposition
and highlights the particular role of the translated cone Cε = C + ε.
Corollary 3.3.10 (Translated cone nondominance). Let Y ⊂ Rm be a set, C ⊂ Rm
be a pointed convex cone, ε ∈ C, and D = Cε := C + ε.
(i) If 0 ∈ C and ε 6= 0, then N(Y,D) = Ns(Y,C, ε).
(ii) If 0 /∈ C (so ε 6= 0), then N(Y,D) = N(Y,C, ε).
In any case, N(Y, intD) = Nw(Y,D) = Nw(Y,C, ε).
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The previous two results emphasize that we need to be very specific if we de-
cide to include or exclude the origin from the domination cone C, based on which the
translated cone nondominance in Proposition 3.3.9 and Corollary 3.3.10 results in
slightly different notions of approximate nondominance. We continue this discussion
after collecting one additional statement that describes the relationship between two
ε-nondominated sets for two different choices of ε and is based on Proposition 2.2.6.
Proposition 3.3.11. Let Y ⊂ Rm be a set, C ⊂ Rm be a pointed convex cone, and
ε1, ε2 ∈ C be two vectors so that ε2 − ε1 ∈ C. Then
N(Y,C, ε1) ⊆ N(Y,C, ε2) (3.70)
and the same inclusion holds for the strictly and weakly ε-nondominated sets.
Proof. Since all three proofs work essentially the same, we only give details for the
ε-nondominated case. Hence, let D1 = C \ {0} + ε1 and D2 = C \ {0} + ε2. If
ε2 − ε1 ∈ C, or ε2 ∈ C + ε1, then it also follows that
C \ {0}+ ε2 ⊆ C \ {0}+ C + ε1 ⊆ C \ {0}+ ε1 (3.71)
since C is a pointed convex cone. Hence, we see that D2 ⊆ D1, and now Proposi-
tion 2.2.6 implies that N(Y,D1) ⊆ N(Y,D2) and, together with Proposition 3.3.9,
that N(Y,C, ε1) ⊆ N(Y,C, ε2). The remaining proofs for the strictly and weakly
ε-nondominated cases now follow analogously. 
In particular, since ε ∈ C implies that (1 − λ)ε ∈ C for all 0 ≤ λ < 1 and
(µ− 1)ε ∈ C for all µ > 1, we conclude from the previous result that
N(Y,C) ⊆ N(Y,C, λε) ⊆ N(Y,C, ε) ⊆ N(Y,C, µε) (3.72)
for every ε ∈ C and all 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 and µ ≥ 1.
Based on Proposition 3.3.9 and Corollary 3.3.10, we mention earlier that the
three different notions of ε-nondominance distinguish between translated cones that
keep or remove the origin from the original underlying cone. For the further study
of this subtle difference, we introduce the following useful definition.
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Definition 3.3.12 (Epsilon-translated nondominated set). Let Y ⊂ Rm be a set,
C ⊂ Rm be a cone, and ε ∈ C be a vector. The sets
Nε(Y,C) := (N(Y,C) + ε) ∩ Y (3.73a)
Nwε(Y,C) := (Nw(Y,C) + ε) ∩ Y (3.73b)
are called the ε-translated and weakly ε-translated nondominated set of Y with re-
spect to C, respectively.
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Figure 3.9 Sets of (weakly) Pareto, ε-Pareto, and ε-translated Pareto outcomes
Figure 3.9 illustrates these two notions together with the three previous
concepts of (strictly and weakly) ε-nondominance for the depicted set Y and the
particular case of Pareto nondominance. First, the set N(Y,R2
≧
) of Pareto outcomes
is given by the curve connecting points A and B, while the set Nw(Y,R2≧) of all weak
Pareto outcomes corresponds to the extended curve from C to D. If we translate
these two sets by the specified translation vector ε, then we obtain the (weakly)
ε-translated Pareto sets Nε(Y,R2≧) and Nwε(Y,R
2
≧
) as the curves connecting points
106
E and F, and G and H, respectively. In this case, the set Ns(Y,R2≧, ε) of strict ε-
Pareto outcomes is the shaded area enclosed by all marked points without the curve
connecting I, G, E, F, H and J, the ε-Pareto set N(Y,R2
≧
, ε) additionally includes
the curve from E to F, and the weakly ε-Pareto set Nw(Y,R2≧, ε) also contains the
complete remaining curve from I to J.
In particular, all outcomes in the (weakly) ε-translated Pareto set in Fig-
ure 3.9 belong to those outcomes that are (weakly) ε-Pareto but not strictly ε-Pareto,
respectively, and it turns out that this characterization holds as a general result.
Proposition 3.3.13 (Relationship between ε-nondominance concepts). Let Y ⊂
Rm be a set, C ⊂ Rm be a cone, and ε ∈ C be a vector. Then
Nε(Y,C) ⊆ N(Y,C, ε) \Ns(Y,C, ε) (3.74a)
Nwε(Y,C) ⊆ Nw(Y,C, ε) \Ns(Y,C, ε) (3.74b)
Proof. For the first inclusion, let y˜ ∈ Nε(Y,C), so y˜ = yˆ+ ε for some yˆ ∈ N(Y,C).
Then there does not exist y ∈ Y such that yˆ − y ∈ C \ {0}, or y˜ − ε− y ∈ C \ {0}
which implies that y˜ ∈ N(Y,C, ε). Moreover, since y˜ − yˆ − ε = 0 ∈ C ∪ {0}, it is
clear that y˜ /∈ Ns(Y,C, ε), and the result follows. As before, the second statement
is proven analogously by replacing the cone C by its interior. 
Figure 3.9 also suggests that outcomes that are ε-Pareto but not strictly
ε-Pareto can be characterized as subset of those outcomes among the ε-Pareto set
that are nondominated with respect to the negative Pareto cone, with an underlying
interpretation of objective maximization rather than minimization. More general,
we show in the following result that the set difference between the ε-nondominated
set and strictly ε-nondominated set constitutes a subset of those outcomes in the
ε-nondominated set (all with respect to C) that are nondominated with respect to
the negative cone −C.
Theorem 3.3.14. Let Y ⊂ Rm be a set, C ⊂ Rm be a cone, and ε ∈ C. Then
N(Y,C, ε) \Ns(Y,C, ε) ⊆ N(N(Y,C, ε),−C) (3.75)
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Proof. If yˆ ∈ N(Y,C, ε) \ Ns(Y,C, ε), then there does not exist y ∈ Y such that
yˆ− y− ε ∈ C \ {0}, but yˆ− y− ε ∈ C ∪{0} for some y ∈ Y which, together with the
former, implies that yˆ = y + ε. To show that yˆ ∈ N(N(Y,C, ε),−C), we then need
that there does not exist y˜ ∈ N(Y,C, ε) such that yˆ− y˜ ∈ −C \ {0}, or equivalently,
that y˜− yˆ ∈ C \ {0} only if y˜ /∈ N(Y,C, ε). Hence, let y˜− yˆ ∈ C \ {0} and the result
now follows since yˆ = y+ε implies that y˜−y−ε ∈ C \{0} and, thus, y˜ /∈ N(Y,C, ε).

Combining the previous result with Proposition 3.3.13, we can infer the
following concluding corollary.
Corollary 3.3.15. Let Y ⊂ Rm be a set, C ⊂ Rm be a cone, and ε ∈ C. Then
Nε(Y,C) ⊆ N(Y,C, ε) \Ns(Y,C, ε) ⊆ N(N(Y,C, ε),−C) (3.76)
Hence, Theorem 3.3.14 and Corollary 3.3.15 provide a partial characteri-
zation of the solution set for a modified optimization problem over the set of ε-
nondominated outcomes. While we illustrate the relevance of this particular result
in the later Section 3.3.4, several parts of the literature also study other optimization
problems over the nondominated or efficient set (Benson and Sayin, 1994; Tu, 2000;
Yamamoto, 2002; Jorge, 2005), including the computation of nadir points (Ehrgott
and Tenfelde-Podehl, 2003) previously mentioned in Remark 3.2.28.
Other than the previous two results that describe the relationship between
the (ε-)nondominated sets with respect to a cone C and its negative −C, we now
address the relationship between ε-nondominated and approximate Pareto outcomes
in further generalization of the nondominance mapping theorem initially discussed
in Section 3.1.2. In particular, using the representation of translated cones as poly-
hedral sets in Theorem 3.3.6, we first extend Theorem 3.1.13 from polyhedral cones
to polyhedral sets and then show how this new result can be used to derive the
corresponding relationship between approximate nondominance with respect to a
polyhedral cone and approximate Pareto nondominance.
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Theorem 3.3.16 (Nondominance mapping theorem for polyhedral sets). Let Y ⊂
Rm be a set, and D = D(A, b) ⊂ Rm be the polyhedral set for some matrix A ∈ Rl×m
and some vector b ∈ Rl. Then
A[N(Y,D)] ⊆ N(A[Y ],Rl≧b) (3.77a)
where Rl
≧b
:= Rl
≧
+ b = {v ∈ Rl : v ≧ b}. If D is pointed, or equivalently, if
rankA = m, then
A[N(Y,D)] = N(A[Y ],Rl≧b) (3.77b)
Proof. Let uˆ ∈ A[N(Y,D)] with uˆ = Ayˆ, yˆ ∈ N(Y,D), i.e., there do not exist
y ∈ Y, d ∈ D, d 6= 0 such that yˆ = y + d. Now suppose by contradiction that
uˆ /∈ N(A[Y ],Rl
≧b
), then uˆ ≧ u + b for some u = Ay ∈ A[Y ], u 6= uˆ and thus y 6= yˆ.
It follows that
uˆ− u = Ayˆ −Ay = A(yˆ − y) ≧ b (3.78a)
and setting d = yˆ − y gives yˆ = y + d, d ∈ D, d 6= 0 in contradiction to the above.
For the opposite direction, let uˆ ∈ N(A[Y ],Rl
≧b
) with uˆ = Ayˆ, yˆ ∈ Y . Then there
does not exist u = Ay ∈ A[Y ], Ay 6= Ayˆ such that Ayˆ ≧ Ay + b, or A(yˆ − y) ≧ b.
Now suppose by contradiction that uˆ /∈ A[N(Y,D)], or yˆ /∈ N(Y,D). Then there
exist y ∈ Y, d ∈ D, d 6= 0 such that yˆ = y + d and hence
A(yˆ − y) = Ad ≧ b (3.78b)
with Ayˆ 6= Ay if rankA = m. This yields the contradiction. 
The next result provides an alternative condition on the vector b ∈ Rl to
guarantee equality in Theorem 3.3.16.
Proposition 3.3.17 (Alternative condition for equality). Let Y ⊂ Rm be a set, and
D = D(A, b) ⊂ Rm be the polyhedral set for A ∈ Rl×m and b ∈ Rl. If b /∈ −Rl
≧
, then
A[N(Y,D)] = N(A[Y ],Rl≧b) (3.79)
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Proof. The inclusion A[N(Y,D)] ⊆ N(A[Y ],Rl
≧b
) follows as in Theorem 3.3.16,
and for the reversed inclusion, the final contradiction follows from
A(yˆ − y) = Ad ≧ b (3.80)
since b /∈ −Rl
≧
implies that Ad 6= 0 and , thus, Ayˆ 6= Ay. 
Based on the above results, we now employ Proposition 3.3.9 to relate ε-
nondominated outcomes with respect to a polyhedral cone C = C(A) to outcomes
that are nondominated with respect to the polyhedral setD = D(A, b) describing the
translated cone Cε = C + ε. Using this relationship, we derive the ε-nondominance
mapping theorem for polyhedral cones as concluding result in this section.
Theorem 3.3.18 (Epsilon-nondominance mapping theorem for polyhedral cones).
Let Y ⊂ Rm be a set and C = C(A) ⊂ Rm be the pointed polyhedral cone induced by
a matrix A ∈ Rl×m with full rankA = m. Let ε ∈ C \ {0} and b = Aε. Then
A[Ns(Y,C, ε)] = N(A[Y ],R
l
≧b) (3.81)
Proof. We combine several of the results derived in this and the previous section.
First, we obtain from Theorem 3.3.6 that the translated polyhedral cone D = Cε
with C = D(A) and translation vector ε can be described by the polyhedral set
D = D(A, b) for b = Aε as stated in the assumptions. Hence, it follows that
D = D(A, b) = Cε = C + ε (3.81a)
where D is pointed because C is pointed, or equivalently, because rankA = m. In
particular, since 0 ∈ C(A), Proposition 3.3.9 and Corollary 3.3.10 imply that
N(Y,D) = Ns(Y,C, ε) (3.81b)
and therefore we can finally apply Theorem 3.3.16 to conclude that
A[Ns(Y,C, ε)] = N(A[Y ],R
l
≧b) (3.81c)
This completes the proof and section. 
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3.3.3 Scalarization Methods and Epsilon-Optimality
After deriving several cone characterizations of ε-nondominance in the pre-
vious section, we now investigate the relationships between ε-nondominance and ǫ-
optimality when solving a multiobjective program based on scalarization approaches.
In particular, for each method introduced in Section 2.2.3 we establish the relation-
ship between ǫ ∈ R and ε ∈ Rm that guarantees that an ǫ-optimal solution for the
single objective program SOP is also ε-efficient for MOP. Most recently, some of
these results are also and independently derived by Gutie´rrez et al. (2006a,b).
Our first result generalizes Lemma 2.2.21 and is formulated for an arbitrary
increasing and superadditive but otherwise generic scalarization function in the par-
ticular case of Pareto nondominance.
Proposition 3.3.19 (Sufficient conditions for approximate Pareto nondominance).
Let Y ⊂ Rm be a nonempty set, and s : Rm → R be an increasing and superadditive
scalarization function. Let ε ∈ Rm, ε ≧ 0 and ǫ ∈ R, ǫ ≥ 0 with s(ε) ≥ ǫ, and yˆ ∈ Y
be ǫ-optimal for the single objective program
SOP: Minimize s(y) subject to y ∈ Y (3.82)
(i) If y˜ is strictly ǫ-optimal, or if ǫ < s(ε), then y˜ ∈ Ns(Y, ε).
(ii) If s is strictly increasing, then y˜ ∈ N(Y, ε).
In any case, yˆ ∈ Nw(Y, ε)
Proof. For (i), if y˜ ∈ Y is strictly ǫ-optimal for SOP, or s(y˜) < s(y) − ε for all
y ∈ Y , let s(ε) ≥ ǫ and suppose by contradiction that y˜ /∈ Ns(Y, ε). Then there
exists y ∈ Y such that y ≦ y˜ − ε, or y + ε ≦ y˜, and thus
s(ε) ≤ s(y + ε)− s(y) ≤ s(y˜)− s(y) < ǫ (3.83a)
since s is superadditive, increasing, and because y˜ is strictly ǫ-optimal, in contra-
diction to s(ε) ≥ ǫ. Moreover, if ǫ < s(ε), then the contradiction still follows if y˜ is
only ǫ-optimal for which all inequalities in (3.83a) may also hold with equality.
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For (ii), if s is strictly increasing, let s(ε) ≥ ǫ and suppose by contradiction
that y˜ /∈ N(Y, ε). Then there exists y ∈ Y such that y ≤ y˜ − ε, or y + ε ≤ y˜, and
s(ε) ≤ s(y + ε)− s(y) < s(yˆ)− s(y) ≤ ǫ (3.83b)
because s is strictly increasing, in contradiction to s(ε) ≥ ǫ.
Finally, again let s(ε) ≥ ǫ and suppose by contradiction that y˜ /∈ Nw(Y, ε).
Then there exists y ∈ Y such that y < y˜ − ε, or y + ε < y˜, and the contradiction to
s(ε) ≥ ǫ again follows from the inequality chain in (3.83b). 
Since weighted sums are linear and, in particular, additive and superadditive,
we can immediately use Proposition 3.3.19 to derive the corresponding result for the
weighted-sum scalarization, which is similarly given in White (1986), Deng (1997),
and Dutta and Vetrivel (2001), for the special case of Pareto nondominance.
Choosing an alternative path and following our discussion in Section 3.1.3
in which we extend several scalarization methods for general cones, we first derive
the corresponding result for the hybrid scalarization method and then derive those
for the weighted-sum, constrained-objective, and Benson method as special cases.
Proposition 3.3.20 (Approximate hybrid scalarization). Let Y ⊂ Rm be a set,
C ⊂ Rm be a convex cone, b ∈ Rm, w ∈ C∗ \ {0}, ε ∈ C, ǫ ≤ 〈w, ε〉, and y˜ ∈ Y be
ǫ-optimal for the hybrid scalarization
HB(w, b): Minimize 〈w, y〉 subject to b− y ∈ C and y ∈ Y (3.84)
(i) If y˜ is strictly ǫ-optimal, or if ǫ < 〈w, ε〉, then y˜ ∈ Ns(Y,C, ε).
(ii) If w ∈ C∗s , then y˜ ∈ N(Y,C, ε).
In any case, y˜ ∈ Nw(Y,C, ε).
Proof. Let y˜ be ǫ-optimal for HB(w, b), so
〈w, y˜〉 ≤ 〈w, y〉 − ǫ for all y ∈ Y (3.84a)
that satisfy b− y ∈ C, and 〈w, y˜〉 < 〈w, y〉 − ǫ if y˜ is strictly ǫ-optimal.
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For (i), if y˜ is strictly ǫ-optimal, let w ∈ C∗ \ {0}, ǫ ≤ 〈w, ε〉, and by
contradiction suppose that y˜ /∈ Ns(Y,C, ε). Then there exists y ∈ Y such that
y˜ − y − ε ∈ C ∪ {0}, and thus
b− y = (b− y˜) + (y˜ − y − ε) + ε ∈ C (3.84b)
by feasibility of y˜ for HB(w, b), ε ∈ C, and convexity of C, showing that y is also
feasible for HB(w, b). Furthermore, it also follows that 〈w, y˜− y− ε〉 ≥ 0 as w ∈ C∗
which implies that
〈w, y˜〉 ≥ 〈w, y〉+ 〈w, ε〉 ≥ 〈w, y〉+ ǫ (3.84c)
in contradiction to strict ǫ-optimality of y˜ for HB(w, b). Moreover, if ǫ < 〈w, ε〉,
then 〈w, y˜〉 > 〈w, y〉+ ǫ and the contradiction persists if y˜ is only ǫ-optimal.
For (ii), if w ∈ C∗s , suppose by contradiction that y˜ /∈ N(Y,C, ε). Then there
exists y ∈ Y with y˜ − y − ε ∈ C \ {0}, and feasibility of y for HB(w, b) follows as
in (i). However, now w ∈ C∗s implies that 〈w, y˜ − y − ε〉 > 0, or 〈w, y˜〉 > 〈w, y〉+ ǫ
again in contradiction to ǫ-optimality of y˜ for HB(w, b).
In any case, (intC)∗s = C
∗ \ {0} from Proposition 2.1.21 which implies that
y˜ ∈ N(Y, intC, ε) = Nw(Y,C, ε) from (ii). 
In particular, analogous to the discussion in Section 3.1.3, we can imme-
diately derive the corresponding results for the weighted-sum, the constrained-
objective, and the Benson scalarization method. The proofs are, therefore, omitted.
Proposition 3.3.21 (Approximate weighted-sum scalarization). Let Y ⊂ Rm be a
set, C ⊂ Rm be a cone, w ∈ C∗ \ {0}, ε ∈ C, ǫ ≤ 〈w, ε〉, and y˜ ∈ Y be ǫ-optimal to
the weighted-sum scalarization
WS(w): Minimize 〈w, y〉 subject to y ∈ Y (3.85)
(i) If y˜ is strictly ǫ-optimal, or if ǫ < 〈w, ε〉, then y˜ ∈ Ns(Y,C, ε).
(ii) If w ∈ C∗s , then y˜ ∈ N(Y,C, ε).
In any case, y˜ ∈ Nw(Y,C, ε).
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Proposition 3.3.22 (Approximate constrained-objective scalarization). Let Y ⊂
Rm be a set, C ⊂ Rm be a convex cone, b ∈ Rm, ek ∈ C∗ be the kth unit vector,
ε ∈ C, ǫ ≤ εk, and y˜ ∈ Y be ǫ-optimal to the constrained-objective scalarization
COk(b): Minimize yk subject to b− y ∈ C and y ∈ Y (3.86)
(i) If y˜ is strictly ǫ-optimal, or if ǫ < εk, then y˜ ∈ Ns(Y,C, ε).
(ii) If ek ∈ C∗s , then y˜ ∈ N(Y,C, ε).
In any case, y˜ ∈ Nw(Y,C, ε).
Proposition 3.3.23 (Approximate Benson scalarization). Let Y ⊂ Rm be a set,
y◦ ∈ Y , C ⊂ Rm be a convex cone, w = (1, . . . , 1)T ∈ C∗ be the vector with all
components equal to one, ε ∈ C, ǫ ≤ ∑ji=1 εi, and y˜ = y◦ − c˜ ∈ Y where c˜ ∈ C be
ǫ-optimal to the Benson scalarization
B(y◦): Maximize
m∑
i=1
ci subject to y
◦ − c = y ∈ Y and c ∈ C (3.87)
(i) If c˜ is strictly ǫ-optimal, or if ǫ <
∑m
i=1 εi, then y˜ ∈ Ns(Y,C, ε).
(ii) If w = (1, . . . , 1)T ∈ C∗s , then y˜ ∈ N(Y,C, ε).
In any case, y˜ ∈ Nw(Y,C, ε).
For the Pascoletti-Serafini scalarization method, we can prove the following
result which, like the original method, is also formulated for a convex cone.
Proposition 3.3.24 (Approximate Pascoletti-Serafini scalarization). Let Y ⊂ Rm
be a nonempty set, C ⊂ Rm be a convex cone, ε ∈ C, ǫ ∈ {δ : ε − δv ∈ C}, and
y˜ = r+ µ˜v− c˜ ∈ Y where (µ˜, c˜) be ǫ-optimal for the Pascoletti-Serafini scalarization
PS(r, v): Minimize µ subject to r + µv − c = y ∈ Y, c ∈ C and µ ∈ R (3.88)
If µ˜ is strictly ǫ-optimal for PS(r, v), then y˜ ∈ Ns(Y,C, ε), and y˜ ∈ Nw(Y,C, ε) in
any case.
Proof. For ǫ ∈ {δ : ε − δv ∈ C}, denote cǫ := ε − ǫv ∈ C. Then let µ˜ with c˜ ∈ C
be strictly ǫ-optimal for PS(r, v), so µ˜ ≤ µ + ǫ whenever r + µv − c ∈ Y for some
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c ∈ C, and suppose by contradiction that µ˜ /∈ Ns(Y,C, ε). Then there exists y ∈ Y
such that y˜ − y − ε ∈ C ∪ {0}, or y = y˜ − c− ε for some c ∈ C ∪ {0} yielding
y = r + µ˜v − c˜− c− ε (3.88a)
= r + µ˜v − c˜− c− (ǫv + cǫ) (3.88b)
= r + (µ˜− ǫ)v − (c˜+ c+ cǫ) (3.88c)
where c˜ + c + cǫ ∈ C as C is a convex cone. Hence, it follows that µ = µ˜ − ǫ, or
µ˜ = µ+ ǫ in contradiction to strict ǫ-optimality of µ˜ for PS(r, v).
Next, let µ˜ with c˜ ∈ C be ǫ-optimal for PS(r, v), so µ˜ ≤ µ + ǫ whenever
r + µv − c ∈ Y for some c ∈ C, and suppose by contradiction that y˜ /∈ Nw(Y,C, ε).
Then there exists y ∈ Y such that y˜ − y − ε ∈ intC, or y = y˜ − c − ε for some
c ∈ intC. Now, since c ∈ intC, there also exists γ > 0 such that cγ = c − γv ∈ C
which implies that
y = r + µ˜v − c˜− c− ε (3.88d)
= r + µ˜v − c˜− (γv + cγ)− (ǫv + d) (3.88e)
= r + (µ˜− γ − ǫ)v − (c˜+ cγ + cǫ) (3.88f)
where c˜+cγ+cǫ ∈ C as C is a convex cone. Hence, it now follows that µ = µ˜−γ−ǫ,
or µ˜ = µ+ γ + ǫ > µ+ ǫ in contradiction to optimality of µ˜ for PS(r, v). 
Finally, we derive two further results for the weighted-Chebyshev norm
scalarization and, as a special case, the max-norm scalarization method which again
are both formulated for the Pareto case.
Proposition 3.3.25 (Approximate weighted-Chebyshev norm scalarization). Let
Y ⊂ Rm be a set, r ∈ Rm, w ∈ Rm, w ≥ 0, ε ∈ Rm, ε ≧ 0, ǫ ≤ mini=1,...,m{wiεi},
and y˜ be ǫ-optimal for the weighted-Chebyshev norm scalarization
CN(r, w): Minimize max
i=1,...,m
{wi(yi − ri)} subject to x ∈ X (3.89)
If y˜ ∈ Y is strictly ǫ-optimal, or if ǫ < mini=1,...,m{wiεi}, then y˜ ∈ Ns(Y, ε), and
y˜ ∈ Nw(Y, ε) in any case.
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Proof. First, if y˜ is strictly ǫ-optimal, so maxi{wi(y˜i− ri)} < maxi{wi(yi− ri)}+ ǫ
for all y ∈ Y , let ǫ ≤ mini{wiεi} and suppose by contradiction that y˜ /∈ Ns(Y, ε).
Then there exists y ∈ Y such that y˜ ≧ y + ε which implies that
max
i=1,...,m
{wi(y˜i − ri)} ≥ max
i=1,...,m
{wi(yi − ri + εi)} (3.89a)
≥ max
i=1,...,m
{wi(yi − ri)}+ min
i=1,...,m
{wiεi} (3.89b)
≥ max
i=1,...,m
{wi(yi − ri)}+ ǫ (3.89c)
in contradiction to strict ǫ-optimality of y˜ for CN(r, w). Moreover, if ǫ < mini{wiεi},
then (3.89c) holds strictly and a contradiction persists also if y˜ is only ǫ-optimal.
Second, suppose by contradiction that y˜ /∈ Nw(Y, ε), then there exists y ∈ Y
such that y < y˜ + ε, or y˜ > y − ε, and in this case the inequality in (3.89a) is strict
because w ≥ 0 and, thus, wi > 0 for at least one i, yielding the same contradiction
as before and concluding the proof. 
In particular, with r = 0 ∈ Rm and wi = 1 > 0 for all i = 1, . . . ,m, we
obtain the corresponding max-norm result as concluding statement of this section.
Proposition 3.3.26 (Approximate max-norm scalarization). Let Y ⊂ Rm be a set,
ε ∈ Rm, ε ≥ 0, ǫ ≤ mini{εi}, and y˜ be ǫ-optimal for the max-norm scalarization
MN: Minimize max
i=1,...,m
{yi} subject to y ∈ Y (3.90)
If y˜ ∈ Y is strictly ǫ-optimal, or if ǫ < mini{εi}, then y˜ ∈ Ns(Y, ε), and y˜ ∈ Nw(Y, ε)
in any case.
3.3.4 Exact Generation of Approximate Solutions
The previous results for approximate scalarization methods in principle dis-
tinguish the generation of strictly ε-nondominated, ε-nondominated, and weakly ε-
nondominated outcomes. However, since strictly ε-nondominated outcomes are also
(weakly) ε-nondominated, these results do not provide the means to more specifically
characterize cases in which a generated outcome is only (weakly) ε-nondominated
but not strictly ε-nondominated.
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Consequently, and motivated by the prominent role of ε-translated nondom-
inated outcomes in Proposition 3.3.13 that enable the proper distinction between
(weakly) ε-nondominated outcomes and strict ε-nondominance, we now investigate
several approaches for the exact generation of an ε-translated nondominated out-
come. Restricting our attention to the Pareto case, throughout the following discus-
sion we assume that we already know a Pareto or weak Pareto outcome yˆ ∈ N(Y,Rm
≧
)
or Nw(Y,Rm≧) but that we want to relax this outcome by some specified ε ∈ Rm to
obtain the corresponding ε-translated outcome y˜ = yˆ + ε. In particular, for conve-
nience we usually assume that y˜ ∈ Y , although y˜ /∈ Y is also possible, in general.
While we still formulate all following statements with respect to the outcome
set Y ⊂ Rm, for which some of the following methods and results are obvious as
they are explicitly constructed to yield y˜ = yˆ+ ε as optimal solution, we emphasize
that the main difficulty remains to solve the underlying optimization problem with
respect to feasible set X in the decision space Rn. We further address some of
the resulting practical or computational issues in the two subsequent sections and,
therefore, refrain from the exposition of any such details already at this point.
The first method utilizes an arbitrary norm and is probably the most intu-
itive method to generate a particular solution y˜ = yˆ + ε.
Proposition 3.3.27 (Exact norm generating method). Let yˆ ∈ Y , ε ∈ Rm, and
y˜ = yˆ+ε ∈ Y . Then y˜ is optimal for the single objective norm-minimization problem
Minimize ‖yˆ − ε− y‖ subject to y ∈ Y (3.91)
We do not need to formally prove the method proposed in Proposition 3.3.27,
as its validity is immediately clear from the assumption that y˜ = yˆ+ε ∈ Y . To solve
the problem in (3.91), we can choose any suitable norm, including the weighted-ℓp
or pth-order norm
‖yˆ − ε− y‖p :=
(
m∑
i=1
wi(|yˆi − εi − yi|)p
)1/p
(3.92)
hence also including the weighted-Chebyshev norm for p =∞ as a special case.
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If our previous assumption that y˜ ∈ Y is not satisfied, then one conceptual
drawback of the above norm method is that the identified optimal solution may
either be greater or smaller than y˜ and, therefore, does not necessarily belong to the
ε-nondominated set N(Y, ε) unless we explicitly introduce the additional constraint
that y ≦ yˆ+ ε. In this case, however, we can more generally formulate the following
multiobjective program.
Proposition 3.3.28 (Exact constraint generating method). Let yˆ ∈ Y , ε ∈ Rm,
and assume that y˜ = yˆ+ ε ∈ Y . Then y˜ is the unique nondominated outcome to the
multiobjective programming problem
Minimize − y subject to y ≦ yˆ + ε and y ∈ Y (3.93)
Again, correctness of Proposition 3.3.28 is immediate from the assumption
that y˜ = yˆ+ε ∈ Y , and a formal proof can be omitted. Furthermore, if our assump-
tion that y˜ ∈ Y is not satisfied, then any other solution to the problem in (3.93)
is still ε-nondominated and can now be found using any suitable scalarization tech-
nique. If y˜ ∈ Y , however, then the imposed constraints in (3.93) enforce optimality
of y˜ by restricting the original outcome set Y such that y˜ lies at the boundary, and
more precisely, at an extreme point of the set y˜ − Rm
≧
.
In the remaining part of this section, we investigate an alternative approach
to modify the original problem so that interior points in the original outcome set
become boundary points of a modified outcome set. However, in this case we do not
introduce any additional constraints but an additional component into the objective
function vector, based on the concept of an outcome space augmentation. The
underlying idea for this method is to define a suitable augmentation function a :
Y → R and then consider Y as new set Y = {(y, z)) ∈ Y × R : z = a(y)} in the
augmented outcome space Rm+1 in which all interior points of Y ⊂ Rm become
boundary points of Y ⊂ Rm+1. We study the associated augmented MOP for
two scalarization methods, namely the weighted-sum and the weighted-Chebyshev
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norm scalarization, and we show how ε-translated Pareto outcomes for MOP can
be identified as nondominated outcomes for the respective AMOP.
Definition 3.3.29 (Augmented Multiobjective Program). Let Y ⊂ Rm and a :
Y → R be a real-valued function. The multiobjective program
AMOP: Minimize [y, a(y)]T subject to y ∈ Y (3.94)
is called the augmented multiobjective program (AMOP), and a is called the aug-
mentation function of AMOP.
Of course, to relate nondominance for AMOP with ε-nondominance for MOP
we need to find some suitable choices of the augmentation function a. In particular,
in the following results we define some specific augmentation functions in terms of
an optimal solution yˆ for a corresponding SOP with scalarization function s.
Definition 3.3.30 (Augmentation function associated with scalarization function).
Let Y ⊂ Rm, s : Y → R be a scalarization function, and yˆ ∈ Y be optimal for the
associated single objective program
SOP: Minimize s(y) subject to y ∈ Y (3.95a)
The function a : Rm → R ∪ {∞} with
a(y) := (s(y)− s(yˆ))−1 (3.95b)
is called the augmentation function associated with s and yˆ.
Following common convention, we define 0−1 :=∞ and derive some further
properties of the resulting augmentation functions in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.3.31 (Properties of augmentation functions associated with scalar-
ization functions). Let Y ⊂ Rm, s : Y → R be an increasing scalarization function,
yˆ ∈ Y be optimal for the corresponding SOP, and a : Y → R ∪ {∞} be the augmen-
tation function associated with s and yˆ. Then
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(i) a(y) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ Y ,
(ii) a(y) =∞ for all y that are optimal for SOP, and
(iii) a is decreasing: y1 ≦ y2 ⇒ a(y1) ≥ a(y2) for all y1, y2 ∈ Y .
Proof. Since yˆ is optimal for SOP, it follows that s(yˆ) ≤ s(y), or s(y) − s(yˆ) ≥ 0
and thus a(y) = (s(y) − s(yˆ))−1 ≥ 0 for all y ∈ Y , showing (i). In particular,
if y ∈ Y is optimal to SOP, then s(y) = s(yˆ) and a(y) = ∞, showing (ii). For
(iii), let y1, y2 ∈ Y with y1 ≦ y2, then s(y1) ≤ s(y2) since s is an increasing
scalarization function and 0 ≤ s(y1)− s(yˆ) ≤ s(y2)− s(yˆ) from (i). Taking inverses
gives (s(y1)− s(yˆ))−1 ≥ (s(y2)− s(yˆ))−1 and thus implies that a(y1) ≥ a(y2). 
The two concluding theorems show that by solving AMOP with an aug-
mentation function associated with either a weighted-sum or a weighted-Chebyshev
norm and an optimal solution yˆ, the corresponding ε-translated outcome y˜ = yˆ + ε
for MOP can be obtained as an optimal solution to the respective scalarized AMOP.
For a further motivation of this approach, we refer to Figure 3.10 which also illus-
trates our first result for the weighted-sum augmentation method.
Theorem 3.3.32 (Weighted-sum augmentation). Let Y ⊂ Rm and yˆ ∈ Y be optimal
for the weighted-sum scalarization WS(w) with scalarization function
s(w, y) := 〈w, y〉 (3.96a)
with weighting parameter w ∈ Rm, w ≥ 0, and
a(w, y) := (s(w, y)− s(w, yˆ))−1 = 〈w, y − yˆ〉−1 (3.96b)
be the augmentation function for AMOP. Let ε ∈ Rm, ε ≥ 0, and assume that
y˜ = yˆ + ε ∈ Y . Let ǫ = s(w, ε) = 〈w, ε〉. Then y˜ is optimal for the weighted-sum
scalarization WS
([
w, ǫ2
]T)
of AMOP with weighting parameter (w, ǫ2)T ∈ Rm+1.
Proof. Consider the AMOP and the related weighted-sum scalarization
AMOP: Minimize
[
y, 〈w, y − yˆ〉−1]T subject to y ∈ Y (3.97a)
WS
([
w, ǫ2
]T)
: Minimize 〈w, y〉+ ǫ2〈w, y − yˆ〉−1 subject to y ∈ Y (3.97b)
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Figure 3.10 Illustration of the weighted-sum augmentation in Theorem 3.3.32
and substitute t = s(w, y) = 〈w, y〉 and tˆ = s(w, yˆ) = 〈w, yˆ〉. Then the objective
function for WS
([
w, ǫ2
]T)
becomes t + ǫ2
(
t− tˆ)−1 and attains its minimum for
t˜ = tˆ+ ǫ = s(w, yˆ) + ǫ, or
t˜ = s(w, yˆ) + ǫ = 〈w, yˆ〉+ 〈w, ε〉 = 〈w, yˆ + ε〉 = s(w, yˆ + ε) = s(w, y˜) (3.98)
Hence, it follows that y˜ is optimal for WS
([
w, ǫ2
]T)
. 
The final theorem uses the weighted-Chebyshev norm scalarization function
and is formulated to find the (weak) ε-translated Pareto outcome y˜ = yˆ + ε for any
(weak) Pareto outcome yˆ ∈ N(Y ), but under the additional assumption that ε > 0.
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Theorem 3.3.33 (Weighted-Chebyshev norm augmentation). Let Y ⊂ Rm and
yˆ ∈ N(Y,Rm
≧
) be a Pareto outcome. Let
s(w, yˆ, y) := max
i=1,...,m
{wi(yi − yˆi)} (3.99a)
be the weighted-Chebyshev norm scalarization function with weighting parameter
w ∈ Rm, w ≥ 0 and reference point yˆ, and
a(w, yˆ, y) := (s(w, yˆ, y)− s(w, yˆ, yˆ))−1 = s(w, yˆ, y)−1 (3.99b)
be the augmentation function for AMOP. Let ε ∈ Rm, ε > 0, and assume that
y˜ = yˆ+ε ∈ Y . Let wi = ε−1i for all i = 1, . . . ,m. Then y˜ is optimal for the weighted-
Chebyshev norm method CN
(
[w, 1]T , [yˆ, 0]T
)
of AMOP with weighting parameter
(w, 1)T ∈ Rm+1 and reference point (yˆ, 0)T ∈ Rm+1.
Proof. Consider AMOP and the related weighted-Chebyshev norm scalarization
AMOP: Minimize
[
y, s (w, yˆ, y)−1
]T
subject to y ∈ Y (3.100a)
CN
(
[w, 1]T , [yˆ, 0]T
)
: Minimize max
i=1,...,m
{
wi(yi − yˆi), s (w, yˆ, y)−1
}
subject to y ∈ Y
(3.100b)
and substitute t = s(w, yˆ, y) = maxi=1,...,m{wi(yi − yˆi)} ≥ 0. Then the objective
function for CN
(
[w, 1]T , [yˆ, 0]T
)
becomes max{t, t−1} with t ≥ 0 and attains its
minimum for t˜ = 1, or
t˜ = s(w, yˆ, y) = max
i=1,...,m
{wi(yi − yˆi)} = 1 (3.101a)
In particular, for y˜ = yˆ + ε it follows that
s(w, yˆ, y˜) = max
i=1,...,m
{wi(y˜i − yˆi)} = max
i=1,...,m
{wiεi} = 1 (3.101b)
by choice of wi = ε
−1
i , and hence, y˜ = yˆ + ε is optimal for CN([w, 1]
T , [yˆ, 0]T ). 
In the following two sections, we first contrast these new generating methods
with the previous approximate scalarization approaches and then examine their
applicability on some concluding practical example.
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3.3.5 Computation of Approximate Solutions
We now address the more practical question of finding approximate solutions
using different techniques from single and multiobjective programming and compu-
tational optimization. Based on our theoretical results in Sections 3.3.4 and 3.3.5,
we propose two different approaches for the generation of ε-nondominated outcomes
for a multiobjective program MOP, which are depicted in Figure 3.11 and further
described in the following paragraphs.
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Figure 3.11 Relationships between (ǫ-)optimality for SOP and (ε-)nondominance
for MOP for the approximate (ABCDE) and exact (FGHI) generating methods
Usually, if we intend to find the nondominated set for MOP, we choose a
suitable scalarization method and formulate an associated single objective program
SOP (A) which is solved to optimality (B) using any appropriate linear or nonlinear
optimization technique. In this case, the established scalarization results that we re-
view in Section 2.2.2 provide us with relationships between the optimal solutions for
SOP and nondominated outcomes (or efficient decisions) for MOP (C). In addition,
using the new relationships between ǫ-optimality for ǫ ∈ R and ε-nondominance for
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ε ∈ Rm derived in the previous Section 3.3.3, we can also relate ǫ-optimal solutions
for SOP (D) to ε-nondominated outcomes for MOP (E). Hence, we accordingly call
these methods approximate methods, as the generation of ε-nondominated outcomes
is based on an approximate solution of SOP.
Procedure 3.3.34 (Approximate method). Let MOP be given.
1. Choice of SOP: Choose a scalarization problem SOP.
2. Choice of π: Choose a scalarization parameter π ∈ Π.
3. Choice of ε: Choose an admissible vector ε ∈ Rm.
4. Computation of ǫ: Compute the corresponding ǫ ∈ R.
5. Solution of SOP: Solve SOP for an ǫ-optimal solution.
This generic procedure assumes that based on prior knowledge and experi-
ence with the underlying MOP, we are able to choose a suitable scalarization problem
SOP in Step 1 together with an appropriate scalarization parameter π ∈ Π and the
desired vector parameter and ε ∈ Rm in Steps 2 and 3, respectively. Clearly, in
practice each of these choices depends on the concrete problem to be solved and the
specific reasons for which an approximate solution is generated.
For now, however, we postpone this discussion and directly proceed to Step 4
in which we compute the corresponding scalar parameter ǫ = ǫ(π, ε) based on the
results derived in the previous section. In particular, we note that each SOP but the
Pascoletti-Serafini method provides us with an explicit upper bound on the set of
suitable values for ǫ ∈ R for which an ǫ-optimal solution for SOP is still guaranteed
to also be ε-nondominated for MOP.
For the most typical case of Pareto nondominance, however, we can also
derive the corresponding upper bound on the set {δ : ε−δv ∈ C} as specified for the
approximate Pascoletti-Serafini scalarization in Proposition 3.3.24. In particular, if
we choose C = Rm
≧
to be the Pareto cone, then we readily obtain that
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ǫ = max{δ : ε− δv ∈ Rm≧} = max{δ : ε ≧ δv} (3.102a)
= max{δ : εi ≥ δvi for all i = 1, . . . ,m} (3.102b)
= max{δ : εi/vi ≥ δ for all i = 1, . . . ,m} = min
i=1,...,m
{εi/vi} (3.102c)
This result is also listed in Table 3.1 which again summarizes all required scalariza-
tion parameters π ∈ Π, the admissible ε ∈ Rm and the corresponding upper bounds
of ǫ ∈ R for all scalarization approaches examined in Section 3.3.3. In particular,
since the max-norm scalarization does not depend on any additional parameters, in
this case, the second step (choice of π) of Procedure 3.3.34 does not apply.
Table 3.1 Parameter choices for the approximate methods in Procedure 3.3.34
SOP(π) π ∈ Π ε ∈ Rm ǫ = ǫ(π, ε)
Hybrid HB(w, b) w ≥ 0, b ∈ Rm ǫ = 〈w, ε〉
Weighted-sum WS(w) w ≥ 0 ǫ = 〈w, ε〉
Constrained-objective COk(b) b ∈ Rm ǫ = εk
Benson B(y◦) y◦ ∈ Y ε ≥ 0 ǫ =∑i εi
Pascoletti-Serafini PS(r, v) r ∈ Rm, v ≥ 0 ǫ = mini{εi/vi}
Chebyshev-norm CN(r, w) r ∈ Rm, w ≥ 0 ǫ = mini{wiεi}
Max-norm MN no parameter ǫ = mini{εi}
Finally, in Step 5 of Procedure 3.3.34 we only need to solve SOP for an
ǫ-optimal solution in which case our previous results ensure that the associated out-
come is also ε-nondominated for MOP. In principle, we suggest that the approximate
solution of SOP is best accomplished by a suitable modification of the termination
criteria of the chosen optimization routine, although possibly challenging due to
inaccurate or unavailable optimality bounds and unclear or hidden black-box imple-
mentations of the different stopping conditions in commercial optimization software.
We illustrate some of our own difficulties together with the discussion of our pre-
liminary computational results in the subsequent section.
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Another potential drawback of the above approximate methods is that an
ǫ-optimal solution for SOP, in general, does not guarantee the full relaxation spec-
ified by the vector parameter ε which, in certain situations that we also discuss
later, might be of primary interest when intentionally generating such approximate
solutions. In order to resolve this current limitation, in Section 3.3.4 we investigate
several alternative approaches for the exact generation of ε-translated nondominated
outcomes, and for its description again see Figure 3.11. These alternative methods
modify MOP and formulate an associated ε-MOP (F) so that optimal solutions
(H) for its associated scalarized problem (G) yield associated ε-nondominated out-
comes (I) for the original MOP. In particular, we propose two exact methods based
on norms and additional constraints in Propositions 3.3.27 and 3.3.28, respectively,
and the two augmentation approaches in Theorems 3.3.32 and 3.3.33 which are again
summarized in the following generic procedure and Table 3.2.
Procedure 3.3.35 (Augmentation method). Let MOP be given.
1. Choice of SOP: Choose a scalarization function s for SOP.
2. Choice of π: Choose a scalarization parameter π for SOP.
3. Solution of SOP: Solve SOP for a Pareto outcome yˆ ∈ N(Y ).
4. Choice of ε: Choose ε ≥ 0 and let y˜ = yˆ + ε ∈ Nε(Y ).
5. AMOP Formulation: Formulate the AMOP associated with s and yˆ.
6. AMOP Scalarization: Formulate a scalarization method for AMOP.
7. AMOP Solution: Solve the scalarization problem for y˜ ∈ Nε(Y ).
In order to examine the practical applicability of these generating meth-
ods for the actual computation of ε-nondominated outcomes, the following section
discusses some of our numerical results that are obtained from implementing the ap-
proximate method, both the exact norm and exact constraint generating methods,
as well as the weighted-sum augmentation approach.
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Table 3.2 Parameter choices for the augmentation methods in Procedure 3.3.35
1. Choice of SOP Weighted-sum Weighted-Chebyshev norm
2. Choice of π s(w, y) = 〈w, y〉 s(w, yˆ, y) = maxi{wi(yi − yˆi)}
3. Solution of SOP yˆ ∈ N(Y ) yˆ ∈ N(Y )
4. Choice of ε ε ≥ 0 ε ≥ 0
5. AMOP formulation a(w, y) = 〈w, y − yˆ〉−1 a(w, yˆ, y) = maxi{wi(yi − yˆi)}
6. AMOP scalarization WS([w, ǫ2]), ǫ = 〈w, ε〉 CN([w, 1]T , [yˆ, 0]T ), wi = ε−1i
7. AMOP solution y˜ = yˆ + ε ∈ Nε(Y ) y˜ = yˆ + ε ∈ Nε(Y )
3.3.6 Example and Computational Results
We present some selected computational results that are obtained from im-
plementing the previously derived approximate and exact generating methods for
finding approximate and ε-translated Pareto outcomes for a multiobjective program.
In particular, for our illustration we choose an engineering problem from truss topol-
ogy design which is frequently used as prominent test case also for many other appli-
cations (Stadler and Dauer, 1992; Coello Coello and Lamont, 2004) and algorithms
(Ben-Tal and Nemirovski, 1997; Jarre et al., 1998; Coello and Christiansen, 2000,
among many others).
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Figure 3.12 A four-bar plane truss with cross-sectional areas x1, x2, x3 and x4
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The specific problem that we select is taken from Koski (1988) who for-
mulates a mathematical model for designing a four-bar plane truss, shown in Fig-
ure 3.12, as a biobjective program with the two conflicting objectives of minimizing
both the volume V of the truss (f1) and the displacement ∆ of the joint connecting
bars 1 and 2 (f2), subject to given physical restraints on the feasible cross-sectional
areas x1, x2, x3, x4 of the four bars. The stress on the truss is caused by three forces
of magnitudes F and 2F as depicted in Figure 3.12, and the length L of each bar,
the Young’s modulus of elasticity E and the only nonzero stress component σ are
modeled as constants. The corresponding formulation of this problem is given as
Minimize f1(x) = L(2x1 +
√
2x2 +
√
2x3 + x4) (3.103a)
f2(x) =
FL
E
(
2
x1
+
2
√
2
x2
− 2
√
2
x3
+
2
x4
)
(3.103b)
subject to (F/σ) ≤ x1 ≤ 3(F/σ) (3.103c)
√
2(F/σ) ≤ x2 ≤ 3(F/σ) (3.103d)
√
2(F/σ) ≤ x3 ≤ 3(F/σ) (3.103e)
(F/σ) ≤ x4 ≤ 3(F/σ) (3.103f)
where F = 10 kN, E = 2× 105 kN/cm2, L = 200 cm and σ = 10 kN/cm2.
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Figure 3.13 Outcome set for the four-bar plane truss problem in 3.103
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A sample of the outcome set for the problem in (3.103) is depicted in Fig-
ure 3.13 and shows that the possible truss volumes range between about 1500 cm3
and 3500 cm3 with the corresponding nodal displacements at the joint connecting
bars 1 and 2 less than 0.05 cm. Hence, due to this significant difference in mag-
nitude, for all following computation we first normalize these objectives and then
generate one hundred Pareto outcomes for an initial representation of the actual
Pareto set, also highlighted in Figure 3.13.
We observe that the generated Pareto set is convex so that, in principle,
we can use the weighted-sum scalarization to generate all Pareto outcomes for this
problem. Consequently, we also choose this method for the following illustration
of the approximate method, following the scheme outlined in the previous section.
First, based on the determined ranges of truss volume and joint displacement, we
specify four different relaxation or tolerance vectors ε and, for varying choices of the
weighting vector w, compute the associated scalar ǫ = w1ε1 + w2ε2. Then, in the
actual computation step, we solve the corresponding weighted-sum scalarization for
an ǫ-optimal solution by suitable modification of the underlying stopping criterion.
The obtained results are shown in Figure 3.14.
As expected, in each case we find that the newly generated outcomes are
ε-Pareto for the original problem, based on the specified values for ε indicated for
each of the four individual plots. However, while we choose one hundred different
combinations for the weighting vector in each case, the numbers of distinct out-
comes that are actually generated are quite different and, in general, decrease with
increasing ε. We believe that the main reason for this behavior is that a modified
stopping criterion enables the optimization routine to terminate early and, thus,
with intermediate solutions that do not yet reach different regions of the outcome
set. In other words, the larger the admissible relaxation, the earlier we can stop
the optimization algorithm and the more often we are still at the same intermediate
solution, resulting in fewer different outcomes generated and providing a possible
explanation for the above observation. A similar argumentation also explains why
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Figure 3.14 Pareto and ε(-translated) Pareto outcomes for the four-bar truss
problem generated by the approximate weighted-sum method with four choices of ε
the generated ε-Pareto outcomes are more or less concentrated in the same area
and, in this case, all fall into the middle region of the Pareto curve.
Moreover, we can also identify numerous other issues that may influence
which ε-Pareto outcomes are generated when using an approximate method that
is based on scalarization, including the chosen optimization routine, the underlying
algorithm and its implementation, the selection of initial points, and of course the
imposed stopping criterion. Consequently, much further work and investigation is
possible and necessary to completely analyze this approach which, however, is far
beyond the purpose of this discussion. Hence, as only one further consequence of
the above dependencies and numerical difficulties, at the moment we conclude that
approximate methods do not seem suitable to generate a reasonable representation
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of the set of ε-Pareto outcomes and especially of those ε-translated Pareto outcomes
that achieve the full relaxation specified by the parameter ε.
In remedy of this last shortcoming and to contrast the approximate methods
with the exact generating methods derived in Section 3.3.5, we also present some
of our results for the exact norm, the exact constraint, and the weighted-sum aug-
mentation method. Starting from the identical set of one hundred Pareto outcomes
initially generated by the weighted-sum scalarization for the original problem, we
use the same four choices of ε as before to formulate the corresponding new problems
for finding the associated ε-translated outcomes. In particular, Figures 3.15 and 3.16
show our results for the exact norm and constraint generating method, respectively,
and as intended both approaches yield a reasonable set of fully ε-translated Pareto
outcomes for each of the four different values of the parameter ε.
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Figure 3.15 Pareto and ε(-translated) Pareto outcomes for the four-bar truss
problem generated by the exact norm generating method with four choices of ε
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Figure 3.16 Pareto and ε(-translated) Pareto outcomes for the four-bar truss
problem generated by the exact constraint generating method with four choices of ε
While the generated sets are almost identical, we emphasize one subtle dif-
ference between these two methods which is also mentioned during the initial discus-
sion of these two approaches in Section 3.3.5. We recall that a norm minimization
method merely attempts to minimize the deviation from the currently specified ε-
translated outcome, thereby possibly resulting in a final outcome that is slightly
greater and, therefore, not itself ε-nondominated, in general. The introduction of
additional constraints for the second approach, however, guarantees that all gener-
ated outcomes also satisfy the additionally imposed constraints and, thus, are always
ε-nondominated, in particular. This observation also explains the different behavior
of these two methods in the lower right regions of Figures 3.15 and 3.16 in which
the corresponding ε-translated outcomes do not anymore belong to the outcome set,
opposite to the assumption in our previous theoretical discussion.
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Moreover, another difference between these two approaches is that only the
exact norm generating method is a single objective program whereas the constraint
method is still formulated as a multiobjective program and, thus, dependent on a
scalarization method for its solution. Based upon the scalarization function used,
this might lead to additional numerical difficulties possibly explaining the few out-
liers in Figure 3.16 that do not occur for the exact norm method in Figure 3.15. In
general, however, we can conclude that both approaches seem to resolve the pre-
viously recognized shortcomings of the approximate method and yield an almost
complete representation of the set of fully relaxed or ε-translated Pareto outcomes
for various choices of ε over the complete outcome set of the original problem.
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Figure 3.17 Pareto and ε(-translated) Pareto outcomes for the four-bar truss
problem generated by the exact weighted-sum augmentation with four choices of ε
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Finally, the results shown in Figure 3.17 are obtained from implementing
the weighted-sum augmentation approach and reveal that this method, although
conceptually appealing, is subject to various numerical issues and difficulties. In
particular, we believe that due to the potential division by zero, this formulation
becomes very sensitive and, especially in comparison to the results for the two previ-
ous methods, therefore does not seem suited for actual implementation in practice.
Nevertheless, again much further research is possible and may lead to other find-
ings, further improvements, or new and better approaches for the generation of
ε-nondominated outcomes in multiobjective programming.
3.4 Discussion and Further Research
In this chapter, we study the concept of domination in multiobjective pro-
gramming, and based on the prominent role played by domination cones, we focus
in large part on domination structures that can be defined in terms of cones. While
we emphasize as part of our literature review in Section 2.2.1 that the established
theory of multiobjective or vector optimization includes various results that describe
properties of the nondominated set for a general convex cone, the use of cones in
multiobjective programming is frequently limited to polyhedral cones and the de-
velopment of generating methods in the large majority of cases typically restricted
to finding Pareto optimal solutions.
Consequently, we begin in Section 3.1 with the investigation of general cones
while taking a closer look at possible cone representations and appropriate modi-
fications of several existing scalarization methods. In analogy to the definition of
polyhedral cones that are described by linear functions, we find in Theorem 3.1.1
(cone representation theorem) that an arbitrary cone can be induced by a function
that is positively homogeneous, and based on the additional property of superlin-
earity we establish some first sufficient conditions for pointedness and convexity in
Proposition 3.1.8. Also motivated by a corresponding result for polyhedral cones,
in Theorem 3.1.12 (nondominance mapping theorem) we establish relationships be-
tween the image of the nondominated set with respect to a general cone and the
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Pareto set of the image of the complete outcome set under that cone-inducing map-
ping. In addition, independent of the specific cone representation, we show in the
series of Propositions 3.1.14–3.1.17 how the hybrid, constrained-objective and Ben-
son scalarization methods can be modified for a general cone, and the weighted-sum
method for a general domination set. Along with this discussion, we illustrate our
main results for four special types of cones, namely Pareto, polyhedral, pth-order
and Bishop-Phelps cones, among which the first three are special cases of an alter-
native cone representation that is examined separately at the end of that section.
We believe that this material offers several interesting research questions
worthwhile of further pursuit. First, other than for polyhedral cones, the charac-
terization of pointedness and the nondominance mapping theorem in the general
case are currently valid only as a sufficient condition and set inclusion, respectively,
and further assumptions or a completely different cone representation may be de-
rived to also obtain the corresponding or new results in stronger form. Second,
although the modified scalarization methods, in principle, allow the generation of
nondominated outcomes for a general cone, except for the weighted-sum we need
to replace the initially linear inequality constraints by new and in general nonlinear
cone constraints, so that the resulting scalarized problems become mathematical
cone programs which are considerably more difficult to solve or may also require
the development of completely new solution methods and algorithms in extension
of semidefinite and second-order cone programming (Alizadeh and Goldfarb, 2003;
Pataki, 2003). Finally, although the literature uses the concept of Bishop-Phelps
cones for applications in nonlinear analysis (Hyers et al., 1997) and reports on various
applications of especially second-order cones in engineering and robust optimization,
including portfolio optimization, signal processing, and truss topology design (Lobo
et al., 1998), the question remains if there is also any practical relevance of general
cones for the purpose of domination in multiobjective programming.
In a way following this very last question, our investigation of variable domi-
nation cones in Section 3.2 provides at least a partial answer as the cones underlying
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the derived variable-cone model in Proposition 3.2.18 can be described as Bishop-
Phelps cones, based on the assumption of ideal-symmetry that is introduced in Defi-
nition 3.2.14 to steer the variability of the associated domination structure. Placing
our discussion into the general framework of preferences and preference modeling,
we lead to this assumption with two motivating examples that illustrate some of
the limitations of preference models that are described by constant cones. In par-
ticular, in Example 3.2.9 we find that, for linear cases, it is not possible to describe
a preference model that excludes extreme or corner points while maintaining a set
of nondominated outcomes in the middle region of the Pareto frontier, and Exam-
ple 3.2.10 shows that a constant cone does not enable the individual specification
of preferences between two arbitrarily selected outcomes without also affecting the
preference relationships among the remaining other points. After examining some of
the consequences and, in fact, difficulties of variable cones in the formulation of gen-
erating methods, we instead use the geometric interpretation of the ideal-symmetry
assumption in Remark 3.2.15 to derive two alternative optimality conditions in The-
orem 3.2.25 for the convex and Theorem 3.2.27 for the concave biobjective case, that
are subsequently used to illustrate how our new variable-cone model removes the
previously recognized shortcomings of constant cones.
Due to the scarce existing literature but the seemingly high potential for
significant impacts on the advancement of domination and preference modeling, we
expect that further inquiry of variable domination structures and variable cones, in
particular, opens a rich and rewarding avenue for many following research activities.
In continuation of our own work, the maybe most imperative issue is the formula-
tion of more general conditions for nondominance that can either emerge from our
preliminary discussion of scalarization methods for variable cones or extend The-
orems 3.2.25 and 3.2.27 from biobjective to multiobjective cases by removing the
restricting geometric character currently employed in their proofs. Moreover, while
the three chosen Examples 3.2.29–3.2.31 are simple enough to find the nondomi-
nated sets based on the above results combined with our perceptual intuition and
some basic algebra, we do not only need to derive new conditions but eventually
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also develop suitable optimization methods for the algorithmic or computational
generation of nondominated outcomes with respect to variable cones. Finally, our
assumption of ideal-symmetry can be replaced by several other mechanisms that
guarantee variability of the associated domination structure which, in particular,
can also be derived directly from an underlying preference assumption such as the
principle of transfers (2.64) or justice (2.65) in Section 2.3.2 to eventually produce
a variety of new approaches to variable preference modeling of immediate relevance
also to multiple criteria decision making.
Another notion of high importance in both theory and applications of mul-
tiobjective programming and optimization is the concept of approximation or ap-
proximate nondominance that we initially address in Section 2.3.1 and investigate
with respect to its underlying domination structure, possible cone representations,
and generating methods in Section 3.3. Highlighting the concepts of (strict and
weak) epsilon-nondominance that we introduce in Definition 3.3.8, we first realize
that the associated domination structures cannot be described by a cone anymore
but now correspond to translated cones (Luenberger, 1969), and we show in Theo-
rem 3.3.6 how translated polyhedral cones have an equivalent representation in terms
of polyhedral sets. We use this result to generalize the nondominance mapping in
Theorem 3.1.13 to also hold for approximate Pareto and epsilon-nondominance in
Theorem 3.3.18, and based on the definition of epsilon-translated nondominated out-
comes in Definition 3.3.12 we establish several other relationships between the (strict
and weak) epsilon-nondominated sets which are summarized in Corollary 3.3.15.
Finally, we propose two different approaches for the generation of approximate so-
lutions based on scalarization methods, illustrate their application on an example
and already provide a detailed assessment of these methods and some selected com-
putational results along with the discussion in the foregoing text.
While possible directions for future work certainly include a similar examina-
tion of other approximation concepts than the ones chosen in this text, we can also
think of several research questions that directly build on our above results obtained
for epsilon-nondominance. First, while we present some initial results on translated
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cones and focus on representations for the polyhedral case in terms of a linear system
of inequalities, analogous characterizations may be derived for translated nonpoly-
hedral cones based on our earlier cone representation in Theorem 3.1.1 when using
systems of inequalities that are nonlinear. Second, we encourage closer investigation
of the proposed generating methods together with their further improvement and
application for the development of new approximation methodologies for difficult or
large-scale multiobjective programs, in which the generation of the nondominated
set is practically impossible or at least computationally too expensive. Addition-
ally, and opposed to the common belief that epsilon-nondominance is a concept of
approximation that primarily accounts for modeling limitations or computational in-
accuracies and thus is tolerable rather than desirable, we also promote the relevance
and application of this concept in practical decision making situations, including
its prominent role in the study of decomposition and coordination methods now
pursued in the following next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
DECOMPOSITION AND COORDINATION METHODS
In remedy of the challenges resulting from a high number of objectives in
multiobjective programming and multiple criteria decision making, in this chapter
we choose to decompose the vector objective function of a large-scale multiobjective
program to define a collection of smaller-sized subproblems and investigate several
solution methods and decision making procedures for their subsequent coordination.
The associated function and problem decomposition is introduced and analyzed in
Section 4.1 which establishes the theoretical foundation for the formulation of an
interactive decision making scheme that we describe in Section 4.2 and illustrate
on an example in Section 4.3. The first two sections are extended versions of the
similar treatment in Engau and Wiecek (2007e), while the particular discussion in
Section 4.2.2 and the third section is adjusted from Engau and Wiecek (2007a)
originally addressing the same subject matter but in the more applied context of
multidisciplinary optimization and engineering design. Section 4.4 concludes this
chapter with a brief summary and suggestions for both further research and numer-
ous applications in direct transition also to the next following chapter.
4.1 The Decomposed Multiobjective Program
The first definition introduces the adopted notion of decomposition and also
serves to clarify the associated notation that is used throughout this chapter.
Definition 4.1.1 (Decomposition and Partition). LetX ⊆ Rn be a set, f : X → Rm
be a vector-valued function, and I := {1, 2, . . . ,m} be the index set of f
f = (f1, f2, . . . , fm) =: (fi)i∈I (4.1a)
A collection {Ij ⊂ I : j = 1, . . . ,M} is called a decomposition of I, and
F := {f j = (fi)i∈Ij : j = 1, . . . ,M} (4.1b)
is called the associated function decomposition of f . It is said to be
(i) complete if
⋃M
j=1 Ij = I, and
(ii) pairwise disjoint if Ii ∩ Ij = ∅ for all i 6= j ∈ I.
A complete and pairwise disjoint decomposition is also called a partition.
In this complete chapter, we restrict our discussion to the Pareto case and
study the multiobjective program (X, f) with respect to the feasible set X and
objective function f rather than with respect to the associated outcome set Y =
f(X). Since the function decomposition of f is conceptually equivalent to projecting
Y onto a collection of different subspaces of the outcome space Rm, the former is
much more convenient as it does not require to distinguish nondominance in these
different subspaces, but allows to restrict our discussion to a common underlying
feasible decision set X in the decision space Rn.
Definition 4.1.2 (Decomposed Multiobjective Program). Let (X, f) be MOP and
F = {f j = (fi)i∈Ij : j = 1, . . . ,M} with |Ij | = mj be a function decomposition of
f . The collection of all multiobjective programs
MOPj : Minimize f
j(x) = [f j1 (x), . . . , f
j
mj (x)] subject to x ∈ X (4.2)
is called the decomposed MOP (DMOP), and each MOPj is also called a subproblem
of DMOP. It is said to be complete if the function decomposition F is complete.
MOP: Minimize f(x) = [f1(x), f2(x), . . . , fm(x)] subject to x ∈ X
MOP1: Min
[
f11 (x), . . . , f
1
m1(x)
]
subject to x ∈ X
MOPM : Min
[
fM1 (x), . . . , f
M
mM
(x)
]
subject to x ∈ X
. . .
. . .
. . .
MOP2: Min
[
f21 (x), . . . , f
2
m2(x)
]
subject to x ∈ X



 



?
6 A
A
A
AU A
A
A
AK
Decomposition Integration
Figure 4.1 Decomposition of MOP into collection of subproblems MOPj (DMOP)
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Definition 4.1.2 is illustrated in Figure 4.1. The original MOP with decision
set X and objective function f = (f1, f2, . . . , fm) is decomposed into a collection
of M subproblems MOPj with the same feasible set X but new objective functions
whose components f j1 , . . . , f
j
mj are only a subset of those contained in the original
objective function f . After solving these subproblems, we refer to the reversed
process of relating solutions for MOPj to solutions for MOP as integration.
A problem formulation that is very similar to this decomposition approach
also arises in multiscenario multiobjective programming (Singh, 2001; Fadel et al.,
2005; Wiecek et al., 2006) which we introduce next.
Definition 4.1.3 (Multiscenario multiobjective program). Let S = {1, 2, . . . ,M}
be a set of scenarios, Xs ⊆ Rn be a feasible set and fs : Xs → Rms be a vector-
valued objective function for each single scenario s ∈ S. Let X := ⋂s∈S Xs 6= ∅ be
the common feasible set for all scenarios. The collection
MSMOP: Minimize {fs(x) : s ∈ S} subject to x ∈ X (4.3)
is called the multiscenario multiobjective program (MSMOP).
Hence, one possible application of DMOP is that it allows to treat MSMOP
in terms of its individual scenarios as subproblems MOPs that are restricted to the
common feasible set X. In particular, in this case any feasible decision for a sub-
problem is also feasible for the original problem, and the integration of decisions
from the subproblem level to the original MOP can be accomplished by simply eval-
uating those objective functions that have not yet been considered in the respective
subproblem. The following result now establishes the relationships between efficient
decisions for a subproblem MOPj of DMOP and the original problem MOP and is
similarly established by Singh (2001) in the context of MSMOP.
Proposition 4.1.4 (Efficiency for MOPj implies efficiency for MOP). Let MOP
and DMOP be given, and xˆ ∈ X be a feasible decision.
(i) If xˆ is weakly efficient for MOPj, then xˆ is weakly efficient for MOP
Ew(X, f
j) ⊆ Ew(X, f) (4.4a)
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(ii) If xˆ is efficient for MOPj and if f
j is injective, then xˆ is efficient for MOP
E(X, f j) ⊆ E(X, f) (4.4b)
Proof. For (i), let xˆ ∈ Ew(X, f j) and, by contradiction, assume that xˆ /∈ Ew(X, f).
Then there exists x ∈ X such that f(x) < f(xˆ), or equivalently, fi(x) < fi(xˆ) for all
i ∈ I. In particular, this implies that fi(x) < fi(xˆ) for all i ∈ Ij ⊂ I, or equivalently,
f j(x) < f j(xˆ) in contradiction to xˆ ∈ Ew(X, f j).
For (ii), let xˆ ∈ E(X, f j) and, by contradiction, assume that xˆ /∈ E(X, f).
Then there exists x ∈ X such that f(x) ≤ f(xˆ), or equivalently, fi(x) ≤ fi(xˆ) for all
i ∈ I and f(x) 6= f(xˆ), so x 6= xˆ. In particular, this implies that fi(x) ≤ fi(xˆ) for all
i ∈ Ij ⊂ I and f j(x) 6= f j(xˆ) because f j is injective, or equivalently, f j(x) ≤ f j(xˆ)
in contradiction to xˆ ∈ E(X, f j). 
Hence, any (weakly) efficient decision for a subproblem of DMOP is also
(weakly) efficient for the original MOP. The following example illustrates that the
reversed statement, however, in general does not hold true.
Example 4.1.5 (Efficiency for MOP does not imply efficiency for MOPj). Let
X = {x1, x2, x3, x4} be a feasible set with only four decisions, and the objective
function f = (f1, f2, f3) : X → R3 be composed of three single objectives that are
to be minimized. The objective function values f(x) of the four decisions are listed
in Table 4.1, and it is easily verified that all four decisions are efficient for MOP
with objective function f = (f1, f2, f3). However, if we define the three subproblems
MOP1, MOP2, and MOP3 with objective functions f
1 = (f1, f2), f
2 = (f1, f3), and
f3 = (f2, f3), respectively, then we find that in each case only one of the decisions
x1, x2, or x3 remains efficient while the respective other two are merely weakly
efficient. In particular, the decision x4 is neither efficient nor weakly efficient for
any of the three subproblems, although apparently the best compromise decision.
Although Example 4.1.5 illustrates that efficient decisions for the original
problem are not necessarily efficient for any subproblem, it is clear that, in fact,
every feasible decision is ε-efficient for MOP and εj-efficient for MOPj .
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Table 4.1 Objective function values for the four decisions in Example 4.1.5
decision f1 f2 f3 observation
x1 1 1 9 efficient for MOP and MOP1 with f
1 = (f1, f2)
x2 1 9 1 efficient for MOP and MOP2 with f
2 = (f1, f3)
x3 9 1 1 efficient for MOP and MOP3 with f
3 = (f2, f3)
x4 2 2 2 efficient for MOP but not for any subproblem
Proposition 4.1.6 (Epsilon-efficiency of feasible solutions). Let MOP and DMOP
be given, and x˜ ∈ X be a feasible decision. Then x˜ is ε-efficient for MOP for some
ε ∈ Rm, ε ≧ 0, and εj-efficient for MOPj for some εj ∈ Rmj , εj ≧ 0.
Proof. Let r ∈ Rm with r ≦ f(x) for all x ∈ X be a utopia or the ideal point
for MOP and set ε := f(x˜) − r ≧ 0. Then there does not exist x ∈ X such that
f(x) ≤ r = f(x˜)− ε and, thus, x˜ ∈ E(X, f, ε). The proofs of x˜ ∈ E(X, f j , εj) follow
analogously. 
The ε found in the proof of Proposition 4.1.6 is usually only a very weak
upper bound. To improve this bound, we can also solve the Benson scalarization
B(f(x˜)): Maximize
m∑
i=1
εi subject to f(x˜)− ε ∈ f(X) and ε ≧ 0 (4.5)
for an optimal solution εˆ to obtain an efficient decision xˆ ∈ E(X, f) with f(xˆ) =
f(x˜)− ε. In particular, then f(x˜) = f(xˆ)+ εˆ is an εˆ-translated Pareto outcome and
x˜ ∈ E(X, f, εˆ) but x˜ /∈ E(X, f, ε) for any ε ≤ εˆ by Proposition 3.3.13.
Corollary 4.1.7 (Efficiency relationships between MOP and DMOP). Let MOP
and DMOP be given. Then there exist εj ∈ Rmj , εj ≧ 0, such that
⋃
j=1,...,M
Ew(X, f
j) ⊂ Ew(X, f) ⊂
⋂
j=1,...,M
E(X, f j , εj) (4.6)
Furthermore, if f j is injective for all j = 1, . . . ,M , then the weakly efficient sets
can be replaced by efficient sets.
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4.1.1 Subproblem Scalarization
Starting from an initial decomposition of MOP into the collection DMOP
of subproblems MOPj , in this section we first use the concept of scalarization func-
tions to combine the multiple objectives of each individual subproblem into a single
objective and then consider the collection of all these objectives as a new multiob-
jective program. We then investigate several relationships between scalarizations of
this new problem and scalarizations of the original MOP.
Definition 4.1.8 (MSOP). Let MOP and DMOP be given, and for all j = 1, . . . ,M
let sj(π
j) : Rmj → R be a scalarization function for MOPj with scalarization pa-
rameter πj ∈ Πj . The collection of all single objective programs
SOPj : Minimize sj(π
j , f j(x)) subject to x ∈ X (4.7)
is called the multiple SOP (MSOP) of DMOP.
By dropping the scalarization parameters πj ∈ Πj and changing from the
scalarization functions sj : Rmj → R to the associated collection of value functions
vj : X → R on the decision set X
vj(x) = sj(π
j , f j(x)) for all j = 1, . . . ,M (4.7a)
we note that MSOP can equivalently be written as the multiobjective program
MSOP: Minimize v(x) = [v1(x), . . . , vM (x)] subject to x ∈ X (4.7b)
In this formulation, now each subproblem is represented by a separate value function
vj which can be chosen either based on analytical properties such as convexity or,
in a more applied context, according to the underlying physical interpretation of
the objectives contained in MOPj . The relationships between efficient decisions for
MSOP and the original MOP are derived in the following result.
Proposition 4.1.9 (Efficiency relationships between MSOP and MOP). Let MOP
and MSOP be given, and xˆ ∈ X be a feasible decision.
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(i) If xˆ is weakly efficient for MSOP, then xˆ is weakly efficient for MOP
Ew(X, v) ⊆ Ew(X, f) (4.8a)
(ii) If xˆ is efficient for MSOP, v is strictly increasing (with respect to f(x)) and
DMOP complete, then xˆ is efficient for MOP
E(X, v) ⊆ E(X, f) (4.8b)
Proof. For (i), let xˆ ∈ Ew(X, v) and, by contradiction, assume that xˆ /∈ Ew(X, f).
Then there exists x ∈ X such that f(x) < f(xˆ), or equivalently, f j(x) < f j(xˆ) for
all j = 1, . . . ,M . In particular, this implies that vj(x) < vj(xˆ) for all j = 1, . . . ,M ,
or equivalently, v(x) < v(xˆ) in contradiction to xˆ ∈ Ew(X, v).
For (ii), let xˆ ∈ E(X, v) and, by contradiction, assume that xˆ /∈ E(X, f).
Then there exists x ∈ X such that f(x) ≤ f(xˆ), or equivalently, f j(x) ≦ f j(xˆ)
for all j = 1, . . . ,M and fk(x) ≤ fk(xˆ) for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,M} (as the objective
function component with strict inequality is contained in some fk because DMOP
is complete). In particular, this implies that vj(x) ≤ vj(xˆ) for all j = 1, . . . ,M
and vk(x) < vk(xˆ) because v is strictly increasing, or equivalently, v(x) ≤ v(xˆ) in
contradiction to xˆ ∈ E(X, v). 
Hence, analogous to the result in Proposition 4.1.4, every (weakly) efficient
decision for MSOP is also (weakly) efficient for the original MOP. Following the
previous notational conventions, we abbreviate a scalarization of MSOP by SSOP
and characterize the resulting single objective functions for the weighted-sum and
the weighted-Chebyshev norm scalarization in the following two examples.
Example 4.1.10 (Weighted-sum SSOP). Let MOP and DMOP with f j = (fi)i∈Ij
and |Ij | = mj for all j = 1, . . . ,M be given. Let wj = (wji )i∈Ij ∈ Rmj , wj ≥ 0, and
u ∈ RM , u ≥ 0, be weighting parameters for weighted sums sj(wj , f j(x)) : Rmj → R
for SOPj and s(u, v(x)) : RM → R be a weighted-sum for SSOP, then
s(u, v(x)) =
M∑
j=1
ujvj(x) =
M∑
j=1
ujsj(w
j , f j(x)) (4.9)
=
M∑
j=1
uj
∑
i∈Ij
wji fi(x) =
M∑
j=1
∑
i∈Ij
ujw
j
i fi(x) =
m∑
i=1
∑
j:i∈Ij
ujw
j
i fi(x)
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Example 4.1.11 (Weighted-Chebyshev norm SSOP). Let MOP and DMOP be
given as in Example 4.1.10, r ∈ Rm be a reference point and wj = (wji )i∈Ij ∈ Rmj ,
wj ≥ 0 be the weighting parameters for weighted-Chebyshev norms sj(r, wj , f j(x)) :
Rmj → R for SOPj for all j = 1, . . . ,M . Let 0 ∈ Rm be the reference point and
u ∈ RM , u ≥ 0 be the weighting parameter for the weighted-Chebyshev norm
s(0, u, v(x)) : RM → R for SSOP, then
s(0, u, v(x)) = max
j=1,...,M
{ujvj(x)} = max
j=1,...,M
{ujsj(r, wj , f j(x))} (4.10)
= max
j=1,...,M
{uj max
i∈Ij
{wji (fi(x)− ri)}} = max
j=1,...,M
max
i∈Ij
{ujwji (fi(x)− ri)}
= max
i=1,...,m
max
j:i∈Ij
{ujwji (fi(x)− ri)} = maxi=1,...,m{maxj:i∈Ij{ujw
j
i }(fi(x)− ri)}
The previous two examples reveal the following relationship between SSOP
and the corresponding scalarizations of the original MOP.
Proposition 4.1.12 (Equivalence between SOP and SSOP). Let MOP and DMOP
be given, and let DMOP be complete. If SOP, all SOPj and SSOP are defined using
either weighted-sum or weighted-Chebyshev norm scalarization functions, then SSOP
is equivalent to SOP.
Proof. (Weighted sum ⇒) Let SSOP be defined using weighted sums, then its
objective function takes the form
s(u, v(x)) =
m∑
i=1
∑
j:i∈Ij
ujw
j
i fi(x) (4.11a)
from Example 4.1.10. In particular, if wi =
∑
j:i∈Ij ujw
j
i for all i ∈ I, then
s(u, v(x)) =
∑m
i=1 wifi(x) is also a weighted sum for SOP.
(Weighted sum ⇐) For the converse, let SOP be defined using a weighted
sum with weighting parameter w ∈ Rm, w ≥ 0, and let DMOP be complete. Then
|{j : i ∈ Ij}| 6= ∅ for all i = 1, . . . ,m, and with wji = wi|{j : i ∈ Ij}|−1 for all i ∈ Ij
and u = 1 as the weighting parameters for SOPj and SSOP, it follows analogous to
Example 4.1.10 that
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s(1, v(x)) =
M∑
j=1
vj(x) =
M∑
j=1
∑
i∈Ij
wji fi(x) =
m∑
i=1
∑
j:i∈Ij
wji fi(x) =
m∑
i=1
wifi(x) (4.11b)
showing that SSOP is equivalent to SOP.
(Chebyshev norm ⇒) If SSOP is defined using weighted-Chebyshev norms,
then its objective function takes the form
s(0, u, v(x)) = max
i=1,...,m
{max
j:i∈Ij
{ujwji }(fi(x)− ri)} (4.12a)
from Example 4.1.11. In particular, if wi = maxj:i∈Ij{ujwji } for all i ∈ I, then
s(0, u, v(x)) = maxi{wi(fi(x)− ri)} is also a weighted-Chebyshev norm for SOP.
(Chebyshev norm⇐) For the converse, let SOP be defined using a weighted-
Chebyshev norm with weighting parameter w ∈ Rm, w ≥ 0 and reference point
r ∈ Rm, and let DMOP be complete. Let wji = wi for all i ∈ Ij and u = 1 be
the weighting parameters and r and 0 ∈ RM be the reference points for SOPj and
SSOP, respectively, then it follows analogous to Example 4.1.11 that
s(0, 1, v(x)) = max
j=1,...,M
{v(x)} = max
j=1,...,M
{sj(wj , r, f j(x))} (4.12b)
= max
j=1,...,M
{max
i∈Ij
{wji (fi(x)− ri)}} = maxi=1,...,m{wi(fi(x)− ri)}
again showing that SSOP is equivalent to SOP. 
In particular, since every (weakly) efficient decision for MOP can be gener-
ated as an optimal solution for a weighted-Chebyshev norm scalarization function
(Steuer, 1986, or Proposition 2.2.39), one consequence of the equivalence between
SOP and SSOP in Proposition 4.1.12 is that through a suitable scalarization of the
subproblems in DMOP, any (weakly) efficient solution for MOP is also (weakly)
efficient for MSOP. This observation is summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 4.1.13 (Equivalence between MOP and MSOP). Let MOP and DMOP
be given, and xˆ ∈ X be a feasible decision. If xˆ is weakly efficient for MOP, then
there exist a collection of scalarization functions and associated value functions for
all MOPj such that xˆ is weakly efficient for MSOP.
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4.1.2 Subproblem Coordination
Other than for the previous subproblem scalarization, we now do not com-
bine the objective functions from different subproblems into a new single objective
program but modify each MOPj by introducing the objectives from other subprob-
lems as additional constraints into an associated coordination problem.
Definition 4.1.14 (Coordination problem). Let MOP and DMOP be given, and
xj ∈ X be a feasible decision and εj ∈ Rmj , εj ≧ 0 be a nonnegative vector for all
j = 1, . . . ,m. The multiobjective program
COPk: Minimize f
k(x) (4.13)
subject to f j(x) ≦ f j(xj) + εj for all j = 1, . . . ,M (4.13a)
and x ∈ X (4.13b)
is called the kth coordination problem (COPk), and x
j and εj are called the reference
point and coordination parameter for COPk from COPj , respectively.
For sake of brevity and notational convenience, we also write
X(f j , xj , εj) := {x ∈ X : f j(x) ≦ f j(xj) + εj} (4.14)
for the associated coordination constraints and then denote the feasible set for COPk
as
⋂M
j=1 X(f
j , xj , εj). Similar to Propositions 4.1.4 and 4.1.9, the relationships
between efficient decisions for COPk and MOP can be described as follows.
Proposition 4.1.15 (Efficiency for COPk implies efficiency for MOP). Let MOP
and DMOP be given, and xˆ ∈ X be a feasible decision.
(i) If xˆ is weakly efficient for COPk, then xˆ is weakly efficient for MOP
Ew

 M⋂
j=1
X(f j , xj , εj), fk

 ⊆ Ew(X, f) (4.15a)
(ii) If xˆ is efficient for COPk and if f
k is injective, then xˆ is efficient for MOP
E

 M⋂
j=1
X(f j , xj , εj), fk

 ⊆ E(X, f) (4.15b)
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(iii) If xˆ is efficient for MOP and if DMOP is complete, then xˆ is efficient for
all COPk with x
j = xˆ and εj = 0 for all j = 1, . . . ,M
xˆ ∈ E

 M⋂
j=1
X(f j , xˆ, 0), fk

 for all k = 1, . . . ,M (4.15c)
In any case, if xˆ is feasible for COPk and if x
j is (weakly) ε-efficient for MOPj,
then xˆ is (weakly) (εj + ε)-efficient for MOPj.
Proof. For (i), let xˆ ∈ Ew(
⋂M
j=1 X(f
j , xj , εj), fk) and, by contradiction, assume
that xˆ /∈ Ew(X, f). Then there exists x ∈ X such that f(x) < f(xˆ), or equivalently,
fi(x) < fi(xˆ) for all i ∈ I. In particular, this implies that fi(x) < fi(xˆ) for all
i ∈ Ij ⊂ I, or equivalently, f j(x) < f j(xˆ) ≦ f j(xj)+εj for all j = 1, . . . ,M , showing
that also x ∈ ⋂Mj=1 X(f j , xj , εj). In particular, fk(x) < fk(xˆ), in contradiction to
xˆ ∈ Ew(
⋂M
j=1 X(f
j , xj , εj), fk).
For (ii), let xˆ ∈ E(⋂Mj=1 X(f j , xj , εj), fk) and, by contradiction, assume that
xˆ /∈ E(X, f). Then there exists x ∈ X such that f(x) ≤ f(xˆ), and, analogous to the
above, it follows that x ∈ ⋂Mj=1 X(f j , xj , εj). Moreover, then f(x) 6= f(xˆ), so x 6= xˆ
and fk(x) 6= fk(xˆ) as fk is injective. In particular, this implies that fk(x) ≤ fk(xˆ)
in contradiction to xˆ ∈ E(⋂Mj=1 X(f j , xj , εj), fk).
For (iii), let xˆ ∈ E(X, f), and assume that xˆ /∈ E(⋂Mj=1 X(f j , xˆ, 0), fk) by
contradiction. Then there exists x ∈ ⋂Mj=1 X(f j , xˆ, 0) such that fk(x) ≤ fk(xˆ), or
equivalently, f j(x) ≦ f j(xˆ) for all j = 1, . . . ,M and fk(x) ≤ fk(xˆ) (as the objective
function component with strict inequality is contained in some fk because DMOP
is complete). In particular, this implies that f ji (x) ≤ f ji (xˆ) for all i ∈ Ij ⊂ I and
fkl (x) < f
k
l (xˆ) for some l ∈ Ik ⊂ I, so fi(x) ≤ fi(xˆ) for all i ∈ I and fl(x) < fl(xˆ)
for some l ∈ I, or equivalently, f(x) ≤ f(xˆ) in contradiction to xˆ /∈ E(X, f).
Finally, let xj ∈ Ew(X, f j , ε) and, of course by contradiction, assume that
xˆ /∈ Ew(X, f j , εj + ε). Then there exists x ∈ X such that f j(x) < f j(xˆ)− εj − ε ≦
f j(xj) − ε, in contradiction to xj ∈ Ew(X, f j , ε). If xj ∈ E(X, f j , ε), the proof of
xˆ ∈ E(X, f j , εj + ε) follows analogously. 
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Hence, we conclude that through the modification of the initial subproblems
MOPj by coordination constraints and a suitable choice of the coordination param-
eters εj , any efficient solution for MOP can be identified by solving a corresponding
coordination problem COPk. In general, however, the set of efficient decisions for
COPk depends on the particular choices of ε
j , and the following problem can be
used to examine some of these underlying dependencies.
Definition 4.1.16 (Tradeoff problem). Let MOP, DMOP, and COPk with reference
points xj ∈ X and coordination parameters εj ∈ Rmj for all j = 1, . . . ,m be given.
The single objective program
TOPkl: Minimize f
k
l (x) (4.16)
subject to f j(x) ≦ f j(xj) + εj for all j = 1, . . . ,M (4.16a)
and x ∈ X (4.16b)
is called the lth tradeoff problem (TOPkl) for COPk involving objective f
k
l .
The following result establishes the relationship between efficient decisions
for COPk and optimal solutions for TOPkl.
Proposition 4.1.17 (Efficiency for COPk implies optimality for TOPkl). Let MOP
and DMOP be given, and let xˆ ∈ X.
(i) If xˆ is efficient for COPk, then xˆ is optimal for TOPkl with x
k = xˆ and
εk = 0.
(ii) If xˆ is efficient for MOP and if DMOP is complete, then xˆ is optimal for all
TOPkl with x
j = xˆ and εj = 0 for all j = 1, . . . ,M .
Proof. For (i), let xˆ ∈ E(⋂Mj=1 X(f j , xj , εj), fk) and, by contradiction, assume
that xˆ is not optimal for TOPkl with x
k = xˆ and εk = 0. Then there exists x ∈⋂M
j=1 X(f
j , xj , εj) with xk = xˆ and εk = 0 such that fkl (x) < f
k
l (xˆ), or equivalently,
f j(x) ≦ f j(xj) + εj for all j = 1, . . . ,M , so x ∈ ⋂Mj=1 X(f j , xj , εj) and, for j = k,
fk(x) ≤ fk(xˆ), in contradiction to xˆ ∈ E(⋂Mj=1 X(f j , xj , εj)).
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For (ii), let DMOP be complete, so
⋃M
j=1 Ij = I, and xˆ ∈ E(X, f). By
Proposition 4.1.15, it follows that xˆ ∈ E(⋂Mj=1 X(f j , xˆ, 0), fk) for all k = 1, . . . ,m,
and the proof follows immediately from (i). 
Remark 4.1.18 (Tradeoff rates associated with coordination and tradeoff prob-
lems). Let xˆ ∈ X be efficient for COPk. By Proposition 4.1.17, it then follows that
xˆ is also optimal for TOPkl, and using Definition 2.2.15 the tradeoff between xˆ and
xj involving fkl and f
j
i is given by
T klji (xˆ, x
j) :=
fkl (xˆ)− fkl (xj)
f ji (x
j)− f ji (xˆ)
(4.17a)
Furthermore, if the conditions in Proposition 2.2.29 (constrained-objective tradeoff
rates) are satisfied for TOPkl, then the tradeoff rate between f
k
l and f
j
i at xˆ is
T klji (xˆ) := −
∂fkl (x)
∂f ji (x)
∣∣∣∣
x=xˆ
= −∂f
k
l (x)
∂εji
∣∣∣∣
x=xˆ
= λklji (4.17b)
where λklij denotes the Lagrangean multiplier of the coordination constraint f
j
i (x) ≤
f ji (xˆ) + ε
j
i in TOPkl. Hence, for an infinitesimal small increase δ of ε
j
i and thus in
f j(xˆ), the resulting decrease in fkl (xˆ) equals δλ
kl
ij .
The above results are used in the following decision making procedures.
4.2 Interactive Procedures and Decision-Making
Based on the previous theoretical results, we now present three different
procedures that can be used by a decision maker to identify a preferred solution for
a multiobjective programming problem using an initial objective decomposition as
proposed in Section 4.1. In each case, the decision making steps involved are first
summarized in a generic procedure or flowchart and then explained in some more
detail in the subsequent discussion.
4.2.1 Optimization-Based Nonhierarchical Coordination
We initially assume that the decision problem and the underlying multi-
objective program is a classical optimization problem with functional descriptions
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for all objectives and constraints. In particular, in this case we can use any suit-
able optimization technique from linear and nonlinear programming to solve the
corresponding subproblems or coordination problems.
Procedure 4.2.1 (Nonhierarchical coordination). Let MOP and DMOP be given.
1. Select an initial xˆ ∈ X, and let xj = xˆ and εj = 0 for all j = 1, . . . ,M .
2a. If xˆ is a preferred solution for MOP, stop.
2b. Otherwise select MOPk for improvement of xˆ with respect to f
k.
3. Solve COPk for a new solution x˜, and update x
k = x˜ and εk = 0.
4a. If fk(x˜) is satisfying, adjust εk ≧ 0, set xˆ = x˜ and go back to Step 2.
4b. Otherwise compute the tradeoffs T k.j. at x˜ from TOPkl.
5. Update some or all εj and go back to Step 3.
The validity of Procedure 4.2.1 is implied by Proposition 4.1.15 which guar-
antees that all efficient decisions for COPk that we select in Step 3 are at least weakly
efficient for the original MOP. Moreover, as every efficient decision for MOP can in
principle be found as an efficient decision to some coordination problem, based on
the decision maker’s input the procedure is capable to also find every potentially
preferred solution for the overall problem. We now give some more details and pro-
vide some helpful discussion for each step of the procedure and its application to
solving a multiobjective program
MOP: Minimize f(x) = [f1(x), f2(x), . . . , fm(x)] subject to x ∈ X (4.18a)
The procedure starts with MOP and assumes that the decision maker is
able to define a suitable decomposition by selecting subsets of the initial objective
function components (f1, f2, . . . , fm) which are then used to formulate the collection
of associated subproblems
MOPj : Minimize f
j(x) = [f j1 (x), f
j
2 (x), . . . , f
j
mj (x)] subject to x ∈ X (4.18b)
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that form the decomposed MOP (DMOP). Clearly, in practice this step depends
in large part on the specific problem that the decision maker wants to solve and
may also influence the choice of intermediate and thus the final preferred solution.
As general guideline, we suggest to decompose MOP into subproblems that have
a sufficiently small number of objectives and, ideally, into biobjective problems to
enable the immediate visualization of the Pareto sets in the form of two-dimensional
Pareto curves, providing various perceptual benefits for the further selection of ef-
ficient decisions and reference points for the individual coordination problems. For
now, however, we postpone the further discussion of these and other related issues
until we show some actual applications of this procedure in the next chapter.
Henceforth assuming that the decomposition DMOP and all MOPj are de-
fined, in Step 1 of Procedure 4.2.1 we select a first feasible decision xˆ, which is also
used as the first reference point for all subproblems, and initialize the coordination
parameters εj = 0 for all j = 1, . . . ,m. To examine if xˆ is already preferred for
MOP, in Step 2 we evaluate f(xˆ) for the complete MOP and, provided this outcome
is already satisfying, terminate the procedure with xˆ as the preferred solution. Oth-
erwise, if the current outcome is not satisfying, then there exists at least one other
subproblem MOPk, or equivalently, some objective function f
k which we would like
to further improve in the subsequent Step 3.
Since the different objectives in different subproblems are usually conflict-
ing, in general we expect that improvement with respect to fk is only possible at
a corresponding decay in some other objective. Initially, however, since the first
feasible decision xˆ is chosen arbitrarily and not necessarily efficient, we might also
improve upon fk(xˆ) without further decay in any other f j(xˆ), and therefore, we
formulate the corresponding kth coordination problem
COPk: Minimize f
k(x) = [fk1 (x), . . . , f
k
mk
(x)] (4.19)
subject to f ji (x) ≤ f ji (xj) + εji for all i ∈ Ij , j = 1, . . . ,M (4.19a)
x ∈ X (4.19b)
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with initial reference points xj = xˆ and coordination parameters εj = 0 for all j =
1, . . . ,M . We then solve this problem using any applicable optimization technique,
for example a scalarization method, and select a new solution x˜ that now, from
Proposition 4.1.15, is also at least weakly efficient for the original MOP.
Next, we need to evaluate the corresponding outcome fk(x˜) of the new
decision x˜ in MOPk in comparison to the previous outcome f
k(xˆ). If we are satisfied
with the improvement that we achieved over fk(xˆ), then we can immediately accept
x˜ as new solution to replace xˆ and start with the next iteration of the procedure at
Step 2. In other instances, we might also be overly satisfied with the improvement
achieved by fk(x˜), in which case we would still use x˜ to replace the previous solution
xˆ but, additionally, increase the corresponding coordination parameter εk so to
allow some later decay in fk to possibly enable further improvement in some other
subproblem during subsequent iterations of the procedure. Otherwise, if we are not
satisfied with the achieved improvement in fk, then we need to accept a further
decay in at least one other objective f j in another subproblem by increasing its
corresponding coordination parameter εj .
To help the decision maker on this tradeoff and to decide which εj to modify,
we propose to compute the associated sensitivities from the corresponding single
objective tradeoff problems
TOPkl: Minimize f
k
l (x) (4.20)
subject to f ji (x) ≤ f ji (xj) + εji for all i ∈ Ij , j 6= k (4.20a)
fki (x) ≤ fki (x˜) for all i ∈ Ik (4.20b)
x ∈ X (4.20c)
From Proposition 4.1.17, we know that since x˜ is efficient for COPk, it is also efficient
for the corresponding TOPkl. In particular, if the conditions in Proposition 2.2.29
(constrained-objective tradeoff rates) hold at x˜, we can compute the Lagrangean
multipliers λklji associated with each constraint f
j
i (x) ≤ f ji (xj) + εji in TOPkl. Fol-
lowing from Remark 4.1.18, a positive λklji > 0 then indicates that the corresponding
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coordination constraint is active at the current decision x˜ so that an increase of
the corresponding coordination parameter εji may yield further improvement in f
k
l .
Hence, after a corresponding update of some or all of these εji in Step 5, we can
again solve the coordination problem COPk with new coordination parameters in
Step 3 to find a new solution x˜ and repeat Step 4 as described above.
Note that the computation of the Lagrangean multipliers can be accom-
plished rather conveniently based on the fact that the efficient decision x˜ for COPk
is already known to be optimal for the tradeoff problem TOPkl. Since almost all
common optimization software provides a final solution together with its associated
Lagrangean multipliers, we therefore suggest to use any suitable optimization rou-
tine and specify the optimal solution x˜ as the initial point for TOPkl, which then
should almost immediately confirm optimality of x˜ and return all λklji in one or at
least a comparably small number of total iterations.
We finally remark that convergence of this procedure, in general, cannot
be established due to its dependency on input by the decision maker. Nevertheless,
based on the underlying theoretical results every decision proposed by the procedure
is at least (weakly) efficient for MOP, and in principle, every efficient solution can
be reached. If a preferred decision, however, cannot be found in a desired number
of iterations, then the decision maker may allow more iterations, choose a different
initial solution, vary the decomposition and, thus, DMOP, or eventually modify the
initial aspirations and expectations.
4.2.2 Optimization-Based Hierarchical Coordination
One potential drawback of the previous nonhierarchical coordination pro-
cedure is that for problems with many objectives or decompositions into many
subproblems, the number of additional constraints in the coordination problems
becomes quite large and renders the simultaneous update of several coordination
parameters εj difficult. Furthermore, if there are several subproblems for which the
current decision is not satisfactory, it might not always be easy to decide which
subproblem to choose for further improvement. To facilitate these two difficulties,
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we propose an alternative procedure that, instead of working with all subproblems
simultaneously, uses a hierarchical ranking of all subproblems. As illustrated in
Figure 4.2, this new procedure initially considers only MOP1 as first coordination
problem COP1 and then sequentially modifies the subsequent MOPj into new COPj
by introducing only the objectives from the previous iterations as additional con-
straints. In particular, note that the coordination problems in this case are slightly
different from the ones in the previous approach and limited to those constraints of
earlier subproblems, so that we do not need to select all εj and reference points xj
immediately, but can specify all our choices in a sequential manner.
MOP: Minimize f(x) = [f1(x), f2(x), . . . , fm(x)] subject to x ∈ X
COP1: Minimize f
1(x) =
[
f11 (x), . . . , f
1
m1
(x)
]
subject to x ∈ X
COP2: Minimize f
2(x) =
[
f21 (x), . . . , f
2
m2
(x)
]
subject to f1(x) ≦ f1(x1) + ε1
x ∈ X
COP3: Minimize f
3(x) =
[
f31 (x), . . . , f
3
m3
(x)
]
subject to f1(x) ≦ f1(x1) + ε1
f2(x) ≦ f2(x2) + ε2
x ∈ X
COPM : Minimize f
M (x) =
[
fM1 (x), . . . , f
M
mM
(x)
]
subject to f1(x) ≦ f1(x1) + ε1
f2(x) ≦ f2(x2) + ε2
. . .
fM−1(x) ≦ fM−1(xM−1) + εM−1
x ∈ X
Backtracking
Coordination
?
Decomposition
6
Integration
xM
6
ε1, ε2, . . . , εM−1
6
-
6
ε1, ε2
-
6ε
1
-
?
x1
ε1
?
x2
ε2
?
x3 . . . xM−1
εM−1
Figure 4.2 Optimization-based hierarchical decomposition and coordination
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Clearly, other than for the nonhierarchical procedure, in this case the decision
maker must decide not only on the particular decomposition of the original MOP
into subproblems, but also on the subproblem hierarchy. While this step is again
problem specific and therefore addressed in some more detail in context of the later
applications, the similar problem also arises for general lexicographic orders for
either single (Fishburn, 1974; Rentmeesters et al., 1996) or multiobjective programs
(Ying, 1983). Some other research, however, exists to provide the decision maker
with further guidance to establish a ranking among criteria (Matsumoto et al., 1993;
Dym et al., 2002) or related works that focus on the decomposition of multiobjective
programs based on criteria influence (Yoshimura et al., 2002, 2003).
Once the decomposition and the subproblem hierarchy have been defined,
the procedure works as follows. In each step, the decision maker solves a coordi-
nation problem COPk and selects a corresponding decision x
k that is used as the
reference point for a corresponding coordination constraint introduced into all sub-
sequent coordination problems. Additionally, the decision maker may also specify
an additional coordination parameter εk that describes the maximal acceptable de-
viation for subsequent solutions from the current outcome fk(xk). Of course, the
decision maker might also initially set all εj = 0 and later change any of these values
using a backtracking mechanism as indicated in Figure 4.2.
For the update of these εj and similar to the previous procedure, the decision
maker can again utilize the sensitivity information obtained from the corresponding
tradeoff problems. For further illustration, we assume that the decision maker has
solved COP1 through COPk−1 by selecting decisions x1, . . . , xk−1 and, mainly to
simplify the following arguments and without loss of generality, has initially decided
to set εj = 0 for all j = 1, . . . , k− 1. In particular, this implies that all coordination
constraints f j(x) ≦ f j(xj) + εj in COPk reduce to f
j(x) ≦ f j(xj) and, hence, that
every feasible decision xk for COPk is also efficient for the previous COPj . While
the decision maker should now select a new decision xk and proceed to the next
problem, it may also happen that the decision maker is not satisfied with any of the
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available outcomes fk(x˜) for COPk and thus is willing to change some or all of the
previous εj to gain further improvement in one of the objectives of fk.
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Figure 4.3 On the left (a), Pareto curve for COPj with f
j = (f j1 , f
j
2 ), and on the
right (b), its image for COPk with f
k = (fk1 , f
k
2 ) [not the Pareto curve for COPk]
This situation is depicted in Figure 4.3 in which we assume for further
simplicity that both COPj and COPk are biobjective programs with objectives
f j = (f j1 , f
j
2 ) and f
k = (fk1 , f
k
2 ), respectively. In particular, since each x
k is also effi-
cient for COPj , f
j(xk) lies on the Pareto curve for COPj , depicted in Figure 4.3(a),
and on the corresponding image of the efficient set for COPj in COPk, shown in
Figure 4.3 (b). Hence, to improve the current objective fk(xk), we need to increase
the coordination parameter εj = (εj1, ε
j
2) to also allow for ε
j-efficient decisions for
COPj , for example the decision x
k
new as indicated in Figure 4.3. In this case, the
corresponding tradeoffs between xk and xknew involving f
k and f j are given by
T k1j1 (x
k, xknew) =
∆fk1 (x
k)
∆f j1 (x
k)
=
fk1 (x
k)− fk1 (xknew)
f j1 (x
k
new)− f j1 (xk)
=
fk1 (x
k)− fk1 (xknew)
ε1
(4.21a)
T k2j1 (x
k, xknew) =
∆fk2 (x
k)
∆f j1 (x
k)
=
fk2 (x
k)− fk2 (xknew)
f j1 (x
k
new)− f j1 (xk)
=
fk2 (x
k)− fk2 (xknew)
ε1
(4.21b)
T k1j2 (x
k, xknew) =
∆fk1 (x
k)
∆f j2 (x
k)
=
fk1 (x
k)− fk1 (xknew)
f j2 (x
k
new)− f21 (xk)
=
fk1 (x
k)− fk1 (xknew)
ε2
(4.21c)
T k2j2 (x
k, xknew) =
∆fk2 (x
k)
∆f j2 (x
k)
=
fk2 (x
k)− fk2 (xknew)
f j2 (x
k
new)− f j2 (xk)
=
fk2 (x
k)− fk2 (xknew)
ε2
(4.21d)
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and as before, to decide which of the εj to modify, we can use the sensitivities from
the corresponding tradeoff problem
TOPkl: Minimize f
k
l (x) (4.22)
subject to f ji (x) ≤ f ji (xj) + εji for all i ∈ Ij , j = 1, . . . , k − 1 (4.22a)
fkl (x) ≤ fkl (xk) for all l ∈ Ik (4.22b)
x ∈ X (4.22c)
In this case, however, and according to the defined subproblem hierarchy, we
only introduce those coordination constraints that are associated with the subprob-
lems that are solved in previous iterations. Again assuming that we can compute
the Lagrangean multipliers for each of these constraints, we obtain that
T klji (x
k) = −∂f
k
l (x)
∂f jj (x)
∣∣∣∣
x=xk
= λklji for all l ∈ Ik and i ∈ Ij , j = 1, . . . , k − 1 (4.23)
and at least for very small changes in εji , we may use these tradeoff rates to approx-
imate the actual tradeoffs similar to the ratios listed in (4.21) as
∆fkl (x
k)
∆f ji (x
k)
=
∆fkl (x
k)
εji
≈ −λklji (4.23a)
⇐⇒ ∆fkl (xk) ≈ −λkljiεji for all l ∈ Ik and i ∈ Ij , j = 1, . . . , k − 1 (4.23b)
As mentioned earlier, however, in general these estimates are only valid for very
small and, in fact, infinitesimal small changes in εji . Merely as a rule of thumb,
we state that the larger the magnitude of a computed Lagrangean multiplier, the
larger the tradeoff that we should expect. For example, if λklji ≫ 1, then we infer
that already a small additional increase in εji may yield a significant improvement of
fkl (x
k). On the other hand, if λklji < 1, then the improvement in f
k
l (x
k) is relatively
small compared to the increase εji . For practical purposes, we therefore suggest to
initially choose a tradeoff threshold of 1 at which we do not wish to further increase
any εji , then suggesting to terminate the procedure with the current decision as
final and preferred solution for the overall problem. In particular, in this case
we do not need to solve all subproblems, while Proposition 4.1.15 still guarantees
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that the final decision is also efficient for the original MOP, although possibly in
favor of the objectives contained in those subproblems COP1, . . . , COPk so far
participating in the coordination process, compared to COPk+1, . . . , COPM that
are omitted due to early termination. Finally, and similar to the previous procedure,
if a preferred decision cannot be revealed in a desired number of iterations, or
after solving the last subproblem COPM , the decision maker again may decide to
allow more iterations, use backtracking to change some of the reference points xj or
coordination parameters εj , modify the proposed tradeoff threshold, or eventually
restart the procedure with a newly chosen decomposition or subproblem hierarchy.
4.2.3 Optimization-Free Coordination
Due to the high complexity in many real-life optimization models or the lim-
ited number of admissible objective function evaluations because of cost-intensive
computational requirements, traditional optimization methods often are not appli-
cable and must be replaced by heuristic approaches such as a genetic algorithm or
simulation and sampling techniques. In these cases, a (possibly still quite large)
set of feasible decisions is generated and presented to the decision maker, who then
needs to make a final decision from among these candidates based on (possibly quite
many) objectives that are used for their evaluation. The procedure in this section
assumes that once this set of preliminary candidate solutions has been found, no
further optimization is possible so that the decision problem essentially reduces to
a mere selection problem. However, the selection of a preferred decision may still
be a very difficult task for large numbers of decisions and objectives and can be
facilitated by a similar decomposition and coordination mechanism as proposed for
the previous two procedures.
The alternative approach in this case is based on the observation in Propo-
sition 4.1.6 that every efficient decision for MOP is εj-efficient in every subproblem
MOPj for some ε
j , giving rise to the relationship
M⋃
j=1
E(X, f j) ⊆ E(X, f) ⊆
M⋂
j=1
E(X, f j , εj) (4.24)
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in the corresponding Corollary 4.1.7. Hence, the idea of the following procedure is
to iteratively modify the choices of εj until we obtain a nonempty intersection of the
sets of εj-efficient decisions E(X, f j , εj) for all MOPj with only a reasonably small
number of potentially preferred decisions for which the final selection becomes a
more manageable task. In this case, the proper coordination of this process should
guarantee that we also compromise between the different εj to eventually reach
preferred compromise solutions for the different subproblems in DMOP.
Procedure 4.2.2 (Optimization-free coordination). Let MOP and DMOP be given.
1. Select initial εj ∈ Rmj , εj ≧ 0, for all j = 1, . . . ,M .
2. Find E(X, f j , εj) for MOPj for all j = 1, . . . ,M .
3a. If
⋂M
j=1 E(X, f
j , εj) 6= ∅, select a solution xˆ from the intersection.
3b. Otherwise change some or all εj and go back to Step 2.
4a. If xˆ is a preferred solution, stop.
4b. Otherwise change some or all εj and go back to Step 2.
In principle, this procedure can be used in two different ways. As a first
possibility, the decision maker may choose to start with comparably large values for
all εj so that, initially, there still exist many solutions in the common intersection
of the εj-efficient sets for MOPj . In this case, however, it may still be difficult to
identify a preferred decision so that the decision maker may sequentially reduce one
or more of the coordination parameters εj until only a reasonable small number of
decisions remain in the new intersection. Under the assumption that the changes
in εj agree with the preferences and expectations of the decision maker, a final
preferred solution then can be chosen from among the set of decisions remaining in
the common intersection of the εj-efficient decisions for MOPj .
On the other hand, the decision maker may also prefer to start with very
small values for εj , or initially set εj = 0 for all j = 1, . . . ,M . In this case, however,
the intersection of the εj-efficient sets in Step 3 is usually empty, so that the decision
maker needs to sequentially increase one or more of the εj until finding one or a
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small number of decisions that belong to the common intersection and thus establish
reasonable compromise decisions, again provided that the choices of εj reflect the
specific preferences of the decision maker.
Without any underlying optimization, however, it is clear that the mere
intersection of the ε-efficient sets in Step 3 of this procedure in general does not
provide the means to guarantee that the final selected solution is actually efficient
for MOP. However, and as mentioned before, the advantage of this coordination
procedure over the two previous approaches is that it is also applicable to a discrete
solution set of a multiobjective program as found by, for example, a sampling tech-
nique or a genetic algorithm, for which a further optimization is computationally
too expensive or for other reasons not possible.
4.3 Mathematical Programming Example
Before we apply each of the three coordination procedures introduced in the
previous section to a real-life application in the next chapter, we first demonstrate
the proposed hierarchical decision making procedure and the underlying coordina-
tion mechanism on an example from mathematical programming. Thereby adopting
the role of a hypothetical decision maker, by the nature of this approach it is un-
avoidable that all our decisions remain subjective and, in practice, would also depend
on the actual decision maker’s expertise, preferences and expectations.
The chosen problem consists of four quadratic objective functions f1, f2, f3
and f4 which need to be minimized, subject to three inequality constraints g1, g2
and g3 in two variables x1 and x2
Minimize f1(x1, x2) = (x1 − 2)2 + (x2 − 1)2
f2(x1, x2) = x
2
1 + (x2 − 3)2
f3(x1, x2) = (x1 − 1)2 + (x2 + 1)2
f4(x1, x2) = (x1 + 1)
2 + (x2 − 1)2
subject to g1(x1, x2) = x
2
1 − x2 ≤ 0
g2(x1, x2) = x1 + x2 − 2 ≤ 0
g3(x1, x2) = −x1 ≤ 0
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We denote the feasible set for this problem by X = {x ∈ R2 : gi(x) ≤ 0, i = 1, 2, 3}
and, since we consider all decisions and objectives without any underlying physical
interpretation, priorities or relative importances, we group the four objectives into
the two canonical pairs f1 = (f11 , f
1
2 ) = (f1, f2) and f
2 = (f21 , f
2
2 ) = (f3, f4).
Additionally, to reduce any further notational burden, we also replace all double
indices 11, 12, 21 and 22 by 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively.
To find a preferred decision to the above problem using the proposed hier-
archical procedure, we now start by solving
COP1: Minimize f
1 = [f1(x), f2(x)] subject to x ∈ X (4.25)
for ten Pareto solutions that are depicted on the left in Figure 4.4 and then select the
highlighted middle point as first solution and reference point x1 = (0.447, 1.553). In
a practical context, this choice can be justified by the fact that this decision yields
comparable outcome levels for f1(x
1) = 2.717 and f2(x
1) = 2.294 and, thus, is one
of the best compromise decisions for COP1. Furthermore, for later reference, we
also calculate the two other objective values f3(x
1) = 6.823 and f4(x
1) = 2.340.
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s Pareto points for COP1
* selected point in COP1
Figure 4.4 On the left, ten Pareto outcomes for COP1 with f
1 = (f1, f2), and on
the right, their corresponding images for f2 = (f3, f4)
However, we remark that, so far, our decision is merely based on the first
subproblem with respect to objectives f1 and f2. The plot on the right of Figure 4.4
shows the Pareto outcomes for COP1 with respect to the two other objectives f3
163
and f4 and is provided here for convenience only. In addition, both plots also depict
a sample of the complete feasible set which show how all Pareto outcomes that
are found as solutions for the first subproblem belong to the worst outcomes with
respect to the second subproblem. In this context, also compare Figure 4.4 with the
previous illustration in Figure 4.3.
Before we proceed to the next coordination problem COP2, we investigate
the tradeoffs at the current decision x1 with respect to the two objectives f3 and f4
by computing the Lagrangean multipliers for the corresponding tradeoff problems
TOP3: Minimize f3(x) TOP4: Minimize f4(x)
subject to f1(x) ≤ f1(x1) + ε1 subject to f1(x) ≤ f1(x1) + ε1
f2(x) ≤ f2(x1) + ε2 f2(x) ≤ f2(x1) + ε2
f4(x) ≤ f4(x1) f4(x) ≤ f4(x1)
x ∈ X x ∈ X
where, initially, ε1 = ε2 = 0. Then choosing the optimal decision x
1 as initial point in
our optimization routine, this immediately (after one iteration) confirms optimality
of x1 for both TOP3 and TOP4 and provides us with the tradeoff information
T31(x
1) = −∂f3(x)
∂f1(x)
∣∣∣∣
x=x1
= λ31 = 0.171 T41(x
1) = −∂f4(x)
∂f1(x)
∣∣∣∣
x=x1
= λ41 = 1.171
T32(x
1) = −∂f3(x)
∂f2(x)
∣∣∣∣
x=x1
= λ32 = 1.829 T42(x
1) = −∂f4(x)
∂f2(x)
∣∣∣∣
x=x1
= λ42 = 0.829
Hence, we see that only two tradeoff values are greater than 1, thus suggesting that
improvement in f3 or f4 is best achieved by increasing the coordination parameter
ε2 for f2 or ε1 for f1, respectively, before solving the second coordination problem
COP2: Minimize f
2 = [f3(x), f4(x)] (4.26)
subject to f1(x) ≤ f1(x1) + ε1 = 2.717 + ε1 (4.26a)
f2(x) ≤ f2(x1) + ε2 = 2.294 + ε2 (4.26b)
x ∈ X (4.26c)
In particular, if we decide to focus on the more promising tradeoff between f3 and
f2, we might choose a new coordination parameter ε2 = 1, and after solving COP2
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with ε = (ε1, ε2) = (0, 1), we select the new decision xnew = (0.440, 1.239) with
its corresponding outcome f(xnew) = (2.490, 3.294, 5.328, 2.131) as new solution.
Hence, in this case, the actually achieved tradeoff between x1 and xnew involving f3
and f2 can now be computed according to the ratios in Equation 4.21 as
T32(x
1, xnew) =
∆f3(x
1)
∆f2(x1)
=
f3(x
1)− f3(xnew)
f2(xnew)− f2(x1) =
6.823− 5.328
3.294− 2.294 = 1.495 (4.27)
Here we note that although the chosen value ε2 = 1 is rather large compared to
the previous outcome value of f2(x1) = 2.294, the computed tradeoff λ32 = 1.829
at x1 provides a quite reasonable estimate for the actual tradeoff of 1.495. However
and as emphasized before, these tradeoff values should not be mistaken as precise
predictions for the tradeoffs that are usually achieved, especially when we decide to
simultaneously change both coordination parameters ε1 and ε2.
For illustration of this last remark, assume that we now decide to set ε =
(ε1, ε2) = (1, 2). Based on the initial tradeoff values computed at x
1, we might
expect to gain improvements of ∆f3(x
1) ≈ −λ32ε2 = 1.829 · 2 = 3.658 in f3 and
∆f4(x
1) ≈ −λ41ε1 = 1.171 · 1 = 1.171 in f4. Then solving COP2 for, say, five new
efficient decisions, we obtain the five corresponding Pareto outcomes depicted on
the right of Figure 4.5 which, together with their new tradeoff values, are listed in
Table 4.2. For convenience, we also circle all those sampled outcomes from Figure 4.4
that satisfy the coordination constraints f1(x) ≤ f1(x1) + ε1 = 3.717 and f2(x) ≤
f2(x
1) + ε2 = 4.294 and, thus, form the underlying set of feasible points for COP2.
1 2 3 4 5
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8
f1(x)
f 2
(x
)
0 5 10
1
1.5
2
2.5
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4
f3(x)
f 4
(x
)
p feasible points for MOP
b feasible points for COP2
s Pareto points for COP2
* selected point in COP2
Figure 4.5 On the right, five Pareto outcomes for COP2 with f
2 = (f2, f3) and
ε1 = (ε1, ε2) = (1, 2), and on the left, their corresponding images for f
1 = (f1, f2)
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Table 4.2 Efficient decisions for COP2 and their objective and tradeoff values
# x1 x2 f1 f2 f3 f4 λ31 λ32 λ41 λ42
1 0.503 0.990 2.242 4.294 4.206 2.258 0 0.990 1.003 0
2 0.384 0.964 2.613 4.294 4.236 1.916 0 0.990 0.856 0
3 0.240 0.942 3.101 4.294 4.348 1.541 0 0.990 0.704 0
4 0.122 0.931 3.532 4.294 4.501 1.264 0 0.990 0.596 0
5 0.072 1.000 3.717 4.005 4.861 1.149 0 1.060 0.556 0
We find that the maximal improvements with respect to f3 and f4
∆maxf
3(x1) = f3(x1)− f3(0.503, 0.990) = 6.823− 4.206 = 2.617 (expected: 3.658)
∆maxf
4(x1) = f4(x1)− f4(0.072, 1.000) = 2.400− 1.149 = 1.251 (expected: 1.171)
are achieved by two different of the five efficient decisions for COP2 and thus not
achievable simultaneously so that, in this case, the choice of a preferred solution must
also compromise between these different possible improvements. Again selecting the
best compromise decision among these five solutions, we choose the third decision
in Table 4.2 as our second solution x2 = (0.240, 0.942), which is also highlighted in
Figure 4.5 with its new objective function values f(x2) = (3.101, 4.294, 4.348, 1.541).
In particular, we note that all tradeoff values at this decision reduce to values below
the suggested tradeoff threshold of 1, and consequently, we terminate the procedure
with this decision as our final solution.
To conclude this example, we also observe that while our final and all other
highlighted outcomes in Figure 4.5 are Pareto for the second subproblem COP2, so
that all underlying decisions are (at least weakly) efficient for the original MOP, none
of these outcomes actually lies on the Pareto curve for either the first or second sub-
problem. Hence, and as mentioned earlier, the decision making procedures proposed
in this chapter are capable to find decisions that truly compromise between the dif-
ferent subproblems and that cannot be found using other decomposition approaches
that do not properly coordinate the chosen decomposition.
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4.4 Discussion and Further Research
In close interplay of theoretical investigation and methodological develop-
ment, in this chapter we study a decomposition strategy for large-scale multiobjec-
tive programs and establish various results that subsequently lead to the formulation
of three interactive coordination and decision making procedures. Based on our ex-
plicit goal to remedy the challenges resulting from a high number of objectives, we
choose to decompose the original objective vector into several subsets of objective
components that can be evaluated independently, thus giving rise to a collection of
separate and smaller-sized subproblems. In particular, the objective spaces in every
subproblem are of lower dimension than for the original problem, and therefore, we
expect that solving these subproblems in the sense of choosing preferred decisions
becomes a more manageable task for the decision maker.
In the characterization of the efficiency relationships between the solutions
for the original and the decomposed subproblems, we show in Proposition 4.1.4
that all (weakly) efficient decisions for subproblems are also (weakly) efficient for
the original problem, for which the stronger result holds true under the additional
assumption that the decomposed objective function is injective. For the converse re-
lationship, however, we find in Example 4.1.5 that efficient decisions for the original
problem are not necessarily efficient for any subproblem, but merely epsilon-efficient
for a suitable choice of the associated relaxation parameter.
We contrast our decomposition approach with traditional scalarization tech-
niques and verify in a series of results preceding Corollary 4.1.13 that any efficient
decision that can be generated by scalarizing the complete problem can also be
found by separate scalarizations of the decomposed subproblems. In particular, as
one additional advantage of the proposed objective decomposition, we mention the
possibility to group objectives with similar analytical properties or a common phys-
ical interpretation into the same subproblem and, for each of these, use different
scalarization functions or parameters to achieve additional flexibility compared to
scalarization approaches that combine all objectives at once.
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To identify efficient solutions by other means than scalarization, we propose
an alternative approach that coordinates between different subproblems by adding
their objectives as additional constraints into a modified coordination problem. In
this case, Proposition 4.1.15 essentially maintains the result of Proposition 4.1.4
that all (weakly) efficient decisions for the coordination problems are also (weakly)
efficient for the original problem but, in addition, now every efficient decision for the
original problem also solves a suitable coordination problem. In particular, although
otherwise similar to the constrained-objective scalarization in Definition 2.2.26, each
coordination problem is still a multiobjective program so that not only the specifica-
tion of the associated parameters but also the selection of its corresponding solution
can be influenced by preferences and input of the decision maker.
In further modification of the above coordination problems, we introduce
a collection of single objective programs that can be used to assess the tradeoffs
and sensitivities associated with each objective function component and coordina-
tion constraint at any selected efficient decision. In particular, based on our result
in Proposition 4.1.17 that guarantees optimality of efficient decisions also for these
tradeoff problems, we can forgo their explicit solution and address in Remark 4.1.18
and the following discussion how we can compute all relevant sensitivities in a
straightforward manner from the associated set of Lagrangean multipliers.
Following the above results, we formulate three interactive decision making
procedures that are proposed to support decision makers in organizing the coordina-
tion between subproblems and to facilitate the required specification of coordination
parameters and the selection of preferred decisions for the individual subproblems.
The first Procedure 4.2.1 and the second in Figure 4.2 differ in whether this coor-
dination is accomplished in a nonhierarchical or hierarchical fashion and are based
on optimization, whereas the unique feature of Procedure 4.2.2 is its formulation as
a pure selection method. Especially in view of our earlier discussion in Section 3.4,
we again emphasize the prominent role played by the concept of epsilon-efficiency to
reflect compromises and tradeoffs based on the preferences of the decision maker but
essentially independent of its previous consideration as concept of approximation.
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Choosing the optimization-based hierarchical procedure to solve a mathe-
matical programming example with four objectives, we illustrate how we can con-
veniently select an overall preferred decision by working only with one pair of biob-
jective problems and effectively use visualizations of the Pareto curves for each indi-
vidual problem which is impossible in the original four-dimensional outcome space.
Moreover, in our discussion we focus in large part on the proposed sensitivity anal-
ysis and find that although the provided tradeoff information, in general, does not
provide reliable estimates for the actually achieved improvement, it can be a helpful
indication for the suggested termination of the overall decision making procedure.
In addition, we expect that the proposed decomposition-coordination scheme is also
well suited for decentralized decision processes and provides a general framework
that enables the independent participation of multiple decision makers.
Nevertheless, much further work is possible and necessary to achieve or fur-
ther advance the practicality of the proposed decision making procedures for real-life
applications and again comes along with several interesting research ideas also of
interest from a theoretical point of view. First, the current limitations of the pro-
posed tradeoff and sensitivity analysis urge to take a closer look at its underlying
assumptions and to derive conditions under which we can more precisely predict the
resulting changes in the corresponding objective function values. Second, while the
current tradeoff analysis utilizes a sensitivity result from single objective program-
ming, namely the sensitivity theorem from nonlinear programming (Luenberger,
1984) that is based on Lagrangean duality, the question remains if there also exists
a multiobjective analogon and motivates a further investigation of general vector
duality and sensitivity. Third, by replacing Pareto by general cone efficiency, it is
not necessarily clear how to properly decompose the overall domination cone for the
individual subproblems so to obtain similar results to those presented for the Pareto
case, and we propose such inquiry as another interesting research problem.
From among the numerous methodological issues that need to be addressed,
we only highlight the apparent dependency of the decision making process and,
thus, of the final preferred decision on the chosen decomposition. While several of
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our results, namely Propositions 4.1.9, 4.1.12, 4.1.15 and 4.1.17, require a complete
decomposition that includes all original objectives in at least one subproblem, at the
moment we do not impose any other restriction on either the number of objectives
per subproblem nor the number of subproblems themselves. Hence, although we
generally recommend to decompose the original problem into sufficiently small and
preferably biobjective programs to enable the visualization of the individual Pareto
curves, the examination of other consequences may lead to new insights and enhance
the subsequent decision making already in the preparatory decomposition step.
In most practical cases, however, we believe that a suitable decomposition
is usually problem-dependent and best chosen based on the specific objectives that
are modeled in the underlying multiobjective program. In particular, emerging in-
terests in the formulation of multiscenario multiobjective programs as given in Def-
inition 4.1.3 provide a host of potential applications that imply a natural problem
decomposition into different scenarios (Wiecek et al., 2006). For example, Kouvelis
and Yu (1997) examine single objective programs for which the different scenarios
are defined by different data instances, and they are interested in finding solutions
that are robust, or comparably preferred in all associated subproblems. In structural
optimization and engineering design, different scenarios are frequently defined as dif-
ferent loading conditions, and for multidisciplinary optimization a different subprob-
lem can be associated with each individual discipline (Sobieszczanski-Sobieski and
Haftka, 1997). Other possible applications include product platform design (Fellini
et al., 2002, 2005) for which the scenarios represent different products that are pro-
duced from a common set of shared components resulting in potential sacrifices in
individual product performance, and typical scenarios in vehicle configuration de-
sign include the same vehicle operating in various steering maneuvers under different
road or driving conditions (Gobbi and Mastinu, 2002; Fadel et al., 2005).
Without going into any further detail, we summarize that the number of
possible applications of the proposed decomposition and coordination methods is
essentially unlimited, and we choose only four particular problems for the further
illustration of our decision making procedures in the now following chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
APPLICATIONS IN FINANCE AND ENGINEERING DESIGN
In this chapter, we apply the decomposition approach proposed in the previ-
ous Chapter 4 to selected real-life applications from finance and engineering design
and show how each of the three interactive decision making procedures can be used to
coordinate between the resulting subproblems by setting tradeoffs and resolving con-
flicts for the identification of a final and overall preferred decision. In particular, we
extend the classical Roy-Markowitz model for portfolio optimization in Section 5.1
to allow for multiple estimates of investment returns and risks, thereby giving rise to
a multiscenario multiobjective program, and we similarly solve a truss design prob-
lem with multiple loading conditions in Section 5.2 using the two optimization-based
procedures. Their modification for a selection problem is described in Section 5.3
for a vehicle configuration problem in the context of packaging optimization, and
we finally use the originally proposed optimization-free procedure to select a vehicle
system component in the context of highway safety in the concluding Section 5.4.
5.1 Investment Selection in Portfolio Optimization
A common problem in portfolio optimization asks an investor to distribute
a financial capital among n assets to maximize the portfolios’s return over a fixed
holding period. For the following discussion, we let xa ∈ R, 0 ≤ xa ≤ 1, denote the
investment proportion into asset a = 1, . . . n, and x = (x1, . . . , xn)
T ∈ Rn be the
investment vector. Since asset returns, in general, are not known at the beginning
of the holding period, we let ra be a real-valued random variable for the return
of asset a, and r(x) =
∑n
a=1 raxa be the portfolio return of the investment vector
or investment strategy x. With this notation, the resulting portfolio optimization
problem (POP) can be formulated as the stochastic program
POP: Maximize r(x) =
n∑
a=1
raxa subject to
n∑
a=1
xa = 1, x ≧ 0 (5.1)
To solve POP, Roy (1952) and Markowitz (1952) independently introduce an equiva-
lent deterministic biobjective program by replacing the random return maximization
r(x) with maximization of the expected return E[r(x)] and minimization of its vari-
ance V [r(x)]. Following their approach, we let µa = E[ra] be the expected return
and σ2aa = V [ra] be the variance of asset a = 1, . . . , n, and for a 6= b = 1, . . . , n, we
let σ2ab = Cov[ra(x), rb(x)] be the covariance between ra and rb. Modern portfolio
theory assumes that µa, σ
2
aa, and σ
2
ab are known for all a, b = 1, . . . , n, although, in
reality, expected returns, variances and covariances are unknown and can only be
estimated from historical data (Elton et al., 2003). Hence, in general, the selected
and presumingly optimal portfolio is usually biased depending on the particularly
chosen estimator, a fact commonly ignored in the discussion of possible investments.
To remove this drawback and to find an investment strategy that per-
forms well for a variety of different estimators, in this example, we study the Roy-
Markowitz mean-variance model and allow the simultaneous consideration of three
different estimates j = 1, 2, 3 for return expectations µja, variances σ
2j
aa and covari-
ances σ2jab. More precisely, given historical data over D days, we let rad denote the
return of asset a on day d = 1, . . . , D and then estimate the average return µa as
µja = E
j(ra) =
∑D
d=1 w
j
drad∑D
d=1 w
j
d
(5.2a)
where the parameters wjd are weights that may vary for different days d to put
different emphases on, say older or more recent data. In particular, with w1d = 1 for
all d = 1, . . . , D, we use the sample mean r¯a as estimate µ
1
a and, furthermore, choose
w2d = d and w
3
d = d
2 to obtain first and second order linearly weighted averages as
µ2a and µ
3
a, respectively, thereby assigning higher weights to data that is more recent.
In all three cases, the variances and covariances are computed accordingly as
σ2jab = E
j [(rad − Ej(ra))(rbd − Ej(rb))] =
∑D
d=1 w
j
d(rad − µja)(rbd − µjb)∑D
d=1 w
j
d
(5.2b)
Finally replacing positive return maximization by the equivalent negative return
minimization, the resulting collection of biobjective programs
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BOPj : Minimize (−Ej [r(x)], V j [r(x)]) subject to
n∑
a=1
xa = 1, x ≧ 0 (5.3)
with Ej [r(x)] =
∑n
a=1 µ
j
axa and V
j [r(x)] =
∑n
a=1
∑n
b=1 σ
2j
abxaxb is a multiscenario
multiobjective program in the same form as DMOP and, thus, can be solved using
any of the two optimization-based procedures proposed in the previous chapter. In
particular, since the expectation terms are linear and the variances are quadratic in
the investment vector x, all objective functions are convex and twice continuously
differentiable which, in principle, allows to compute the Lagrangean multipliers from
the tradeoff problems associated with each of the three subproblems BOPj .
Based on recent one-year data of twenty assets included in the S&P500
stock market index, we first use the two formulas in (5.2a) and (5.2b) to compute
expected returns µja, variances σ
2j
aa and covariances σ
2j
ab for all assets a, b = 1, . . . , 20
and j = 1, 2, 3, respectively. Furthermore, we normalize all data to magnitudes
less than 1 by dividing each return vector and covariance matrix by the maximum
absolute value of its entries, before starting with Step 1 of Procedure 4.2.1.
Step 1: We select an initial strategy xˆ of equal investment proportions xˆa =
1/20 for every asset a = 1, . . . , 20 and initialize xj = xˆ and εj = (εjE , ε
j
V ) = (0, 0)
for j = 1, 2, 3. The associated expected returns and variances correspond to point
A in Figure 5.1, that also shows the individual Pareto sets obtained from separately
solving each of the three subproblems BOPj . Moreover, the numerical values of all
returns and variances are listed in Table 5.1, and to simplify the later discussion we
also denote the current portfolio xˆ as xA.
Step 2b: The initial investment xA naturally shows a considerable diversifi-
cation and, therefore, already provides very small variances of at most 0.13, strongly
favoring the minimization of the portfolio’s risk over its return maximization. Conse-
quently, this initial solution is not preferred, and we can select any and, specifically,
choose the first subproblem for its further improvement.
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Step 3: We formulate and solve the problem
COP1: minimize (−E1[r(x)], V 1[r(x)]) (5.4)
subject to −Ej [r(x)] ≤ −Ej [r(xj)] + εjE (5.4a)
V j [r(x)] ≤ V j [r(xj)] + εjV for j = 1, 2, 3 (5.4b)
where xj = xA and εjE = ε
j
V = 0 for all j from Step 1. Using the weighted-sum
scalarization approach, we identify the Pareto set for COP1, depicted in Figure 5.1,
and then select the solution corresponding to point B as our new portfolio xˆ = xB.
In particular, this solution yields the most improvement with respect to expected
returns, while meeting or even further reducing the variances and, thus, the risk as-
sociated with the initial investment strategy xA, which can be inferred by comparing
the numerical values in Table 5.1. Moreover, the new point B now is Pareto for the
first subproblem, although it is not Pareto for the second or third subproblem. Since
still ε1 = 0, we only update x1 = xB before proceeding to Step 4.
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Figure 5.1 Individual Pareto sets for each BOPj with bold curves corresponding
to the Pareto set for COP1 (left) in Step 3 and its image for BOP2 and BOP3
Step 4b: Figure 5.1 indicates that the variance constraints V j [r(x)] ≤
V j [r(xA)]+εjV with ε
j
V = 0 in COP1 prevent a further improvement in the expected
return unless we decide to further relax the values for εjV . Since the V
1 constraint in
COP1 is active at the current solution x
B, we can formulate the associated tradeoff
problem TOP11 and minimize the negative expected return −E1[r(x)] under the
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same constraints as in COP1 to compute that T
11
12 = λ
11
12 = 3.35, where λ
11
12 is the
Lagrangean multiplier associated with the constraint V 1[r(x)] ≤ V 1[r(x1)] at the
optimal solution xB of TOP11. Although we note from Table 5.1 that the two con-
straints for V 2 and V 3 are not active, the slack is sufficiently small to similarly
approximate T 1122 = λ
11
22 = 3.15 and T
11
32 = λ
11
32 = 3.27 from neighboring points of
xB. An interpretation of these values implies that for very small increases in εjV or,
equivalently, V j , we expect a threefold improvement in the expected return E1.
Step 5: To restrict the acceptable variances to values of, say less than 0.3,
we specify all εjV = 0.18 before resolving COP1 in Step 3. While this should guaran-
tee the significant further improvement in E1, however, this relaxation is clearly too
large to result in an accurate threefold improvement obtained as current tradeoff in
Step 4b, valid only for much smaller relaxations of εjV .
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Figure 5.2 Bold curves from point B to point C correspond to the Pareto set for
COP1 (left) in Step 3(2) and its image for BOP2 (center) and BOP3 (right)
Step 3(2): Figure 5.2 shows the new Pareto set obtained by solving COP1
with x1 = xB from the previous Step 3, initial strategies x2 = x3 = xA, εjE = 0 and
εjV = 0.18 for j = 1, 2, 3. In particular, while all solutions are still Pareto for the
first subproblem, now they deviate significantly from the individual Pareto curves
for the second and third subproblem. Hence, after selecting the point C as new
solution xˆ = xC , we update x1 = xC , reset ε1V = 0, and again proceed to Step 4.
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Step 4a: Overly satisfied with the achieved return E1 = 0.9 of the current
portfolio xC , which is listed with the other values in Table 5.1, we adjust ε1E = 0.1 to
merely maintain an expected return E1 ≥ 0.8 for the first subproblem, but possibly
gain a better solution in view of the other two subproblems.
Step 2b(2) While the current portfolio xC is still reasonable for the second
subproblem but rather unacceptable for the third subproblem, simply judged based
on the respective distances from point C to the Pareto curves in Figure 5.2, we now
focus on further improvement on the expected return E3.
Step 3(3): Consequently, we formulate and solve the problem
COP3: minimize (−E3[r(x)], V 3[r(x)]) (5.5)
subject to −Ej [r(x)] ≤ −Ej [r(xj)] + εjE (5.5a)
V j [r(x)] ≤ V j [r(xj)] + εjV for j = 1, 2, 3 (5.5b)
where x1 = xC is the current solution, x2 = x3 = xA is still the initial point,
ε1E = 0.1, ε
1
V = 0, ε
j
E = 0 and ε
j
V = 0.18 for j = 2, 3. The resulting Pareto set
for COP3 is depicted in Figure 5.3, and the values for the three highlighted points
D, E, and F are listed in Table 5.1. Note that all solutions for COP3 relax E
1 by
the maximum specified amount of ε1E = 0.1 and achieve improvement not only in
the optimized third subproblem, but also in the second subproblem. In particular,
after selecting the solution xE that corresponds to the middle point E in Figure 5.3
as the best compromise solution xˆ for COP3, we set x
3 = xE , ε3 = 0, and do not
desire further improvement of either E2 or V 2.
Step 4a and 2a: Satisfied with the achieved objective function values in the
third and, moreover, all other subproblems, we do not need to further adjust ε3
and now go to Step 2a to terminate the procedure with the current xˆ = xE as the
preferred final solution and investment strategy.
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Figure 5.3 Bold curves from point D to point F correspond to the Pareto set for
COP3 (right) in Step 3(3) and its image for BOP1 (left) and BOP2 (center)
Table 5.1 Return and variance estimates for portfolios in Figures 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3
BOP1 BOP2 BOP3
E1[r(xˆ)] V 1[r(xˆ)] E2[r(xˆ)] V 2[r(xˆ)] E3[r(xˆ)] V 3[r(xˆ)]
A 0.152906 0.120385 0.290292 0.129330 0.357932 0.126309
B 0.636321 0.120385 0.700503 0.125709 0.671444 0.122688
C 0.905929 0.300385 0.845338 0.294723 0.753173 0.272746
D 0.805929 0.199371 0.791192 0.201070 0.726274 0.190173
E 0.805929 0.250229 0.863149 0.243992 0.825127 0.225964
F 0.805929 0.300385 0.893574 0.294483 0.875052 0.274021
This example can be modified in several ways. Instead of changing the
weights for the chosen return and variance estimates, different scenarios can also be
defined based on data of varying histories, for example, 12-month or 3-year perfor-
mances (Ehrgott et al., 2004). In addition, various new objectives such as dividends,
social responsibility, or liquidity can be included into the portfolio selection process
(Spronk et al., 2005; Steuer et al., 2005), thereby necessitating to decompose the
resulting problem without a physical interpretation of different scenarios. The ap-
plication of the procedure, however, will essentially remain the same.
177
5.2 Truss Topology Design in Structural Optimization
Structural design optimization deals with the development and engineering
of complex systems and structures such as cars, airplanes, spaceships or satellites.
Based on tremendous gain in experience and knowledge, together with the rapid
progress in available computing technologies, the underlying mathematical models
and design simulations become better and better and provide designers with grow-
ing amounts of data that need to be analyzed for choosing a final optimal design.
In particular, the steadily increasing number of design specifications, measures and
criteria used to evaluate the performance of the simulated designs lead to cumber-
some and sometimes unachievable tradeoff analyses, thus resulting in complex and
very difficult, if not unsolvable, decision making problems.
Consequently, structural design is also a common field for application of
multiobjective optimization. By nature, in a majority of such problems one criterion
is typically the structural volume or weight which needs to be minimized, while
loading conditions or other structural performance specifications may give rise to
the additional criteria. In particular, in our discussion we investigate the design
of the four-bar plane truss structure already described in Section 3.3.6 and various
other places in the literature (Koski, 1984, 1985; Koski and Silvennoinen, 1987;
Koski, 1988; Stadler and Dauer, 1992; Coello and Christiansen, 2000; Coello Coello,
2001; Coello Coello and Lamont, 2004) for which the original mathematical model
is a biobjective program with the two conflicting objectives of minimizing both the
volume V of the truss and the displacement d1 of the node joining bars 1 and 2
under the loading condition depicted for the leftmost truss in Figure 5.4.
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Figure 5.4 Three different loading conditions on a four-bar plane truss structure
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In our particular application, however, we also use the two additional loading
conditions from Koski (1984) that are depicted for the middle and right truss in
Figure 5.4 and analyzed with respect to their associated displacements d2 and d3 by
Blouin (2004). The length L = 200 cm of the structure, the acting force F = 10 kN,
Young’s modulus of elasticity E = 2 × 105 kN/cm2 and the only nonzero stress
component σ = 10 kN/cm2 are again assumed to be constant, and the cross-sectional
areas x1, x2, x3 and x4 of the four bars again are subject to several additional
physical restraints that yield the feasible design or decision set
X =
{
x = (x1, x2, x3, x4) ∈ R4 : Fσ ≤ x1, x4 ≤ 3Fσ ,
√
2Fσ ≤ x2, x3 ≤ 3Fσ
}
(5.6)
The overall problem then becomes to select a feasible preferred design that minimizes
the structural volume V (x) and joint displacements d1, d2, d3 for the three different
loading conditions in Figure 5.4
Minimize V (x) = L(2x1 +
√
2x2 +
√
2x3 + x4) (5.7a)
d1(x) =
FL
E
(
2
x1
+
2
√
2
x2
− 2
√
2
x3
+
2
x4
)
(5.7b)
d2(x) =
FL
E
(
2
x1
+
2
√
2
x2
+
4
√
2
x3
+
6
x4
)
(5.7c)
d3(x) =
FL
E
(
6
√
2
x3
+
3
x4
)
subject to x ∈ X (5.7d)
This problem can also be viewed as a multiscenario multiobjective program
(Fadel et al., 2005) as introduced in Definition 4.1.3, with each loading condition act-
ing as one of three possible scenarios. Based on the assumption that the first loading
scenario occurs most often and the third scenario only very rarely, we decompose
the overall problem into the three associated criteria pairs f1 = (f11 , f
1
2 ) = (d1, V ),
f2 = (f21 , f
2
2 ) = (d2, V ) and f
3 = (f31 , f
3
2 ) = (d3, V ). In particular, we note that the
volume criterion participates in every scenario and, thus, is repeated in each sub-
problem. Moreover, by including additional scenarios this example readily extends
to problems with five or any other number of objectives as well, and the restric-
tion to three subproblems is merely for the ease of demonstration. Similar to our
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previous discussion of the mathematical programming example in Section 4.2.2, we
use the optimization-based hierarchical procedure from Figure 4.2 to find a common
design that is preferred for all given scenarios. Consequently, we start by solving
COP1: Minimize f
1(x) = [d1(x), V (x)] subject to x ∈ X (5.8)
to obtain the ten Pareto solutions that are highlighted in Figure 5.5, from among
which we subsequently select the highlighted point (∗) as preferred compromise solu-
tion for COP1. The corresponding truss design x
1 = (1.7459, 2.4732, 1.4142, 2.4730)
is illustrated in Figure 5.7 and has performance values of V (x1) = 2292.5 cm3 for the
truss volume and d1(x
1) = 0.0110 cm, d2(x
1) = 0.0721 cm and d3(x
1) = 0.0872 cm
for the three node displacements.
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Figure 5.5 On the left, ten Pareto solutions for COP1 and the first scenario, and
centered and on the right, their respective images for the second and third scenario
Before we solve the next coordination problem, we formulate the two tradeoff
problems that are associated with the second and third scenario
TOP21: Minimize d2(x) TOP31: Minimize d3(x)
subject to d1(x) ≤ d1(x1) + εd1 subject to d1(x) ≤ d1(x1) + εd1
V (x) ≤ V (x1) + εV V (x) ≤ V (x1) + εV
x ∈ X x ∈ X
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but, for conceptual simplicity, restrict our analysis to the tradeoff between the dif-
ferent deflection criteria. Solving the two tradeoff problems TOP21 and TOP31 with
x1 as initial design, we obtain the associated Lagrangean multipliers
λ21 =
∂d2(x)
∂d1(x)
∣∣∣∣
x=x1
= 413.77 and λ31 =
∂d3(x)
∂d1(x)
∣∣∣∣
x=x1
= 538.03 (5.9)
in which case the very large magnitudes of these values clearly indicate that the
currently selected design x1 should be further improved. However, as emphasized
before and quite obvious at this point, these values do not give us an accurate
prediction on the improvement that we should expect to actually obtain.
Considering that the current first node deflection of d1(x
1) = 0.0110 cm is
significantly smaller than the second and third displacement, d2(x
1) = 0.0721 cm
and d3(x
1) = 0.0872 cm, we assume that we are still willing to accept a design that
yields a first node deflection of up to 0.03 cm, provided a reasonable tradeoff or
improvement with respect to d2 or d3. Thus, while setting εV = 0 to maintain the
current volume of the truss, we only change the tolerance value εd1 = 0.02 cm and
then solve the next coordination problem
COP2: Minimize f
2 = [d2(x), V (x)] (5.10)
subject to d1(x) ≤ d1(x1) + εd1 = 0.0310 (5.10a)
V (x) ≤ V (x1) + εV = 2292.5 (5.10b)
x ∈ X (5.10c)
By solving COP2 for the second scenario, we now find a corresponding new
set of Pareto optimal designs, that is depicted in the middle plot of Figure 5.6 and
for which the corresponding performances for the first and third scenario are again
depicted in the left and in the right plot, respectively.
In particular, we note from the left plot that all these new solutions, in
fact, meet the specified upper performance bound on d1 for the first subproblem,
while resulting in a tradeoff between the volume and second node deflection in
COP2. Assuming that our main incentive is still the improvement with respect
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Figure 5.6 In the center, Pareto solutions for COP2 and the second scenario, and
on the left and right, their respective images for the first and third scenario
to the second node deflection d2, we decide not to further improve the structural
volume and, thus, select the highlighted bottommost point as the improved second
design x2 = (1.1754, 1.6582, 2.7837, 2.8298), depicted in Figure 5.7.
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Figure 5.7 Selected Pareto designs x1 for COP1 (left) and x
2 for COP2 (right)
The performances of this new design are given as V (x2) = 2292.5 cm3,
d1(x
2) = 0.0310 cm, d2(x
2) = 0.0411 cm and d3(x
2) = 0.0756 cm, and hence, the
actually achieved tradeoffs can now be computed as
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∆d2(x)
∆d1(x)
=
d2(x
1)− d2(x2)
d1(x2)− d1(x1) =
0.0721− 0.0411
0.0310− 0.0110 = 1.55 (5.11a)
∆d3(x)
∆d1(x)
=
d3(x
1)− d3(x2)
d1(x2)− d1(x1) =
0.0872− 0.0756
0.0310− 0.0110 = 0.58 (5.11b)
As expected, the tradeoff between d1 and d2 achieves a value greater than 1
and, thus, is a favorable one. The smaller tradeoff value between d1 and d3 is not
surprising either as we only solve COP2 which, in fact, does not minimize with
respect to d3. Nevertheless, from the right plot in Figure 5.6 we see that the current
design x2 already gives a reasonable compromise solution with respect to the third
loading scenario that also involves d3. In particular, upon computing the updated
tradeoff ratios λ21 from TOP21 at the new design x
2 and including the additional
constraint d2(x) ≤ d2(x2) + εd2 with (εd1 , εd2 , εV ) = (0.02, 0, 0) into a new TOP31
TOP31: Minimize d3(x) (5.12)
subject to d1(x) ≤ d1(x1) + εd1 = d1(x2) = 0.0310 (5.12a)
d2(x) ≤ d2(x2) + εd2 = 0.0411 (5.12b)
V (x) ≤ V (x2) + εV = 2292.5 (5.12c)
x ∈ X (5.12d)
we obtain a set of new Lagrangean multipliers, yielding the updated tradeoff ratios
T21(x
2) = −∂d2(x)
∂d1(x)
∣∣∣∣
x=x2
= λ21 = 0.7877 (5.13a)
T31(x
2) = −∂d3(x)
∂d1(x)
∣∣∣∣
x=x2
= λ31 = 0 (5.13b)
T32(x
2) = −∂d3(x)
∂d2(x)
∣∣∣∣
x=x2
= λ32 = 0.2481 (5.13c)
Since all these values are now less than a possible tradeoff threshold of 1, we may
conclude that solving the third coordination problem is unlikely to yield significant
further improvement, and thus, our previous discussion suggests to terminate the
solution of this problem with x2 from Figure 5.7 as the final preferred design.
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5.3 Vehicle Layout Configuration in Packaging Optimization
Packaging optimization deals with the spatial arrangement of a given set of
objects into some specified volume. We personally face such problems when packing
our book bag or briefcase to get ready for school or work, or when fitting clothes and
other belonging into a suitcase and that suitcase into our car’s trunk to get ready for
our next vacation. Clearly, these problems also occur in many industrial settings,
for example when a manufacturer of cat food needs to put the produced cans into
boxes, a grocery store supplier loads those boxes onto a truck, and a worker at the
local store takes the cans out of their boxes and arranges their display onto shelves
for their final sale to a customer. In an engineering context, packaging optimization
is also related to layout and configuration design, and the problem that we address
in the following discussion is taken from the particular case of vehicle configuration
design following the treatment in Yi (2005).
In this particular application, we are interested in the layout of a set of ve-
hicle components for a medium-sized truck that needs to be designed for possible
use in both civilian and military situations and environments, thus imposing some
very specific and critical design objectives onto the final truck configuration. As
depicted in Figure 5.8, the components include engine, reformer, transmission, ac-
cumulator, pump, reservoir, fuel tank, and auxiliary power unit (APU), and a total
of 36 decision variables models the respective location and rotational orientation of
these components as well as their overall packaging sequence.
The objectives that we consider are the truck’s ground clearance, its vehicle
dynamics, as well as component maintainability and survivability. A high ground
clearance is important to enable the truck’s flexibility in a variety of different terrains
and is measured as the maximum angle that the truck can climb without interference
with the ground. As vehicle dynamics objective, we employ the maximum lateral
acceleration of the truck before wheel-lift, which must be avoided due to the potential
fatal consequence of a truck roll-over. It is clear, however, that the possibility of a
roll-over increases with the truck’s ground clearance, and consequently, we already
expect to see a conflict between these first two objectives in our later analysis.
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Figure 5.8 Vehicle components for configuration design of a medium-size truck
The component maintainability is defined as index for the ease of mainte-
nance of the truck, for which we require that those components that need to be
handled more frequently, such as the reservoir or fuel tank, are easily accessible.
Finally, with the objective of survivability we refer to the specific military require-
ment that the truck must be capable to resist the attack of bullets and explosives
during combat, so that especially the fuel tank and power unit should be blocked by
other items to be protected from a direct external access. As before, we note that
the objectives of maintainability and survivability are usually in conflict.
A very detailed discussion of this model together with an extensive expla-
nation of the underlying computation and simulation codes is given in the original
reference (Yi, 2005). In particular, due to the high complexity in evaluating the
different objectives for a given packaging sequence and design configuration, this
problem is originally solved by a genetic algorithm that provides the designer or
decision maker with a set of one hundred candidate designs and their correspond-
ing outcomes from among which a final truck layout is to be chosen. Clearly, this
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selection still puts a significant burden on the decision maker who now needs to
consider and suitably compare all these candidates to ultimately select a final and
preferred layout design. In particular, since this problem consists of four objectives
so that the outcome space is four dimensional, a visualization of these outcomes is
only possible if we choose a decomposition into biobjective subproblems, using the
general objective decomposition approach as proposed in the previous chapter.
In Figure 5.9, we show this decomposition of the four-dimensional outcome
space into the two subproblems with ground clearance and vehicle dynamics in the
first plot on the left and maintainability and survivability in the second subproblem
plotted on the right. While the physical interpretation of ground clearance and
vehicle dynamics is given as maximum angle (measured in degrees) and acceleration
(measured in meters per square seconds), the other two objectives are normalized
between 0 and 1 so that their values can be interpreted as percental achievement of
the respective single objective optimum. We also note that, in both cases, the two
objectives exhibit the conflict that we expect from our earlier discussion.
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Figure 5.9 Decomposition of the four-dimensional outcome space of the truck
layout problem into biobjective subproblems with their individual Pareto sets
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Since in this application all outcomes are readily available, we do not need to
formally solve any subproblem or coordination problem but can immediately select
a preferred outcome (∗) from the Pareto set of the first subproblem. Here note that,
because all objectives are subject to maximization, the Pareto sets correspond to the
upper right fronts and are highlighted by black bullets (•) and squares () for the
first and second subproblem, respectively. Similar to the discussion for the previous
examples and Figures 4.3 and 4.4, we also note that the individual Pareto outcomes
for each subproblem are again among the worst outcomes for the respective other
problem, justifying the subsequent coordination step to find a design whose outcome
establishes a better compromise between all four objectives by trading off ground
clearance and vehicle dynamics with maintainability and survivability.
To decide on this tradeoff, we also investigate the objective values at the
current design with a ground clearance of 43.5 degrees, a vehicle dynamics index
of 5.79 m/s2, and maintainability and survivability values of 16% and 41%, respec-
tively. Based on further expert opinion, we can now specify maximal deviations
from each of these values and, as indicated in Figure 5.10, select εgc = 1.5 degrees
for ground clearance and εvd = 0.8 m/s
2 for vehicle dynamics. The resulting set
of ε-Pareto outcomes for the first subproblem and the correspondingly improved
outcomes for the second subproblem are highlighted as circled points in Figure 5.10.
In view of the high importance of survivability, we now select the new high-
lighted point (∗) in Figure 5.10 as the new and final outcome, yielding the new
objective values of 42.21 degrees for ground clearance and 5.72 m/s2 for vehicle
dynamics as well as 52% for maintainability and 81% for survivability. Hence, the
decay of 0.07 m/s2 in vehicle dynamics and 1.29 degrees in ground clearance has
enabled an improvement of 36% in maintainability and 40% in survivability. While
the comparison and interpretation of these changes with respect to the actual truck
layouts, depicted in Figure 5.11, is difficult due to complex dependencies between
the different vehicle characteristics, we only note how the cylinder-shaped fuel tank
has moved from the very exposed side position for the first to a more hidden position
for the second truck layout. Clearly, based on the critical role of a well protected fuel
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Figure 5.10 Subproblem tradeoff and selected outcomes for truck layout problem
tank for the overall survivability of both the truck’s driver and its passengers, this
might be one of the reasons for the significant improvement in survivability of the
second over the first truck layout. Any further discussion, however, again requires
specific expert knowledge on this particular application.
Figure 5.11 Vehicle configurations of outcomes selected for truck layout problem
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5.4 Seat and Head Restraint Selection in Vehicle System Design
According to the most recent data released by the U.S. Department of Trans-
portation, 43,443 people died in motor vehicle crashes in the year 2005 (Fatality
Analysis Reporting System (FARS), 2006). To reduce the deaths and injuries that
occur in car and other traffic accidents, the Vehicle Research Center (VRC) of the
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) conducts research on crash testing to
supply consumers with information about car crashworthiness and car manufactur-
ers with recommendations on improving their adopted design specifications.
In this context, we consider the selection of a seat and head restraint system
following the recent Research Council for Automobile Repair (RCAR) standard for
evaluating and rating the ability of seats and head restraints to prevent neck injury
in moderate and low-speed car crashes (Insurance Insitute for Highway Safety, 2006).
The procedures and criteria were developed by the International Insurance Whiplash
Prevention Group (IIWPG), and the data underlying our analysis is provided by
courtesy of Ford Research & Advance Engineering Laboratories (Fu, 2006).
This data consists of 510 design solutions that are evaluated by four per-
formance criteria as developed by the IIWPG, namely the forward acceleration of
the seat occupant’s torso (T1 acceleration), the time to head restraint contact, the
neck shear force, and the neck tension force. The latter two are considered jointly
and combined by an equally weighted vector sum, thereby yielding a multiobjective
program with three objectives. Since the performance evaluation of any additional
design would necessitate to conduct a new crash test and, thus, is not possible
anymore at this stage of the design process, an actual optimization is replaced by
the mere selection of the preferred available design solution, using the objective
decomposition and coordination outlined in Procedure 4.2.2 in Section 4.2.3.
Let I = {1, 2, 3}, and f = (f1, f2, f3) denote the vector criterion including T1
acceleration (f1), time to head restraint contact (f2), and neck forces (f3), all nor-
malized to values between 0 and 1. We completely decompose I into I1 = {1, 2}, I2 =
{1, 3}, I3 = {2, 3}, and, accordingly, let f1 = (f1, f2), f2 = (f1, f3), f3 = (f2, f3),
and ε1 = (ε1, ε2), ε
2 = (ε1, ε3), ε
3 = (ε2, ε3). Finally, we let X = {x1, . . . , x510} be
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the set of designs and denote E = |E(X, f, ε)|, Ej = |E(X, f j , εj)| for j = 1, 2, 3,
Ejk = |E(X, f j , εj)∩E(X, fk, εk)| for j 6= k = 1, 2, 3, and E123 = |
⋂3
j=1 E(X, f
j , εj)|.
Table 5.2 shows these cardinalities for different choices of ε, and Figure 5.12 depicts
all 510 designs evaluated for MOP and the three biobjective subproblems BOP1,
BOP2, and BOP3 to provide illustration of our following discussion.
Table 5.2 Solution set sizes of MOP and DMOP for design selection problem
ε1 ε2 ε3 E E1 E2 E3 E12 E13 E23 E123
1 0.0 0.0 0.0 36 17 7 5 3 2 1 0
2 0.1 0.0 0.0 84 54 27 5 20 3 1 0
3 0.5 0.0 0.0 384 380 263 5 263 5 2 2
4 0.0 0.1 0.0 94 69 7 13 6 8 2 2
5 0.0 0.5 0.0 410 399 7 183 7 173 4 4
6 0.0 0.0 0.1 118 17 97 73 9 7 69 6
7 0.0 0.0 0.5 432 17 422 425 15 16 421 15
8 0.0 0.1 0.1 160 69 97 78 24 22 69 18
9 0.1 0.1 0.1 205 129 119 78 55 35 71 32
10 0.03 0.03 0.03 77 45 28 16 11 4 11 1
Step 1: In this initialization step, we select ε1 = ε2 = ε3 = 0 so that all
coordination parameters for each of the subproblems are initially equal to zero.
Step 2: Based on pairwise comparisons, we find the true efficient sets
E(X, f j , 0) = E(X, f j) with set cardinalities as listed in Row 1 in Table 5.2. Note
that we obtain 36 efficient solutions for MOP, of which E1 = 17, E2 = 7, and E3 = 5
are also efficient for BOP1, BOP2, and BOP3, respectively. In particular, this means
that 7 solutions are efficient for the complete, but not for any subproblem.
Step 3a: While the intersections of the solution sets for any two subprob-
lems contain E12 = 3, E13 = 2, or E23 = 1 solutions and, in particular, are nonempty,
there does not exist a common design that is efficient for all three subproblems si-
multaneously, E123 = 0. Hence, we need to relax at least one of the εj , and since
190
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Figure 5.12 Decomposition of the three-dimensional outcome space of the design
selection problem into biobjective subproblems with their individual Pareto sets
the smallest set contains E3 = 5 solutions, obtained for the third subproblem BOP3
that combines the second and third objective, we subsequently choose either ε2 or
ε3. For completeness, however, we also note that upon relaxing ε1 = 0.1, the in-
tersection of all three solution sets remains empty, and even for the relatively large
value of ε1 = 0.5, we only find E123 = 2 designs as potential candidate solutions.
The corresponding other cardinalities are listed in Rows 2 and 3 of Table 5.2.
Step 2(2): Rows 4/5 and 6/7 in Table 5.2 show the number of new solu-
tions when relaxing ε2 and ε3, respectively, for repeating values of 0.1 and 0.5. In
particular, now the number E123 of common solutions in the intersection of all three
subproblems increases from 2 and 4 for relaxation of ε2 to 6 and 15 for ε3.
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Step 3b and 4a: A remaining drawback of these solutions, however, is the
relatively large relaxation of only one εj , whereas better compromise solution might
exist for smaller but simultaneous relaxation of several εj . Hence, we once more
repeat Step 2, before finally concluding this discussion.
Step 2(3): Row 8 in Table 5.2 shows that a small simultaneous relaxation
of both ε2 = ε3 = 0.1 is sufficient to find E123 = 18 and, thus, more solutions than
for a separate relaxation by 0.5 in either one. Moreover, although the individual
relaxation of ε1 = 0.1 in Row 2 did not result in an increase in the number of
common solutions for all three subproblems, in combination with ε2 and ε3 it does
and now almost doubles this number from earlier 18 to now 32 solutions.
Step 3b and 4b: Hence, to select a final solution, we can further reduce the
current values ε1 = ε2 = ε3 = 0.1 until finding a unique solution in the intersection
of the three individual subproblems. In particular, by choosing ε1 = ε2 = ε3 = 0.03,
only one of the previously 18 solutions remains in the common solution set, as
given in Row 10 in Table 5.2. Therefore, we terminate this exemplary illustration
of our procedure and the optimization-free coordination method with this solution,
corresponding to the highlighted point in Figure 5.12, as preferred final design.
In general, Steps 3b and 4b of Procedure 4.2.2 do not require that the fi-
nal solution is always obtained as a singleton. In fact, for most decision making
situations we recommend that this procedure only be used to identify a (suitably
small) number of candidate solutions for ultimate consideration based on specific
problem knowledge and expert opinion. Without this expertise, however, we decide
to conclude this example without any additional discussion.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
During the last few decades, multiobjective programming has received much
attention for both its numerous theoretical advances as well as its continued success
in modeling real-life optimization and decision problems with multiple criteria in
various fields including the management and engineering sciences. A common char-
acteristic of these problems is that, in general, there does not exist a unique optimal
solution, but a set of efficient decisions or nondominated outcomes from among
which a decision maker chooses based on personal preferences or additional criteria
not included in the original optimization model. While a great variety of approaches
exist to generate parts of these two sets, however, choosing a final preferred solution
still remains difficult, especially if the numbers of solutions and objectives are too
large to allow the effective use of currently existing decision making techniques. The
research that we here present can in various ways be related to this observation, and
its main accomplishments fall into the following two major parts.
At first, we pursue the mathematical investigation of multiobjective pro-
grams that usually elides the role of a decision maker and merely focuses on the
theoretical characterization of the sets of efficient decisions or nondominated out-
comes and the development of different optimization techniques for their generation,
based on the nature of the underlying feasible set, objective functions, and the cho-
sen concept of optimality. Based on the equivalence between partial orders and
certain classes of convex cones, much attention has been devoted to the case of cone
efficiency where, in large part, the cone is polyhedral and described by a linear sys-
tem of inequalities as induced by a linear function or matrix. General domination
structures, however, are a more flexible means to describe preference or domination
relationships and provide the fundamental framework for this part of our work.
We present a diverse collection of new results that characterize the nondom-
inated set of a multiobjective program when the underlying domination structure is
defined in terms of different cones. In particular, we extend the case of a constant
polyhedral cone to constant and variable nonpolyhedral cones, and to translated
polyhedral cones that can be used to also describe epsilon-nondominated outcomes.
In each of these three cases, we start with an analysis of the associated cone represen-
tation, discuss some related cone properties and investigate possible generalizations
of several results originally known for only polyhedral cones. Some of our main
results include that every cone can be described by a positively homogeneous func-
tion, that the defined variable cones belong to the class of Bishop-Phelps cones,
and that translated polyhedral cones can also be characterized as polyhedral sets.
For a further characterization and the generation of corresponding nondominated
outcomes, we modify scalarization methods that are originally formulated for the
Pareto case and extend the associated optimality conditions for domination by gen-
eral cones and epsilon-nondominance. We derive some more specific conditions for
the variable-cone model and develop several new approaches that also allow the
intentional generation of a merely approximate solution. Wherever possible, we il-
lustrate our findings on some analytical, graphical, or practical example and offer
an outlook to topics for possible further research in the concluding discussion.
While advancing various theoretical aspects of multiobjective programming,
we envision that the previous results also have several potential implications for prac-
tical decision making and preference modeling, in particular. While it is undoubtful
that preferences of decision makers in general cannot be described completely and
therefore must remain at least partially unmodeled, our variable-cone model illus-
trates that several limitations of the current restriction to constant polyhedral cones
can be removed if we also allow for variable domination. Some possible further re-
search into this direction is proposed along with the relevant discussion within the
text. Furthermore, we believe that the importance of epsilon-nondominance is usu-
ally underestimated as simply a concept of approximation or suboptimality, in spite
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of its high relevance to objective decompositions, decision tradeoffs and compromis-
ing between scenarios as discussed in the second part of this dissertation.
Therein we continue with the investigation of Pareto multiobjective pro-
grams and employ the concepts of function and problem decompositions to examine
the consequences of decomposing the original objective function into a collection of
new functions that consist of only a subset of the original objective function compo-
nents. In particular, in analyzing the corresponding efficiency relationships between
the original problem and the decomposed subproblems, we observe that efficient
decisions for the latter are also efficient for the former and that this relation, in
general, cannot be reversed unless we relax efficiency to epsilon-efficiency. Several
further results are derived for either scalarization of the original and subproblem
objectives or for adding objectives as additional constraints to allow the overall co-
ordination of efficiency tradeoffs, and we obtain that both approaches are capable
to completely characterize the efficient set of the original problem.
Based on the latter result and reintroducing participation of a decision
maker, we formulate a first interactive decision making procedure that utilizes the
above problem decomposition and subproblem coordination to support the solution
of a large-scale problem by only working with the collection of smaller-sized sub-
problems. The procedure assumes that the decision maker is capable to articulate
his preferences for both the selection of intermediate solutions and the specifica-
tion of additional coordination parameters that are used for trading off between
the different subproblems. In addition to the possibility of assessing these tradeoffs
through a sensitivity analysis for every intermediate decision, we further enhance the
initially nonhierarchical procedure by a hierarchical coordination to reduce some of
the preference information required from the decision maker, and we demonstrate
its use on a mathematical programming example. Also taking into account that
many real-life decision problems are limited in computational resources or simply
too complex to enable a traditional subproblem optimization, we finally suggest a
third procedure for the pure selection of a final solution from a given candidate set
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or population which may be generated by sampling and simulation techniques or
other heuristic approaches such as an evolutionary or genetic algorithm.
To illustrate applications for each of the three procedures, we describe four
real-life problems from financial optimization and engineering design and provide
some careful discussion in support of our theoretical findings. The first two prob-
lems are drawn from portfolio and structural optimization and formulated as mul-
tiscenario programs which are solved using the optimization-based hierarchical and
nonhierarchical coordination method, respectively. In both cases, we show that the
procedures provide convenient methods to arrive at final solutions that establish
reasonable tradeoffs between the different scenarios. The other two examples are
motivated from vehicle design and described as selection problems for which we need
to choose a single final outcome from a finite set that is obtained through simula-
tions and a genetic algorithm. Using a modified version of the previous procedures
in one and the third procedure in the other case, we illustrate how a decision maker
can arrive at a preferred decision for these two problems as well.
While the first two applications reveal that the additional information ob-
tained from the proposed sensitivity analysis, at the moment, cannot provide the
decision maker with accurate predictions on remaining tradeoffs between subprob-
lems, we are confident that a further analysis in continuation of our current efforts
can bring new insights and lead to additional improvements of our proposed method-
ology. As of now, however, we believe that our procedures are already well suited for
practical decision making by offering the benefits of a simplified problem perception,
enhanced preference articulation, and facilitated decision making due to the overall
reduction of dimensionality. In particular, for decompositions into biobjective sub-
problems, our methods enable the simultaneous consideration of multiple objectives
without their aggregation or scalarization but, at the same time, maintaining the ca-
pability to visualize Pareto curves, which is of vital importance for decision makers
without strong analytical training. A method validation for large-scale problems,
however, together with several other remaining issues as outlined in the respective
discussions is postponed for inquiry in the near or later future.
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For now, we decide to conclude this text with the following final remark.
Without a doubt, the preparation and writing of this dissertation is influenced by
a series of different decisions which reflect numerous compromises and tradeoffs
in selection and arrangement of the included materials. If this outcome supports
understanding, achieves appreciation, stimulates interest or motivates continuation
of any of the work presented, then we meet our primary objective and are content
to come to an end.
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